Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

188. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, April 28, 1957—1 p.m.

5854. USDEL Disarmament No. 151.

1. Following are highlights of bilateral meeting between Zorin and Stassen each accompanied by six members delegations at Lancaster House, afternoon April 27. Full account being pouched.²

2. Stassen gave USDEL provisional and preliminary reaction to Soviet memo of April 26.³ Acknowledged impression seriousness of proposals for partial agreement but said memo revealed many difficult issues which would present hard negotiating problems and may mean agreement impossible.

3. Stassen stated Soviet formula for prohibition on use of atomic weapons unacceptable in its present form. US cannot be expected commit itself not to use atomic weapons if vital interests attacked by aggressor using such weapons; or other weapons, especially if US reduced forces in accordance with agreement. On the other hand, there might be some improvement over vague formula not to use nuclear weapons except against aggression.

4. Any provision for nuclear control in a partial agreement ought to contribute to solution of “4th country” problem, with which Soviet said it was concerned. Stassen suggested exploring possibility that nations not possessing nuclear weapons might agree not to possess, manufacture or use them, if the nuclear-weapons countries had undertaken to halt further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, etc. along line of US proposal.

5. Zorin said all nations were interested in preventing “aggression” but the word could not be defined. USSR therefore had sought to find formula to keep A-weapons from being used. He indicated that if the proposals contained in Soviet memorandum were unacceptable, further negotiation might turn up compromise formula.

6. Stassen noted that in Soviet proposal cessation of nuclear weapons production seemed linked with complete elimination and prohibition which impossible to ensure under known methods of control. However, if the principal nuclear-weapons states undertook to halt production of further fissionable material for weapons, other states might accept further forms of prohibition. If the nuclear powers did not do this, other countries, e.g. France and West Germany, and many others would very probably undertake nuclear weapons manufacture. Some curb on weapons production could be included in a first phase partial agreement, if not in its first year, under inspection procedures which would be compatible to the US, USSR and UK.

7. Zorin replied that Soviet did not believe halt of weapons production possible in a partial agreement unless complete prohibition and elimination were also provided. He argued that controls necessary to insure fissionable material for weapons production curb would mean close supervision and control of a country’s entire atomic economy. Stassen explained that such onerous controls were not necessary and not contemplated. Zorin then said that if US could supply any formulation of the kind of undertakings it had in mind which might be entered into by “fourth countries”, the Soviet delegation would be glad to examine it together with reconsideration of whole problem of nuclear controls in a partial agreement.

8. Stassen noted except for aerial inspection USSR permitted less inspection in the partial plan than in its earlier proposals. Negotiations would have to reconcile differences on extent of controls. He noted that zones of aerial inspection conceived by Soviet left great areas for Soviet forces in Soviet hinterland uncovered, but blanketed Western European forces right to the oceans. Also Stassen noted inclusion further territories and capitals, including Paris. Zorin replied that number of forces and capitals included in Western and Russian areas under its inspection scheme were roughly equal and exact definition of the zones could be subject to further negotiation.

9. On question of levels of forces, Stassen commented on the disproportion between suggested one-third cut for troops on German soil and reductions to ceilings of 2.5 million and 750,000 in a first phase agreement. Also pointed out that discussion of one-third cut for Germany involved difficult political issues which made the inclusion of such a provision in a partial agreement the more difficult. Zorin said proposition took account of extensive cuts already made by Soviet Union and those contemplated by UK. Did not think size of cuts could be obstacle to first phase agreement. However, amount of reductions was negotiable. In response to query from Stassen as to whether the Soviet proposal on troops in Germany was indispensable to Soviet partial plan, Zorin refrained from saying that it was, or was not, but said it would contribute to beneficial trend in foreign affairs which he saw in the making. In response to another question, he confirmed that the suggestion for cuts in the forces of NATO and Warsaw countries was an additional proposal, not an alternative one. He pointed out, however, that no figure was stipulated for size of cuts.

10. Stassen referred briefly to other issues: The US and Soviet positions on nuclear test explosions were still opposed and there was also the important question of levels of forces to be reached after a first phase. In reply to Zorin’s question he said he hoped some provision could be made on these problems in a partial agreement. He understood Soviet concern about reductions to follow after a first phase, but emphasized that 1,500,000 was an inacceptable figure.

11. Zorin said that he hoped that the item “zones of inspection” might be concluded in the next sub-committee meeting, and that SovDel might or might not introduce its new partial plan. He stated a strong belief in utility of bilaterals and requested a continuation of such sessions as well as parallel subcommittee and five power sessions.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–1757. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. See supra.