202. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of State1
Dear Mr. Dulles: Inclosed herewith are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Mr. Stassen’s proposals for a limited first step agreement on limitation of armaments, which you inclosed in your letter of May 11, 1957.2 In accordance with your suggestion at the May 17 meeting,3 I requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address their comments only to those portions of Mr. Stassen’s proposal which pertain to the first phase. In general, I share the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over certain aspects of the program. I feel too, that the danger posed by the “4th country” problem is not of such immediate import as to be controlling in any current formulation of United States disarmament policy.
Further consideration of the views I presented to you in my letter of May 174 has not tended to alter my conviction that it would be injudicious, in an opening step, to undertake the settlement of a wide range of problems, particularly where the execution would be projected well into the future and hence subject to evolving conditions which cannot now be forecast. I still consider, however, that there remain areas of a more limited scope which provide a basis for the negotiation of an acceptable first stage agreement.
I believe that the proposals approved by the President on 21 November, 1956,5 should constitute the fundamentals of the U.S. position, perhaps adjusted in some details in the light of the deliberations which have taken place in the interim.
I recommend that the United States position not project the reciprocal force reductions in specific figures beyond the 2.5 million level or armaments reductions beyond those corresponding with the force reductions. I would have no objection to a statement which would establish future reductions as the desired goal, the specific levels to be a matter for future negotiation conditioned upon the satisfactory execution of the first stage commitments.
With regard to the establishment of zones, as contemplated in Mr. Stassen’s proposal, I believe that such a project would create problems both at home and abroad. I feel that a zonal arrangement as regards the USSR and the North American continent would not necessarily be to the strategic disadvantage of the U.S. However, the zones in Siberia [Page 540] on the one hand and Alaska and the United States on the other, as proposed by the USSR, are generally viewed by the United States public as widely disparate from the standpoint of relative strategic importance, as distinguished from mere mileage. Since Mr. Stassen’s proposal contemplates the coverage of an area in the U.S. approximating that proposed by the Soviets, I feel that it would meet with an unfavorable public reaction in this country. We should not establish or accept the principle of a zonal arrangement on the basis of equal geographic areas which have no relation to strategic importance or forces and facilities to be inspected. Further, I do not consider that a zonal arrangement would provide adequate assurance that disarmament commitments outside the zone were being fulfilled.
As to the zones in Europe, the United States and our allies have, in the past, presented this concept solely in terms of a security system associated with the reunification of Germany. The special provisions for the thinning out of forces and the prohibition against the stationing of nuclear weapons in the area would have an immediate impact on the effectiveness of the NATO forces. In his informal memo to the Secretary of State of May 22,6 Mr. Stassen states that the European zonal arrangement may be independent of the rest of the agreement. I believe that the European zonal arrangement should be separated from the remainder of the proposed agreement and treated in a separate forum in which all affected nations would be represented.
Current U.S. policy proposes the progressive development and installation of an inspection and control system concurrently with the reduction of forces to the 2.5 million level. This policy also states that there must be effective inspection for every portion of any agreement affecting armaments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that Mr. Stassen’s proposal does not meet these requirements in the first stage. If the zonal arrangement is to be proposed it should provide for the unrestricted movement of the ground inspection teams from the outset, as well as for overflight. Further, in order to provide an effective inspection and control system, the progressive expansion of the zones to encompass all of the areas subject to inspection should proceed as the reductions in forces take place and not await the completion of the first stage reduction. With the progressive expansion of the zones, overflights and unrestricted movement of the ground inspection teams should be permitted within the expanded areas. While I do not consider complete aerial photography of the USSR as essential to verify the first stage reduction, I do feel that the right to conduct aerial surveillance and to use air transport are essential elements of the verification system.
[Page 541]As I indicated in my letter to you of May 17, I feel that the U.S. position regarding the limitations on testing of nuclear weapons is susceptible of adjustment. I believe that the U.S. could agree as an interim measure to an arrangement whereby the countries concerned would commit themselves to (a) advance notification and international observation of tests; (b) a specified test limitation one approach to which could be the release of fissioned material in the atmosphere in a given period and (c) the establishment of an international agency which would be capable of monitoring tests and detecting the violations of the agreement.
With regard to the provisions of the proposal concerning the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons by the “have not” as well as the “have” nations, I consider that the U.S. should not undertake any further restrictions than our present position contemplates, i.e., there should be no use of nuclear weapons or any other weapons in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
In my opinion the risk to U.S. security interests entailed in a first stage agreement involving reductions to the 2.5 million level can be kept within acceptable proportions, if the U.S. adheres to the basic principle underlying our November 21, 1956 policy—the essentiality of an effective inspection system (and one in which we have full confidence) for each phase of every agreement. We should not accept the doctrine advanced by the Soviets in this regard—that partial disarmament warrants only partial inspection measures.
I appreciate the importance of moving in the direction of a limited first step agreement, and believe the November 21, 1956 policy with the variations I have outlined above should be generally recognized as equitable and reasonable. Accordingly, I recommend that the provisions of the November 21 policy, modified as I have indicated, form the basis of the proposed United States position.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–2457. Secret.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 196. For Stassen’s proposals, see Document 195.↩
- See Document 197.↩
- Document 196.↩
- Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.↩
- Document 200.↩
- Secret.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Documents 195 and 196, respectively.↩
- The undated enclosure, entitled “Comments Regarding Military Implications of Governor Stassen’s Latest Disarmament Proposal”, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–2457)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩