Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

207. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, May 26, 1957, 9:35 a.m.¹

Washington, May 26, 1957, 9:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Governor Stassen
• Mr. Elbrick

Mr. Stassen gave the Secretary General Cutler’s notes on the conference yesterday, which had been initialed by the President last night.² The Secretary said he had spoken to him this morning about getting them all together so that there would be in one document the net results of the meetings. Mr. Stassen said he would get his delegation working on this immediately and send the draft to the Secretary,³ who after he was satisfied with it could send it to the other Departments concerned, and then back to him. Mr. Stassen said the President had talked to Cutler and changed the language slightly, from “should” to “request”. Mr. Stassen said Messrs. Bowie, Reinhardt, Strauss, Allen Dulles, Quarles, and General Loper had all been present when Cutler went over the draft of the notes. Mr. Stassen said he would try to pouch a draft back Monday.⁴ The Secretary said this was not an ultimatum; if Russia came back with something solid, we should consider it.

The matter of an approach to Zorin was discussed. Mr. Stassen said he would talk first with the three Western powers re his telling Zorin that the Subcommittee meetings would be “window dressing”; if they felt they wanted to be present, he would do it that way. Mr. Elbrick said he was sure they would want to be there, and the Secretary said it would be better to have them there; they would be suspicious if Stassen met with Zorin alone. It was agreed that Stassen would see the Western powers first to agree on Western procedure, and then the four would see Zorin.

The matter of procedure with NATO was discussed. The Secretary said that first the Western NATO members of the London group should be apprized of our position. Mr. Stassen said he would not spell the whole position out at once to allow for a bargaining position within his position. The Secretary said it was awkward as we had to have a trading position with the Russians; particularly on the question of zones, he said Stassen would probably want to fall back gradually and make maneuvering proposals. The Secretary said this would have to be in executive session to keep public opinion from being aroused unnecessarily. Mr. Stassen said the first thing would be to get a Four Power agreement as to the method by which to approach NATO. The Secretary said this could be an apple of discord for NATO. Mr. Elbrick said that NATO’s being asked to formulate ideas would be the best way to give the NATO countries the feeling that they were being consulted before the fact. Mr. Stassen said if he got agreement among the four in London, he would go to Paris for the presentation to NATO and give them a background briefing of the history of the negotiations for disarmament beginning with our proposals at the Geneva “Summit” conference. The Secretary said as a first step this was all right, but the question was what did we want NATO to do. He said he felt we must convey to the Soviets and our allies the sense of urgency about getting started, control that which could be controlled as soon as possible if the whole project was not to collapse; we could not keep the talks going indefinitely without any progress. The Secretary said we must see if our allies would permit our going along alone with Russia, and whether the Soviets would do so without a prior solution to the European problem.

Mr. Stassen mentioned the possibility of NATO setting up a side negotiating group in London; he said Germany was considering sending a man to their London Embassy to deal with these matters—if other nations did that, it would be a way of coordinating. (This would really mean 7 nations—Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Iceland are not in any zone and might agree merely to regular diplomatic consultation.) The Secretary mentioned that the Italian Ambassador had seen him at a party yesterday and excitedly mentioned that he wanted to see him about getting in on the discussions. Mr. Stassen mentioned that in a public statement Adenauer had come close to our position and stated that German reunification was not a prerequisite to a first step in disarmament, but that for any comprehensive plan it would be. Chancellor Adenauer’s proposal for a Four Power Foreign Ministers meeting was discussed.⁵ Mr. Stassen mentioned that the public opinion in the European countries might help the nations to a decision; they would fear failure.

Guidance for Ambassador Perkins was discussed. Mr. Elbrick said the Council meeting would be Wednesday. Mr. Stassen said he could go to Paris then and discuss with NATO the type of negotiating contact it wanted. It was agreed that the presentation would be made as coming from the Four Powers in London, not just the US. The Secretary said Perkins should know what the desired outcome was. Mr. Elbrick said it would be for the Council to organize a working group to sit in Paris or London to formulate ideas for a European inspection zone to pass to the four negotiating powers and keep in touch with them. The Secretary said it would be useful to talk to Spaak in advance, and it was agreed that Perkins should do this rather than Stassen; Stassen should always act in terms of a member of the team of four—they would be suspicious if he talked alone to Spaak. The Secretary said it was difficult to keep our position obscure to maintain our trading position. Mr. Stassen said what a wonderful job the Secretary had done in connection with the disarmament talks this last week. Mr. Stassen said he would send a cable as soon as he had spoken to the Western powers tomorrow morning at 9, and send it to Perkins for information.⁶ The Secretary said we did not know how our allies felt re separating the two zone questions. Mr. Stassen said he felt the UK was at cross currents, was not really clear itself, but would come along with us. Mr. Elbrick said they too were undoubtedly under pressure from Italy. The Secretary said they might be distrustful of our working with the Russians as they would not be able to go so fast, and they might ask us to hold back; or they might realize the great complications and the possibility of jeopardizing the whole affair. The Secretary mentioned the importance of keeping in touch with SACEUR. Mr. Stassen said there was the possibility that the free world does not want the degree of inspection needed to be useful reciprocally from the other side; in this case, nothing could be accomplished. The Secretary asked whether Northern Italy was included in the European zone. Mr. Stassen said it always had been, although it would not need to be. He said the Russians had been thinking of Foggia, from whence the Germans launched long-range bombing raids in the last war.

At this point the Secretary dictated a draft cable of instructions for Perkins, which Mr. Stassen agreed with. Mr. Elbrick was to return at 12:30 to go over the draft with the Secretary.⁷

Following this, Governor Stassen raised the question of Senate participation. The Secretary said he felt it would be helpful if we could get two such Senators as Mansfield and Saltonstall⁸ into the picture, perhaps on a basis of their first being allowed to see on a confidential basis our State Department documents on this subject, with an invitation to one or both of them to be in London as much as was feasible consistent with their participation in essential Senate matters.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–2657. Secret. The drafting officer is not identified but was probably Elbrick.
2. Supra.
3. See Document 212.
4. May 27.
5. Adenauer’s thoughts on the relationship between disarmament and German reunification and on a Four-Power Foreign Ministers meeting were reaffirmed in the joint declaration with President Eisenhower on May 28; see Document 205.
6. Telegram 6481 from London, May 27, repeated to Paris for Perkins as telegram 1007. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.134/5–2757)
7. Telegram 4734 to Paris, infra.
8. Mike Mansfield (D.–Mont.) and Leverett Saltonstall (R.–Mass.).