187. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

5847. USDEL Disarmament No. 148. Ref London Embtel 5838 (USDEL Disarmament No. 145), and London Embtel 5845 (USDEL Disarmament No. 147).2

1.
Following Zorin request, bilateral session held with SovDel at Lancaster House, April 26. Stassen, Peaslee, Matteson, Owsley (State), Higgins (DOD),3 Goodby (AEC) and Zorin and seven of the SovDel present. Akalovsky (US) interpreted, Eden (US)4 reporting officer.
2.
Zorin opened session and proceeded to outline Sov position along following lines: After consulting with Sov Gov’t it was still Sov position that agreement on at least basic disarmament issues was [Page 492] needed but subcommittee meetings showed insufficient basis for reaching comprehensive agreement, revealed Western support for partial agreement, and taking a realistic approach the USSR was prepared to consider a partial agreement which encompassed three factors; reductions in conventional forces and arms, nuclear weapons, and control.
3.
Zorin stated Sov impression that US wants to move toward partial agreement was reinforced after reading recent Eisenhower and Dulles statements during Stassen conferences in US.
4.
Stassen concurred that results most likely if we focused on partial agreement which would in turn facilitate later steps. He reaffirmed that his trip to Washington decided after Sov announcement of Zorin trip. He said the US took a positive attitude toward efforts to negotiate a sound partial agreement.
5.
Responding to direct question Stassen stated that first partial agreement should include appropriate features of the three issues outlined by the Sovs; i.e., reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces, nuclear weapons, and control. It should be possible to include more.
6.
Zorin handed Stassen aide-mémoire5 which he stated contained not only proposals but supporting motivations (forwarded separately as USDEL Disarmament No. 147). He then commented on specific Sov proposals.
7.
Proposed forces and conventional arms reductions where based on strategic considerations: Larger Sov territory, US separated by oceans and surrounded by friendly countries, USSR ringed by hostile military blocs. Sovs therefore unable to agree to equal level of forces if there is no substantial forces reduction. Stated need to agree on two-stage reductions; i.e., 2.5 million and 1.5 million. Sovs would propose armaments and budgets be reduced 15 percent in first stage rather than 10 percent as proposed by US. Further reductions to follow additional manpower cuts.
8.
Zorin stated liquidation of some military bases, including Big Four reductions in Germany, closely connected with conventional reductions.
9.
Zorin alluded to difficulty of reaching comprehensive nuclear agreement. Emphasized need to take concrete steps to halt nuclear race and prevent “fourth countries” from having such weapons. Two steps in Sov memo, he said, would take care of this problem: Cessation or suspension of tests and a declaration on prohibition of use of [Page 493] nuclear weapons. These two proposals are minimum for agreement. Test cessation could be worked out even before first stage as a separate measure.
10.
In control field, Sovs proposed a control organ be established within the framework of the Security Council. Proposal indicates territories in which control posts should be established.
11.
Zorin said USSR desirous of meeting US position on including aerial inspection in partial agreement. Sovs adopted US approach of delimiting zones by longitudes and latitudes. Do not include North Pole in aerial zones and prefer to focus on areas with greatest concentration of forces. Details of Sov inspection zone proposals outlined in aide-mémoire. Zorin displayed color maps of the aerial zones. Zorin said the zones were subject to negotiation.
12.
Sovs also indicated limited number of control posts in first stage.
13.
Zorin referred to Sov declaration calling on states to reject war propaganda and spreading ideological struggle on plane of interstate relations.
14.
March 18 proposals6 remain in force and can be considered in negotiations for partial agreement or a supplementary agreement. Zorin mentioned European zone of limitation specifically, which is excluded from current memo.
15.
In response to Zorin request for preliminary comment, Stassen outlined three-step US procedure relating to latest Sov paper. US would first study proposals and endeavor to thoroughly understand new Sov position; then begin to convey US reactions; and finally proceed with serious negotiations in an endeavor to reach partial agreement on the differences of position.
16.
Stassen stated appeared to him best way to proceed was for the US to make no comments at this session, to read the documents first, and then meet with the Sov delegation on the morning of the 27th at Lancaster House to begin to ask the Sov questions for clarification in endeavor to attain an understanding of the new Sov position. Zorin concurred in this procedure.

(reftels being rptd by London to Moscow.)

Whitney
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–2757. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.
  2. Neither printed. (Both ibid., 330.13/4–2657)
  3. Commander Elmore F. Higgins, USN, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.
  4. Arthur Eden, senior research analyst on Stassen’s Special Staff.
  5. The Soviet aide-mémoire given to Stassen on April 26 is quoted in full in telegram 5845 from London, April 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–2657) It is printed as a Soviet memorandum submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/55) on April 30 in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 778–787.
  6. For the Soviet proposal on reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which was introduced in the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/49) on March 18, see ibid., pp. 752–757.