Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

202. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 24, 1957.

Dear Mr. Dulles: Inclosed herewith are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Mr. Stassen’s proposals for a limited first step agreement on limitation of armaments, which you inclosed in your letter of May 11, 1957.² In accordance with your suggestion at the May 17 meeting,³ I requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address their comments only to those portions of Mr. Stassen’s proposal which pertain to the first phase. In general, I share the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over certain aspects of the program. I feel too, that the danger posed by the “4th country” problem is not of such immediate import as to be controlling in any current formulation of United States disarmament policy.

Further consideration of the views I presented to you in my letter of May 17⁴ has not tended to alter my conviction that it would be injudicious, in an opening step, to undertake the settlement of a wide range of problems, particularly where the execution would be projected well into the future and hence subject to evolving conditions which cannot now be forecast. I still consider, however, that there remain areas of a more limited scope which provide a basis for the negotiation of an acceptable first stage agreement.

I believe that the proposals approved by the President on 21 November, 1956,⁵ should constitute the fundamentals of the U.S. position, perhaps adjusted in some details in the light of the deliberations which have taken place in the interim.

I recommend that the United States position not project the reciprocal force reductions in specific figures beyond the 2.5 million level or armaments reductions beyond those corresponding with the force reductions. I would have no objection to a statement which would establish future reductions as the desired goal, the specific levels to be a matter for future negotiation conditioned upon the satisfactory execution of the first stage commitments.

With regard to the establishment of zones, as contemplated in Mr. Stassen’s proposal, I believe that such a project would create problems both at home and abroad. I feel that a zonal arrangement as regards the USSR and the North American continent would not necessarily be to the strategic disadvantage of the U.S. However, the zones in Siberia on the one hand and Alaska and the United States on the other, as proposed by the USSR, are generally viewed by the United States public as widely disparate from the standpoint of relative strategic importance, as distinguished from mere mileage. Since Mr. Stassen’s proposal contemplates the coverage of an area in the U.S. approximating that proposed by the Soviets, I feel that it would meet with an unfavorable public reaction in this country. We should not establish or accept the principle of a zonal arrangement on the basis of equal geographic areas which have no relation to strategic importance or forces and facilities to be inspected. Further, I do not consider that a zonal arrangement would provide adequate assurance that disarmament commitments outside the zone were being fulfilled.

As to the zones in Europe, the United States and our allies have, in the past, presented this concept solely in terms of a security system associated with the reunification of Germany. The special provisions for the thinning out of forces and the prohibition against the stationing of nuclear weapons in the area would have an immediate impact on the effectiveness of the NATO forces. In his informal memo to the Secretary of State of May 22,⁶ Mr. Stassen states that the European zonal arrangement may be independent of the rest of the agreement. I believe that the European zonal arrangement should be separated from the remainder of the proposed agreement and treated in a separate forum in which all affected nations would be represented.

Current U.S. policy proposes the progressive development and installation of an inspection and control system concurrently with the reduction of forces to the 2.5 million level. This policy also states that there must be effective inspection for every portion of any agreement affecting armaments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that Mr. Stassen’s proposal does not meet these requirements in the first stage. If the zonal arrangement is to be proposed it should provide for the unrestricted movement of the ground inspection teams from the outset, as well as for overflight. Further, in order to provide an effective inspection and control system, the progressive expansion of the zones to encompass all of the areas subject to inspection should proceed as the reductions in forces take place and not await the completion of the first stage reduction. With the progressive expansion of the zones, overflights and unrestricted movement of the ground inspection teams should be permitted within the expanded areas. While I do not consider complete aerial photography of the USSR as essential to verify the first stage reduction, I do feel that the right to conduct aerial surveillance and to use air transport are essential elements of the verification system.

As I indicated in my letter to you of May 17, I feel that the U.S. position regarding the limitations on testing of nuclear weapons is susceptible of adjustment. I believe that the U.S. could agree as an interim measure to an arrangement whereby the countries concerned would commit themselves to (a) advance notification and international observation of tests; (b) a specified test limitation one approach to which could be the release of fissioned material in the atmosphere in a given period and (c) the establishment of an international agency which would be capable of monitoring tests and detecting the violations of the agreement.

With regard to the provisions of the proposal concerning the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons by the “have not” as well as the “have” nations, I consider that the U.S. should not undertake any further restrictions than our present position contemplates, i.e., there should be no use of nuclear weapons or any other weapons in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

In my opinion the risk to U.S. security interests entailed in a first stage agreement involving reductions to the 2.5 million level can be kept within acceptable proportions, if the U.S. adheres to the basic principle underlying our November 21, 1956 policy—the essentiality of an effective inspection system (and one in which we have full confidence) for each phase of every agreement. We should not accept the doctrine advanced by the Soviets in this regard—that partial disarmament warrants only partial inspection measures.

I appreciate the importance of moving in the direction of a limited first step agreement, and believe the November 21, 1956 policy with the variations I have outlined above should be generally recognized as equitable and reasonable. Accordingly, I recommend that the provisions of the November 21 policy, modified as I have indicated, form the basis of the proposed United States position.

Sincerely yours,

Donald A. Quarles

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)⁷

Washington, May 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 17 May 1957,⁸ subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Governor Stassen’s latest disarmament proposal and your interim reply thereto.⁹ They strongly concur with the preliminary views you have forwarded to the Secretary of State.

3. Detailed comments on Governor Stassen’s proposal are appended herewith.¹⁰ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have confined these to the proposed first stage reductions (July 1958 to July 1959). They are of the opinion, however, that his proposals for subsequent reductions in U.S. forces below 2.5 million, plus progressive restrictions on nuclear weapons and missiles would completely negate present U.S. military planning and prevent the fulfillment of collective defense obligations throughout the world.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted several aspects of Mr. Stassen’s outline plan upon which they wish to offer additional comment:

a. They are concerned with the nuclear restrictions without any clear indication of adequate inspection.

b. They are concerned with the indefinite nature and inadequacy of the provisions for the specifications of the inspection system.

c. They are concerned over provisions which establish a time phasing differential for aerial and ground inspection, and the implications that the ground inspectors may not have unimpeded access to objects of control.

d. They are concerned with the zonal arrangements in Europe. In this most sensitive area the provisions are such that the strength and morale of the NATO would be almost immediately destroyed.

e. They note the apparent preoccupation with the necessity of preventing a nuclear capability for fourth countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not visualize the security of the U.S. being jeopardized if such countries are successful in achieving this capability. In their opinion it is extremely unlikely that the USSR would provide such weapons to her satellites and therefore, from the military point of view, the fourth power problem is of far greater concern to the USSR. Nuclear weapons is the hands of our Allies should strengthen our alliances. If a disarmament system incorporates safeguards which are adequate to control the two principal nuclear powers they would certainly be adequate to sufficiently control fourth powers.

5. The new proposal by Mr. Stassen is intended as a counterproposal to the partial disarmament plan submitted by the USSR on 30 April 1957. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that the latest Soviet proposal indicates any relaxation of their position. The Soviets have seemingly accepted some features of the U.S. aerial inspection proposal but have in fact retrogressed with respect to ground inspection. The Joint Chiefs of Staff see nothing in the USSR proposal to cause them to feel that the U.S. should recommend concessions from the approved national policy. Mr. Stassen’s proposal is inconsistent with that policy in many respects and is so vague and general with respect to some aspects, such as time phasing and inspection provisions, that in its present form the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it completely unacceptable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reiterated time and again that any disarmament plan must be based on effective inspection for each progressive step and strongly recommend that the United States continue to insist that every portion of every agreement affecting armaments be covered by effective aerial and ground inspection.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford¹¹
Chairman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–2457. Secret.
2. See footnote 2, Document 196. For Stassen’s proposals, see Document 195.
3. See Document 197.
4. Document 196.
5. Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.
6. Document 200.
7. Secret.
8. Not found in Department of State files.
9. Documents 195 and 196, respectively.
10. The undated enclosure, entitled “Comments Regarding Military Implications of Governor Stassen’s Latest Disarmament Proposal”, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–2457)
11. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.