196. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State1
Dear Foster: I have reviewed Harold Stassen’s tentative reformulation of the U.S. position on limitation of armaments, which you inclosed in your letter of May 11.2 Because of its far-reaching security [Page 511] implications I have requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the proposal. While awaiting their more detailed analysis, I think it may be helpful to give you my preliminary views regarding certain aspects of the program.
As a general comment, the proposal projects the U.S. position well beyond that contemplated by our existing disarmament policy which, as you know, was arrived at after prolonged study and deliberation within our government. The Department of Defense viewed the proposals which were approved by the President on 21 November 1956,3 as representing the outer limits which the U.S. could safely adopt for its position in the light of the present world situation. Mr. Stassen’s suggested program would materially expand those limits while the Soviets, on their part, do not appear to have made similar significant advances from their basic position.
While I am aware that the U.S. has favored the reciprocal establishment of zones for testing the mechanism of inspection and control, I consider that the zonal arrangement in the European area, as first proposed by the Soviets and as revised in Mr. Stassen’s proposal, has inherent dangers which outweigh any possible advantages which might accrue. The provision for the very substantial reduction of forces and the prohibition against our stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone would so reduce the effectiveness of the NATO forces in the area as to render them incapable of a sustained defense. Further, the concept of such a zonal arrangement in Europe has, in the past, only been associated with an overall European Security System in which German reunification was implicit. While I do not presume to gauge precisely the political repercussions which might ensue, I feel that the mere announcement that the U.S. is sponsoring such a proposal in the context of a disarmament agreement would generate reactions, particularly in West Germany, which might well jeopardize the solidarity if not the continued existence of NATO. The advantage from the security standpoint of moving toward the Soviet position in this regard is not apparent.
The Department of Defense has recommended that the U.S. not undertake a commitment to reduce its forces to any specific level beyond the 2.5 million level, in the absence of a resolution of some of the major outstanding political problems now dividing the East and the West. It is noted that the suggested proposal projects the reciprocal reductions first to a 2.0 million and ultimately to a 1.5 million ceiling, contingent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. I consider that it is not in our interest to undertake such a commitment at this time. It is [Page 512] almost inevitable that the pressures to fulfill such a commitment would be of such proportions as to restrict our future freedom of action, even though the requisite pre-conditions had not been met.
The proposal to undertake a commitment to suspend nuclear tests for 12 months would implicate the U.S. in a situation from which, due to the compulsion of public opinion, we would find it difficult to withdraw, except in extreme circumstances. Meanwhile, it is probable that our technological force would disintegrate and our capacity to resume testing, should that be indicated, would be seriously crippled. While I consider that our present position in regard to testing may be susceptible of certain adjustments, I feel that for security reasons we must confine such adjustments to the area of limitations, as distinguished from cessation of testing. Accordingly, I would recommend that a commitment to suspend testing under the conditions stated not be undertaken.
In my opinion there are large areas of possible agreement between the East and the West which, if identified and worked out, would be to the mutual advantage of both parties. Obviously the big element that is lacking is confidence on both sides. Nevertheless, this may be the time when constructive steps can be taken to establish confidence and make some progress. It is very important to make sure that such steps as are taken will contribute to the building up of mutual confidence and not be the cause of additional misunderstanding and consequent tension. An essential factor in building confidence is the ability of each party to fully satisfy himself by audit and inspection that the other is living up to his commitments no matter how small they may be.
It seems to me that it would be a mistake to attempt to settle too many things too far ahead or in too much detail, as such agreements might be found difficult for either party and therefore the agreements in themselves would add to friction and tension rather than to taking the heat out of the world.
My observation of long-term agreements is that they only stand up if they continue to be of mutual advantage at all times. I am sure this is especially true in regard to agreements between nations.
Moreover, while nations go on through the years, individuals that have the political responsibility and power in those nations go through their normal life cycle or tenure in office. It is neither sound nor realistic for one group of men on either side to try to bind their nations too far into the future especially when a long history of mutual confidence and satisfactory relations does not exist. In all nations the time will come when other men will have the political responsibility and power. These men are bound to take a new look at their political problems, and they will not respect agreements which they do not believe are in the interest of themselves or their nations.
[Page 513]Upon receipt of the views of the JCS I will make them available to you.4 I am sympathetic to the desire for progress toward achieving a partial agreement in the disarmament field. However, I do not consider that it would be in our best interests to make substantive concession in such highly sensitive areas as Harold proposes as an opening step.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–1757. Secret.↩
On May 11, Dulles sent identical covering letters to Wilson and Strauss along with Stassen’s May 9 paper, supra. Dulles’ letters read in part:
“I think it important that we should make maximum efforts to avoid the substance of this Stassen proposal getting out into the press because it is still highly tentative and because of the possible bad effect of publicity upon the bargaining position at London. I think we should produce a fairly quick reply.” (Department of State, Central Files, 300.13/5–1157)
↩- Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.↩
- See Document 202.↩