Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

206. Memorandum of a Conference, White House, Washington, May 25, 1957, 9–11:20 a.m.¹

Washington, May 25, 1957, 9–11:20 a.m.

PRESENT

• The President, Secretary Dulles, Admiral Strauss, Deputy Secretary Quarles, Admiral Radford, Allen W. Dulles, Harold E. Stassen, and Robert Cutler. There were also present in the room Under Secretary Herter, Assistant Secretary Bowie, Counselor Reinhardt, General Fox, General Loper, General Persons, General Goodpaster, and Captain Blouin

1. The conference considered the Stassen “Policy Recommendation to Washington” of May 9, 1957 (12 pages)² as modified by the Stassen “Informal Memorandum” to the Secretary of State of May 22, 1957(4 pages).³

2. The Secretary of State referred to the “Policy Recommendation” paper and proceeded to take up each numbered paragraph, beginning with 1, through 27. The Preamble and Part III of the “Policy Recommendation” paper were not considered and should be omitted from the paper as revised to reflect the decisions. The “Informal Memorandum” was not separately considered, but portions of it affecting paragraphs in the “Policy Recommendation” were mentioned.

3. The following paragraphs were either agreed to or modified in some minor way not requiring detailed mention in this memorandum:

Paragraphs: 1;

3 (as modified by the “Informal Memorandum”);

4 (as modified by the “Informal Memorandum” and by a provision that nuclear weapons may be refabricated);

7 (subject to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

8 (subject to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone and eliminating the clause referring to “embarkation ports of Eastern United States”)

11 (as modified by the “Informal Memorandum”);

12;

13 (subject to modification conforming to the revision in paragraphs 9–10);

14 (subject to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

15 (subject to modification conforming to the revision in paragraphs 9–10 and to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

17 (subject to modification conforming to the revision in paragraphs 9–10 and to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

24;

25;

26;

27.

4. The substance of the agreements affecting the other paragraphs (2, 5, 6, 9–10, 16–18–19–20–21–22, and 23) are set forth in the attached pages.

5. The Pres. requests the USDEL promptly to⁴ revise the basic paper referred to in 1 above, in the light of this memorandum, so that the President may have⁵ a complete corrected text.⁶

Paragraph 2. (as modified by the “Informal Memorandum”)

1. This paragraph should be modified to allow the use of nuclear weapons by fourth countries in case of an attack, on the same basis on which they would be usable by one of the three countries possessing nuclear weapons in case of attack.

Paragraph 5. (as modified by the “Informal Memorandum”)

1. This paragraph should be modified so that the initial agreement will fix the specific ratios between the contributions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes; clarifying the present language, “agreed equitable proportionate transfers.”

2. Unless the Soviets insist on a 50–50 ratio, the following ratios of the quantity in each increment are approved: U.S. 55 and U.S.S.R. 45, with whatever amount the U.K. may transfer to be in addition to the amount so transferred.

Paragraph 6.

This paragraph should be modified in a number of ways:

1. The European-Russian Zone

In view of the effects on our NATO allies and the complexity of the multi-national interests involved, the European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be treated separately from the U.S.–Canada–U.S.S.R. aerial and ground control zone, insofar as possible. Negotiations and arrangements for a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be handled in a way allowing our NATO allies (and other affected non-NATO nations) to have a full voice in the development of the position.

2. The U.S.–Canada–U.S.S.R. Zone

Initially the U.S. will propose that our side include the continental U.S., Alaska, and Canada, and that the Soviet side include all Soviet territory. If the Soviets should continue to refuse to deal on this basis, the U.S. will accept a limited initial zone,—in order to start an inspection technique. This limited zone will comprise roughly the entire area north of the Arctic Circle (except Sweden and Finland), all of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and all of the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands. In conducting U.S. Del. negotiations concerning the area of the zone, the greatest caution should be exercised relative to offering more U.S. territory in exchange for more Siberian territory.

Paragraphs 9–10.

1. These paragraphs require major modification, because:

a. “Blueprint” includes both a statement of fixed military installations and also an inventory of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons-delivery vehicles but excluding nuclear weapons), together with these locations.

b. No “blueprint” relating to the whole U.S.S.R., or calculations of percentage reductions based on such “blueprint”, would be reliable, until aerial and ground control inspection systems covering the whole U.S.S.R. territory were established and operating.

c. A list of armaments prepared by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., as a basis for agreeing to armaments reductions, will state specific quantities of identified types of armaments, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture. Such list will not relate to a percentage of the nation’s total armaments or of the nation’s armaments located within a certain zone.

2. The following first step is approved:

a. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree on a U.S.–Canada–U.S.S.R. zone for aerial and ground control inspection.

b. Each of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. furnish to the other a “blueprint” (as described in 1–a above) of the total military installations, armaments, and military forces located within such inspection zone.

c. The initial agreement will include commitments for each of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to reduce military forces to 2.5 million, and a list (as described in 1–c above) of armaments scheduled for reduction; the armaments so listed bearing a rough relation to the stated reduction in military forces.

d. After the treaty becomes effective, each places the armaments set forth on its list in an internationally supervised national storage depot within its own territory.

Paragraphs 16–19–20–21–22.

1. The initial agreement should not spell out in detail a second phase of reduction.

2. The U.S. Del. may state that if the first stage under the agreement is carried through successfully, the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate for further major reductions in armaments and armed forces. (The possibility of a reduction in the second phase to not less than 2 million men may be discussed, without any commitment.)

3. A hope might also be expressed that further reductions in armaments and armed forces might be negotiated, if the second phase under the agreement is carried through successfully, but no floor below 1.5 million should be indicated.

Paragraph 18.

This paragraph should be modified as follows:

Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated at July, 1958), all signators would be committed:

a. to cooperate in setting up an international inspection commission to monitor tests;

b. to refrain from further tests until 12 months after such effective date;—with the understanding that the U.S. intends, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary by the end of such 12 months’ period, thereafter to resume testing;

c. if tests are resumed, to give notification in advance of such tests and approximate yields; to provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and to place limitations upon the amount of radioactive material to be released in the atmosphere.

Paragraph 23.

This paragraph should be modified to read as follows:

“The signators agree that within 3 months after the effective date of the agreement (estimated to be October, 1958) they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.”

Add at the end of the policy recommendation paper a new paragraph reading:

“The specific provisions of this paper are considered as inseparable parts of a whole, unless the contrary is stated.”

1. Source: Eiserhower Library, Project Clear Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers. Secret. Drafted by Cutler. A notation on a cover sheet, presumably in Cutler’s handwriting, reads in part:

   “RC’s summary memo of decisions. First draft prepared immediately after WH Cabinet Room Conference. Second draft attached, prevision [?] prepared in conference in Cabinet Room 3:30–6:30 May 25 by persons noted on first page in ink and approved by P[resident] 7:10 pm.”

   There is no notation of persons in ink on the first page of the source text. The first page of the source text does have a handwritten notation: “As approved by P[resident] at 7:10 pm.” The initials “D.E” appear in the President’s handwriting following paragraph 5 of the source text.

2. Document 195.
3. Document 200.
4. The words “Pres. requests the” and “promptly to” were added in the President’s handwriting and the words “should at once” following “USDEL” were deleted.
5. The word “promptly” immediately following this word has been deleted from the source text.
6. For the completed corrected text of the revised basic paper, prepared by the U.S. Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission and communicated to Secretary Dulles on May 31, see Document 212.