Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

197. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, May 17, 1957, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, May 17, 1957, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Reinhardt, C
  • Mr. Bowie, S/P
  • Mr. Wilcox, IO
  • Mr. Smith, S/AE
  • Mr. Walmsley, IO
  • Mr. Stelle, S/P
  • Mr. Greene, S/S
  • Mr. Wolf, RA²
  • Mr. Owsley, UNP
  • Mr. Baker, UNP
• Disarmament Staff
  • Governor Stassen
  • Ambassador Peaslee
  • Col. Firehock
  • Col. Willis
  • Capt. Fuetsch³
  • Mr. Weiler
  • Mr. Lippmann
• Atomic Energy Commission
  • Chairman Strauss
  • Capt. Gardner
• Central Intelligence Agency
  • Mr. Allen Dulles
  • Mr. Amory
• Department of Defense
  • Secretary Wilson
  • General Loper
  • General Fox
• The White House
  • General Cutler

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting stating that it seemed desirable before crystallizing any position to have a general assessment of the situation from Governor Stassen and to learn the background of his thinking with regard to the proposals which he had made for consideration within the government. Following such an exposition and clarification of Governor Stassen’s proposals, he suggested that the Departments involved would probably want a few days to think over the situation, and that a further meeting might be held around the middle of next week to consider the United States position. He asked whether Mr. Stassen believed the Soviets were interested in getting somewhere.

Mr. Stassen said he believed the Soviets were interested in attempting to reach agreement, and that all of the western four delegations were of this opinion. He mentioned that Zorin had told him the night before that he was returning to Moscow for consultations during the recess.

Mr. Allen Dulles asked whether Soviet motives in seeking agreement appeared to be basic or merely tactical.

Mr. Stassen replied that their motives appeared to be basic and arose in part from the fact that in the cases of Suez and Hungary the Soviets looked down the barrel of atomic war.

Mr. Wilson suggested that the Soviets were not in an easy position in the arms race, and cited the fact that they had recently reneged on their bonds, to which Mr. Stassen agreed but added they had reneged on their bonds before.

Mr. Allen Dulles asked if the Soviets appeared to be in a hurry to reach agreement. Mr. Stassen said not exceptionally so, but also they were not wanting to stall. Correspondingly, he said, the Soviets were constantly wondering whether we want to stall and whether we are serious.

Mr. Wilson read a letter he had addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting their comments on various zones of aerial inspection.⁴

Mr. Stassen was asked if he would care to give a general report and exposition of his proposals of May 9.⁵

Mr. Stassen expressed appreciation for the opportunity to do so. He stated that since his consultations here at Easter the US delegation had sought to move toward implementation of the policy objectives set forth at that time; namely, (1) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to multinational hands, (2) to increase safeguards against surprise attack, and (3) to open up the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The delegation had begun with that guidance to re-examine our position and that of other countries.

The Soviet proposals of April 30 had been presented to the US delegation privately on April 26. In three successive bilateral discussions following, the US delegation had sought to examine the exact meaning of the Soviet proposals, the reasons that lay back of them, their negotiability and their acceptability to other countries. The mutual interests of the USSR and the western powers had been the theme the delegation had sought to emphasize in these discussions.⁶

Following these consultations each member of the US delegation had drawn up a paper recommending elements of a first stage plan that might be acceptable to the USSR, France, the UK and Germany and which might fulfill the priority objectives of the United States.⁷ French views were given careful consideration because Moch has informed the US delegation that France will decide in two months whether to embark upon a weapons program. If it does so, Germany will join in such a program or follow closely. If these two go, many other nations will follow suit. On the basis of these factors and studies, on the basis of the statements at the NATO meeting of Foreign Ministers and in response to Secretary Dulles’ request for recommendations in concrete terms, the delegation had arrived at the recommendations transmitted on May 9. The delegation believed the British and others would, in the first instance, want more than these recommendations called for, but that they would settle for this kind of program as a final position.

Governor Stassen then proceeded to read paragraph-by-paragraph his recommendations of May 9, adding comments on certain of the paragraphs as follows:

Paragraph 1. The suspension provision was particularly important to fourth countries, who under it might be more easily induced to abstain from nuclear weapons programs on a trial basis.

Paragraph 2. This prohibition on use of nuclear weapons is the key to the program as a whole. The French and the Federal Republic will take this provision, and if they do so the other countries concerned will come along. Moch had given him a letter last night, cleared with Pineau and read by the French Council of Ministers affirming French willingness to accept such an abstention in the kind of program Mr. Stassen proposed. Mr. Stassen had talked with the German ambassador who will report back on the question, but the indications are that the Federal Republic would also abstain with some objections from the German Straus.

Paragraph 3. This limitation on use would not be worded to include the US, UK and USSR by name, but would be worded to have this practical effect in any proposal put forward. While others were prohibiting use, we would thus be limiting use. Such an undertaking would serve to bring the Charter up-to-date for the atomic age. It would be only a moral prohibition, but it would establish a moral climate which would permit others to abstain from the manufacture and use of such weapons.

Paragraph 4. The provision for transfer of stockpiles to peaceful uses would take effect only after a year during which all materials could be gotten into weapons. It would serve to allay French, German and Soviet suspicions about the continued ability to produce nuclear weapons after the cut-off date from existing stockpiles. This provision, however, would be tough to negotiate with the UK because they want to attain major nuclear capability. The UK, however, must be permitted only limited nuclear capability if France is to abstain.

Paragraph 5. This paragraph adds to present policy a clear statement regarding retention of a substantial nuclear capability. It may be desirable to put in a percentage to further define this principle.

Paragraph 6. Elaborating upon aerial inspection, Mr. Stassen stated that the Soviets in effect are saying that “if you will increase our security, we will increase yours”. The greatest Soviet fear is that in Europe, states other than the US or USSR will start a war which would involve the two. The Soviets are aware that our main concern is surprise attack over the polar regions. They are willing now for the first time to trade, on the toughest bargaining terms possible, security for us in the north for security for themselves in Europe.

The Soviets will not give us access to the centers of their power for aerial photography, but they will give us the arctic circle a zone 2½ degrees east of their present proposed zone in Europe, though they would initially ask more in all respect. It is significant that their latest proposed zone in Europe for the first time departs from the demarcation line in Germany and its center point runs half way through East Germany. A movement of 2½ degrees would place the center of the zone on the German-Polish border.

On our side a corresponding zone should be granted in Alaska, Canada and the United States. The US is open now. There are only six spots in the US which planes cannot now fly over and photograph: Hanford, Las Vegas, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Savannah and the White House. At present airplanes can from the sides of all six of these zones photograph the entire zone legally. In defining a zone in the US we should stay away from the US industrial heartland; i.e., Detroit, Pittsburgh, St. Louis triangle, but must of necessity include some, but not all, SAC bases. Similarly, we must keep out of the Soviet heartland but include some of its long range bases.

In area, China and the Soviet Union equal the area of the free world. Mile for mile, exchanges in areas of comparable importance are accordingly required. As a second phase, Mr. Stassen was thinking of an exchange of inspection over China for inspection over the Seato countries. Then might come the rest of Russia (except for its heartland) for the rest of Europe and North Africa. Finally, the heartland of the US might be inspected at the time of extension of the system to the heartland of the USSR. It would be inadvisable, however, to specify such later steps in the present negotiations.

Paragraph 8. These ground control posts would extend over the Leningard complex and to the Moscow line. We should, however, ask for more first.

Paragraph 11. The same formula could not be applicable across the board because France and the UK do not have the reserve armaments that we do, and in the case of Germany the question would merely be that of a ceiling upon new armaments and would not involve any cuts at all.

Paragraph 13. There would be no mobile posts until one year after the agreement had gone into effect.

Paragraph 14. The proposed European zone would not include France beyond Paris, the southern parts of Italy, Greece or Turkey, the northern part of Iceland or the UK. The delegation proposed a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in a limited zone in Europe as a substitute for the Soviet demand for a prohibition of use of nuclear weapons or a prohibition on stationing them outside national borders. This prohibition on stationing them in a limited zone would be essential to get a French or German abstention from weapons production, since neither France nor Germany could abstain if nuclear weapons were stationed throughout the other.

Paragraph 18. Working out this test moratorium would be critical in the fourth country problem. An initial suspension would be necessary to get fourth countries in. A further step would then be necessary in a year to hold fourth countries in the agreement.

Paragraph 19. This second stage provision was one of the most important. You could at this point say adherence of a unified Germany, for example, was essential, or put in any other political conditions you wished such as adherence of a unified Korea or adherence of a government satisfactory to the US in China. It would seem realistic that at this point with 15% of major armaments in depots, force levels down and being verified, tests suspended, inspection extending part way into the USSR, and a cut off being worked out, you could put in political conditions.

Paragraph 21. The reason for stating the percentages of reduction in Europe is to show Europe the US had no intention of withdrawing from Europe, and by inference no intention of withdrawing in other areas of the world.

Paragraph 23. The proposal is only for a technical committee because all you could now get would be a technical committee.

Paragraph 25. This is important as a safeguard against surprise attack because you cannot allow, for example, Soviet submarines and maneuvers extending to the coast of the US without notice.

In concluding his presentation, Mr. Stassen reaffirmed that the program could, in the opinion of the delegation, be negotiated, and that it would fulfill US objectives.

It was then suggested by the Secretary that each paragraph again be considered in a period of questions which might be addressed to Mr. Stassen regarding the meaning of specific provisions. Major questions raised with respect to the various paragraphs were as follows:

Paragraph 1: Admiral Strauss asked whether advance notice of suspension was mandatory, and if so, how much. Governor Stassen replied that none was necessary.

Paragraph 2: Secretary Dulles asked whether it was intended that this prohibition of use of nuclear weapons should survive a war. Mr. Stassen said yes. Secretary Dulles asked whether it would then mean that we would use but our allies could not use such weapons in war. Mr. Stassen said we could if we wished in that event invoke the suspension clause. Admiral Strauss mentioned that there were developing peaceful uses of large nuclear explosions.

Mr. Strauss asked whether fourth countries would be prohibited from research and development. Mr. Stassen said you could not prohibit what you cannot inspect, and accordingly could not prohibit research.

Mr. Strauss asked whether they could develop nuclear weapons short of tests and whether they could manufacture non-nuclear hardware. Mr. Stassen said they could not manufacture such hardware, and the extent to which they could have programs of development would depend on the legal definitions agreed upon.

Mr. Wilson asked whether fourth countries could possess nuclear weapons. Mr. Stassen said paragraph 27 would not permit import or export of anything not allowable under the treaty. The delegation believed the Soviets would have to spread weapons if they were allowed to spread in the free world, and that the Soviets fear what a fourth country could do in initiating a US-USSR conflict in that event.

Secretary Dulles asked if the provision covered possession of such weapons did it mean they could not be used in war. Mr. Stassen replied that under the suspension clause all limitations would be out the window in any major war.

Paragraph 3: Secretary Dulles asked whether a limitation of this kind would have much effect in keeping the French from making weapons, and whether the moral limitation might not help the Soviets by going against the idea of adequate defenses for the western allies.

Mr. Stassen said such a provision would, in his opinion, help in securing the abstention of the French and other fourth countries. Many countries believe we are engrossed with nuclear weapons. Especially they read our statements about the cheapness of such weapons and fear we would exercise no restraint in their use. There is a need for us to establish a code of circumstances relating to their use. Some want us to limit ourselves to using them if they are used against us. The US delegation has privately pointed out, however, that such a limitation would, for example, make it impossible for us to stop China from going into Southeast Asia, and that as a deterrent we need such weapons. The provision has limited meaning but it has a reassuring effect.

Secretary Dulles agreed that it would reassure, but was not sure whether it would not also create a moral commitment on our part to keep conventional forces to repel attack.

Mr. Stassen said it would be possible to safeguard against this inference.

Paragraph 4: Admiral Strauss asked whether the wording meant the commitment to the cut-off was to precede or to follow agreement upon the inspection system.

Secretary Dulles said the provision might be clearer if stated in such a way as to reverse the order of commitments.

Mr. Stassen said it was like a commitment to pay a man one hundred dollars next time you met him in Chicago plus the further commitment to try to get to Chicago.

Admiral Strauss said the provision on immediate transfer of stockpiles was impractical from the standpoint of maintaining stockpiles required for efficient operation.

Mr. Wilson emphasized the need for clarity, and the difficulties that could follow an imprecise agreement. He said there should be no loopholes.

Mr. Stassen added that the provision did not prevent refabrication.

Admiral Strauss said he had examined the Subcommittee record and would like to discuss with Mr. Stassen privately some of the cautions necessary in discussion of refabrication. He also noted use of the term “nuclear material” in the cut off provision, a much wider term than fissionable materials.

Mr. Stassen said no distinction was intended, and this was an editing mistake in the cable.

Admiral Strauss suggested that the time might have come to clarify the meaning of transfers on an “equitable” basis.

Secretary Wilson believed we should try to make reductions on matching terms by quantity.

Mr. Stassen pointed out we are not committed to transfer anything unless there is agreement on what is equitable, but that the hope of reductions by the three nuclear powers makes it possible for fourth countries to accept a commitment to abstain.

Secretary Dulles noted that paragraph 4 did not mention the UK problem. The provision that the three powers had to make transfers to peaceful uses seemed to contradict the provision that the three would retain very substantial nuclear capability, since the UK could not attain substantial capability if transfers were required.

Mr. Stassen said he believed we could take care of the UK by the formula on equitable transfers, and that it could also be several years before such transfers began. He further believed the UK would want to make at least some transfers since its position as a member of the club of three would make it unwilling to say it was so low in supply that it could not transfer anything.

Paragraph 6: Secretary Dulles said he doubted there would be time for discussion of this question of aerial inspection in any detail.

Mr. Wilson agreed, saying the Joint Chiefs would evaluate this question for him within the near future.

Secretary Dulles asked the meaning of the reference to “the approved method”.

Mr. Stassen said these involved designated ports of entry, taking monitors aboard, establishing bases for landings, and abiding by rules of air safety. He said the Joint Chiefs had worked this out in a paper of August 30, 1955 following the Geneva meeting.⁸

Secretary Dulles asked if Mr. Stassen’s proposal covered means of communication.

Mr. Stassen said Mr. Fiske of the Bell Laboratories was chairman of a task force which had worked out this aspect. Their plan provided a method by which failure of a communications station would itself be a warning.⁹

Secretary Wilson said in an international document the provisions might be easier to sell if they did not have President Eisenhower’s name attached, and merely said an agreed method.

Mr. Stassen said this was purely an internal document.

Secretary Dulles said that Mr. Stassen should have his staff put the proposal in the form of an international document.

Mr. Stassen said the delegation would do a draft on the basis of decisions to be taken.

Secretary Dulles asked the basis for measurement of the zones as between Russia and ourselves. Mr. Stassen replied that it should be mile for mile of comparable importance with the USSR and China measured against the free world, and that this appeared to be a logical basis since the areas were the same and the Soviets would be anxious to look at widely dispersed points in the free world such as North Africa, Dahran, and the Philippines. He added they would not forget that the Philippines were bombed from Australia in World War II.

Mr. Allen Dulles emphasized the need to equate strategic factors.

Secretary Wilson said area in square miles was not the complete answer and such factors as population as well as strategic importance should be weighed or we would be trading a horse for a rabbit.

Mr. Stassen pointed out the Soviet fear of aerial photography of their heartland, and suspicion that the United States after getting the pictures would withdraw from the surprise attack warning system. Especially, he said, they fear developments in Europe.

Secretary Dulles asked why if the Soviets fear Europe most Mr. Stassen’s proposed areas did not include US bases in the UK, for example.

Mr. Stassen said the Soviets feel the US will act responsibly, and that even an irresponsible administration would not attack unless prepared to follow through on land in Europe to finish them off. The Soviets fear most situations that could arise in Germany or Poland, and look to the general situation in Europe as the greatest danger.

Mr. Allen Dulles said this surprised him.

Secretary Dulles said it surprised him, too.

Mr. Allen Dulles said their propaganda at least reflected fear more of US bases.

Mr. Stassen said they appeared to be concerned about our bases only as they might be used as an outgrowth of a war begun by other states.

Paragraph 8: Secretary Dulles noted that ground posts were to be established beyond the zone of aerial inspection and asked whether this was feasible and wise.

Mr. Stassen said he did not believe the French and Germans would accept aerial inspection unless by some device we are able to get further into the USSR than the Soviets will accept aerial photography. Ground posts would extend the range of coverage.

Secretary Wilson recalled that this idea was proposed by the Soviets themselves.

Mr. Stassen said the Soviets are uneasy about even what the zones of inspection they proposed in their April 30 paper means for their regime, but they have concluded the increased security of an agreement would be worth the risk. Mr. Stassen added that he believed with such an opening up of the region the Soviets would lose Poland by the kind of evolutionary liberation of which the Secretary had spoken.

Secretary Dulles asked whether we could get radar at these posts.

Mr. Stassen said no, that we could get radar installations only in the zones of aerial inspection.

Mr. Cutler asked as an example what a ground control post would do in New York.

Mr. Stassen said it would serve only to give warning of the embarkation of any expeditionary force. The Soviet proposal for such posts at points of embarkation emphasizes their fear of a ground follow up for any attack.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented that weather conditions are such over much of the Soviet Union that ground posts would be needed to supplement aerial inspection.

Secretary Wilson said ground posts in the US would be quite unpopular and it would take time to sell the idea.

Mr. Stassen recalled that while polls showed only 40% of the American people would have been prepared to accept the Eisenhower plan when it was advanced, this percentage subsequently grew.

Paragraph 9: Secretary Dulles observed that this proposal would require elaboration.

General Fox asked if the exchange of blueprints was to precede verification. Mr. Stassen said verification would in the plan begin 9 months following the exchange.

In response to a question as to the meaning of blueprints, Mr. Stassen said they were in effect an order of battle, and that the Joint Chiefs’ paper of August 30, 1955¹⁰ spelled out the definition.

Paragraph 10: Secretary Wilson said he was bothered by the proposed 15% reduction in military budgets because money is of different value at different times, and because figures on budgets are not reliable. He mentioned that the Japanese had two budgets to conceal their preparations for World War II.

Secretary Dulles said the provision was totally meaningless, since expenditures could for example be transferred to the constituent states of the USSR. He assumed Mr. Stassen had included the idea as a harmless concession to the French.

Mr. Stassen said he had done it partly for that reason, but partly also as across check upon other means of inspection. His task groups had recommended checks on (1) arms, (2) men and (3) budgets, asserting none was completely reliable, and the third least reliable, but the cross checks afforded by the three constituted a pretty thorough system.

Secretary Dulles said the Soviets could easily compel their factories to produce at half price, whereas General Motors would not do that.

Secretary Wilson said there had been a 15% increase in two years in prices of¹¹ metals and essential elements for defense.

Admiral Strauss asked whether nuclear delivery systems included submarines.

Mr. Stassen said yes.

Secretary Wilson suggested a provision for disclosure of the budget as a check without promising to do anything about the budget.

Mr. Stassen said you would probably have to agree to do something to get access to the Soviet budget.

Paragraph 12: Admiral Strauss asked whether this paragraph applies to both nuclear and conventional. Mr. Stassen said it did. Secretary Wilson again said it was important to make all paragraphs clear.

Paragraph 13: Admiral Strauss asked if the inspection teams are to go in only after a year.

Mr. Stassen said mobile teams go in at that time, but that you would have ground posts from the outset.

Admiral Strauss asked whether the mobile teams would only look once at the end of a year. Mr. Stassen said no, they would continue to inspect continuously after that date.

Secretary Dulles asked whether the teams would verify the full inventory of armaments or only the part laid up in storage.

Mr. Stassen said they would verify the entire inventory of armaments and also force levels. The placement of armaments in internationally supervised storage could be verified as it was done.

Secretary Dulles said he had real skepticism about verifying inventories and asked Wilson if he knew yet what he had by way of inventory. Wilson said he was closer to it all the time, but after Korea it was pretty difficult.

Mr. Stassen pointed out the storage provision gave a very limited margin of error and that we would retain tremendous nuclear capability while beginning the opening of the USSR.

Paragraph 14: Secretary Dulles observed that the Soviets would be eager to get such a provision prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons, and that he would like to tie that in with the reunification of Germany.

Mr. Stassen said continuation of such a commitment could be tied in, but unless we do something now to restrain stationing weapons there we will not get abstention from weapons production by the French and Germans.

Mr. Bowie said he would think France and Germany would be more willing to abstain if we keep our weapons there.

Mr. Stassen said France will fear Germany might take over our weapons on its soil.

Secretary Wilson asked if anybody had figured out how you unify a country when half its economy is communized and the other half free.

Mr. Allen Dulles said Austria had been unified.

Mr. Stassen said paragraph 14 is essential to get French abstention, and necessary to get us protection from Soviet surprise attack since they believe the greatest danger is here. He believed the greatest leverage on the problem of German reunification could be gained by threatening to lift the abstention in a year.

Paragraph 15: Secretary Dulles noted there were no problems of interpretation here but he had certain policy questions.

Mr. Stassen said future stages may not move at all, but we must show fourth countries we will go further if we can. We must also by designating a force level show them we have no intention of withdrawing anywhere in the second stage.

Paragraph 18: Admiral Strauss said the Soviets should be required to meet the conditions mentioned in the paragraph before the suspension of tests. The year suspension would seriously affect the laboratories and test organization.

Mr. Stassen said we must act now on tests to stop France, which will otherwise decide on its weapons program in two months and test in 18 months. The laboratories could work 12 months on the results of the last test and on future plans. This step would bring world opinion behind the US position and afford a boost toward further agreement.

Admiral Strauss said once there was a moratorium, we could not because of this public opinion resume tests, and we would toss out all possibilities of gaining further information such as we gained, for example, in learning to make clean weapons.

Secretary Wilson suggested it might be possible to have certain limits established.

Paragraph 19: Secretary Dulles said the proposals became rather problematical here, and these were merely indicative of an intent to proceed. He observed that we are operating in a field where public opinion is powerful and it is hard not to fulfill expectations.

Secretary Wilson said if you plan too far ahead you lay the groundwork for future misunderstanding, and that a government cannot bind succeeding governments.

Secretary Dulles said that Secretary Wilson need not give a lot of study to these later phases and should not be delayed in his analysis of the first stage by awaiting conclusions regarding these.

Secretary Wilson said he wished the second phases did not exist.

Mr. Stassen said the question cut two ways and it was equally important to show that we will go on, and that we will not go too far.

Secretary Dulles said study only the paragraphs through 18 and the subsequent paragraphs which relate to the first phase.

Secretary Wilson recalled the problems created for both State and Defense by leaks which resulted from planning far in advance a year ago. He could have a study of the first phase, however, by the latter part of next week.

It was agreed that further consideration should be given to the proposals at that time.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–1757. Secret. Drafted by Baker. Another account of this meeting by Cutler is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Disarmament Talks. See also footnote 1, infra.
2. Joseph J. Wolf.
3. Captain Bernhart A. Fuetsch, member of Stassen’s disarmament staff.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. See Document 195.
6. For summaries of the U.S.–USSR bilateral sessions, April 26 and 27, see Documents 187 and 188. A summary of a May 2 session, in telegram 5964 from London, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5–257)
7. Not found in Department of State files.
8. Not found in Department of State files.
9. The final report of the task force on communications, contained in “A Plan for a Comprehensive Armament and Armed Force Inspection System, 20 January 1956,” pp. 75–90, is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Comprehensive Inspection Plan)
10. Not found in Department of State files.
11. The words “prices of” are inserted in handwriting on the source text.