Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

201. Memorandum of Discussion at the 324th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 23, 1957¹

Washington, May 23, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments (NSC Action No. 1553; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 10, 1956; Annex to NSC Action No. 1553)²

Mr. Cutler explained the nature of the report which Governor Stassen would present to the Council. He pointed out that Governor Stassen had submitted a paper with the title “Policy Recommendation to Washington”, dated May 9, 1957.³ The Council was not now asked to make any decision on this recommendation. The decision would be made at special meetings to be held on Friday morning, in the Secretary of State’s office, and on Saturday morning, in the President’s office.⁴ Accordingly, Governor Stassen’s report would simply bring the Council up to date as to what had been happening at the London meetings of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, after which he would answer questions. (A copy of the aforesaid Policy Recommendation is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Governor Stassen directed his opening remarks to the mechanics of the current sessions in London, which had lasted for eight weeks. The U.S. Delegation consisted of eleven members, representing all the responsible departments. The Delegation had operated smoothly under the guidance of the Secretary of State and in terms of the directive given to Governor Stassen in NSC Action No. 1553 and the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553. The U.S. Delegation met every morning, and two cables were dispatched daily to the Department of State. There were regular meetings in the morning between the U.S. Delegation and the other three Western powers. The Five-Power meetings in the afternoon occurred at three o’clock. In addition to these regular meetings, Governor Stassen indicated that he had held many bilateral sessions with the Soviet Delegation. He always briefed the other allied powers on what occurred at these bilateral sessions.

Governor Stassen said that he and the U.S. Delegation were concentrating their efforts on achieving the top priority U.S. objectives in the disarmament negotiations, viz., measures to prevent fourth powers from obtaining nuclear weapons; measures to increase the security of the United States against surprise Soviet attack; measures which would begin to open up the Soviet Union to inspection; and, finally, cautious steps designed to achieve a limited initial disarmament agreement.

With respect to the problem of preventing fourth powers from obtaining nuclear weapons, Governor Stassen stated that the positions of France and Germany were crucial. The French have already decided to begin the fabrication of nuclear weapons in two months’ time if some kind of disarmament agreement were not concluded by the United States and the United Kingdom and the USSR. Governor Stassen estimated that the French would be able to manufacture a nuclear weapon 18 months after they commenced the effort. If the French went ahead to manufacture nuclear weapons, it was highly likely that the Germans would do the same. For this reason, said Governor Stassen, there had been heavy concentration on trying to develop an initial partial agreement with the Soviets which would be satisfactory to powers like France and Germany, and which would otherwise advance the priority objectives which he had earlier mentioned.

Governor Stassen then indicated that one of the hopeful developments at London had been a series of “plain talking” sessions with the Soviets, in which the latter had abandoned their propaganda techniques of previous meetings of the Disarmament Subcommittee. Governor Stassen described the general Soviet position as something like the following. Their prime concern was that incidents might occur in Europe which, although not of U.S. making, might nevertheless get out of hand, involve the United States, and ultimately result in the nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union. The Soviets likewise recognize that the great area of U.S. anxiety is the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. In essence, therefore, the Soviets have indicated to us that they are prepared to move in directions which will lessen the aforementioned anxiety of the United States if in turn the United States will move to lessen the aforementioned Soviet concern.

With respect to the problem of a surprise attack from the Soviet Union, Governor Stassen said that he had been governed by the recent reports of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee to the National Security Council.⁵ These reports had quite clearly indicated the area of concern for the United States with respect to surprise nuclear attack, and accordingly they indicated the areas overseas where it would be in the interests of the United States to establish aerial and ground inspection. Pointing out that he had also exercised the very greatest caution in dealing with the Soviets, Governor Stassen uncovered a chart with the title “Progressive Installation of Aerial Inspection”.⁶

Governor Stassen next confirmed Mr. Culter’s statement that his report was a broad progress report and not a report requiring decisions. The decisions would be developed at the special meetings on Friday and Saturday. Thereafter, Governor Stassen illustrated, with the assistance of a chart, a plan for the gradual opening up to aerial and ground inspection of certain areas in the Soviet Union. In addition to considerable portions of Eastern Siberia, the area also included the northern Arctic coast areas of the Soviet Union as far as Norway. The earliest date for the establishment of an inspection system in these areas was stated to be July 1, 1958.

In response to the aforementioned plan, Governor Stassen indicated that the Soviets had come back at the end of April with a counter-plan which moved the inspection zone back approximately five degrees from the westernmost point. While this was not encouraging, the Soviet proposal (a copy of which is included in the minutes of the meeting)⁷ had at least this one notable advance: The Soviet memorandum marked the first time that the Soviets had abandoned measuring demarcation lines for inspection zones based on the border between the Federal Republic and East Germany. Governor Stassen had made clear to them that the United States would never agree to a demarcation line consisting of the border between the two Germanys. In general, Governor Stassen expressed the belief that there remained a field for negotiation between the inspection zone proposals made by the United States and by the Soviet Union. Referring to his chart and a map, Governor Stassen indicated that our proposed zone covered, according to the estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, the areas of the Soviet Union in which approximately 75% of the armed forces of the Soviet Union were currently deployed. He admitted, however, that the Soviet forces could be redeployed elsewhere.

Governor Stassen then turned to what he described as another great area of difficulty—the area of nuclear weapons and of nuclear power. The Soviets, he said, had indicated great apprehension over the possibility that their atomic economy might be taken over by some international inspection agency. On the other hand, Governor Stassen believed that negotiations for the cutting off of the use of fissionable material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons could be satisfactorily worked out with the Soviets provided that, at the time the inspection system is put into operation, there could also be a partial suspension of tests of nuclear weapons. Such a suspension might run from July 1958 to July 1959. However, Governor Stassen admitted the difficulty that the United States would encounter from world public opinion in resuming nuclear weapons tests if the Soviets proved not to have acted in good faith. There was also a serious problem of retaining the interest and services of our nuclear scientists if the testing of new weapons and devices were prohibited.

Governor Stassen indicated that the first actual cut in arms would range somewhere between 10 and 15% of the major armaments of the powers which were party to the agreement, particularly nuclear-capable weapons. The 10 or 15% of the armaments would, according to this plan, be placed in depots subject to international inspection but actually located within the boundaries of the nation from whose armed forces they had been removed. Here, Governor Stassen admitted the risk that the Soviets would incorrectly report on the total levels of their armaments. He went on to say that as a first step, if this plan were adopted, the level of the personnel in the armed forces of the United States and of the USSR would be reduced to 2.5 million.

With respect to the problem of nuclear weapons, Governor Stassen said that in the current London meetings the Soviets had finally abandoned their demands for an immediate agreement to outlaw all nuclear weapons. He had made it plain to the Soviets that we would never negotiate an agreement with them on the basis of a complete ban of nuclear weapons. The Soviets had likewise abandoned their insistence that the United States abandon all its overseas bases, and now were calling for a reduction in these bases but not for their complete elimination. The Soviets were now supporting a position that no nuclear weapons were to be stationed outside the borders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR. Accordingly, it appeared to Governor Stassen that when the first aerial inspection zone was established in Europe, nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from the agreed zone, although nuclear-capable weapons would remain and there would be continued training in the use of nuclear-capable weapons minus their nuclear warheads.

The French, the British and the Soviets, continued Governor Stassen, all seemed to believe that if the first step in some such disarmament program as this were faithfully carried out, and there could be simultaneously settlements of political issues between the Soviet Union and the West, we might look forward to further and sharper reductions of the level of armaments.

Referring to the matter of the use of nuclear weapons, Governor Stassen said that the U.S. Delegation had made it perfectly plain to the Soviets that we would never agree to forgo all use of such weapons. We might, however, agree to certain limitations on the use of such weapons; for example, limitations to use in the case of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

With respect to further steps in disarmament if the first step were faithfully carred out, Governor Stassen indicated the “old level” of 1 to 1.5 million. Apropos of this, however, he added that he did not feel that we needed to mention a figure as low as 1 million, although of course the next step would have to be a level somewhere below 2.5 million. Governor Stassen did not feel that this further step in the reduction of force levels would require us to withdraw our armed forces from Europe or other areas of the world which we considered vital. We would also have to make clear that this further step in disarmament would require political settlements between the Soviet bloc and the West.

In concluding, Governor Stassen stated that the great question now before the United States in these disarmament negotiations was whether or not we could take a first step in disarmament while convincing the American public that this was only a first step and thus avoid arousing false and dangerous hopes. Also, we must be sure that if we take this first step our armed forces remain on the alert. For the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the great question posed by these negotiations was whether or not the Soviet regime could succeed in surviving even such a relatively modest initial opening up of the Soviet Union. Governor Stassen added that the Soviets had shown very great concern on this point.

At the conclusion of Governor Stassen’s remarks, the President questioned whether the proposed agreement by the three powers on the use of nuclear weapons was properly part of a disarmament plan. In the President’s opinion, this was primarily a political question. Governor Stassen explained that it had been necessary to put the agreement on the use of nuclear weapons into the disarmament plan in order to provide evidence that the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR were placing restraints on themselves in return for asking all other powers to forgo the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The President commented that, even so, he felt that this problem was “a tricky one”.

The President then changed the subject by stating that he had read just the other day in a newspaper that the Kremlin was reported to be about to tear down the Iron Curtain. Mr. Larson undertook to comment for the President on the newspaper story of the creation by the Kremlin of a State Committee for Cultural Relations with foreign countries. The President asked Governor Stassen if he had picked up any evidence at London that it was the intention of the Soviets to tear down the Iron Curtain and to liberalize their courses of action and open up the Soviet Union. Governor Stassen replied that he had picked up nothing concrete on this alleged plan, and that the proof of this pudding would have to be in the eating.

The President went on to say that his next question was concerned with what part of the United States would be opened up to Soviet inspection if the initial disarmament step were taken. Governor Stassen replied that the extent of the areas of the United States to be opened up to Soviet inspection had not been clearly decided. In general, however, they would probably include Alaska, a portion of Western Canada, and portions of the Western part of the United States. Involved in the question of how much we would be prepared to exchange with the Soviet Union by way of areas open to inspection, it should be remembered that the United States was already much more open than the USSR. Nevertheless, Governor Stassen felt that we should not open the heartland of the United States to Soviet inspection until the Soviets had opened their heartland to U.S. inspection. This would probably not occur until the last stages of a progressive disarmament plan.

The President then asked further questions about the precise areas in the Soviet Union to be opened up to inspection with the first disarmament step. Governor Stassen indicated, by reference to the map, the areas that the Soviets had offered in Siberia and the additional areas which the United States desired to add along the Arctic coast up to Norway, which area would include installations on the Kola Peninsula. He added that we had not yet talked to the Soviet Delegation about these additional areas.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State if he wished to make any comments. Secretary Dulles replied that it was only fair to point out that there remained very considerable differences of view in the U.S. Government as to how the disarmament plan should be developed. He was therefore holding a meeting of responsible officials tomorrow in his office, with the objective of trying to iron out these differences as far as that was possible, and to bring before the President on Saturday the basis for a policy decision which Governor Stassen could take back to London. For this reason, Secretary Dulles did not think it was particularly useful to discuss the question of disarmament further at today’s meeting. Secretary Dulles added that he and Governor Stassen were to appear before a group of Senators on the subject of disarmament this afternoon. Originally the group was to be small in size, but Secretary Dulles understood that it had grown now to consist of some 30 Senators. This seemed a pretty large group in which to hope to make much progress.

In bringing the discussion to a close, the President said very forcefully that he wished to express one thought about the meetings to be held on Friday and Saturday for policy decision. This thought was the absolute necessity of some kind of a halt in the arms race. The President went on to state that he received from Secretary Humphrey every day or so a message delineating the severe financial and budgetary problems facing us. He agreed that if our spending goes unchecked, the effects will be very terrible for the United States. While we should not incur serious risks in reaching a disarmament agreement with the Soviets, we certainly could not stand pat and refuse to respond to Soviet offers by some kind of U.S. counter-offers. So what we are engaging in is no mere intellectual exercise or empty debate. We have got to do something.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Noted and discussed a progress report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the recent meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee in London.

b. Noted the President’s restatement of the necessity of achieving some kind of halt to the current arms race without incurring serious risks to U.S. security.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on May 24.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141. The memorandum from the Executive Secretary to the NSC has not been found in Department of State files. For the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, see Document 165.
3. Document 195.
4. For the informal record of the May 24 meeting, see Document 204. For the record of the May 25 meeting at the White House, see Document 206.
5. Documentation on the Net Evaluation Subcommittee is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. Presumably a reference to the inspection zones proposed in the Soviet memorandum to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, April 30, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959–, vol. II, pp. 784-785. The minutes of the meeting, including a copy of the Soviet proposal, have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
8. Paragraphs a–b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1722, approved by the President on May 25. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)