208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France1
Washington, May 26,
1957—2:35 p.m.
4734. Pass USRO for Perkins from Secretary.
- (1)
- Stassen returns London tonight with new US position and will propose to other three Western members Subcommittee that there should be presentation to NATO, presumably Wednesday.2
- (2)
- With respect to the nuclear aspects of our position, these are substantially unchanged in that they will seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers and this will, we hope, be made tolerable by the agreement of the three powers now processing such weapons to stop after a fixed date any further use of fissionable material for weapons purposes and gradually to draw down the present weapons stocks by agreed proportionate transfers to a peacetime internationally inspected stockpile. There will also be some limitations on the use of nuclear weapons in war, although these will be more formal than substantive.
- (3)
- With respect to the inspection zones, we believe the problem of a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be treated separately from the US-Canada-Soviet aerial and ground control zone insofar as possible, and that negotiations for and substance of a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be handled in a way allowing our NATO allies to have a full voice in the development of a position. SACEUR would also presumably be brought in.
- (4)
- We feel that if the whole project of disarmament is not to collapse there is imperative need to make some concrete progress and that we should seek to make progress as rapidly as possible wherever it is possible. We further feel that the complications of what might start out as primarily an Arctic zone are far less than of European-Soviet zone. Also we feel as regards European-Russian zone that the Continental West Europeans, including the German Federal Republic, Italy, and Benelux should be in a position where they not only can, but will have to, assume a greater measure of responsibility and that the four Western Powers at London, and particularly US, should avoid being in a position where we in effect are taking the initiative on the Continental zone and merely having from time to time reports and superficial consultation as to what we are doing and planning.
- (5)
- This approach will, we think, make it desirable and perhaps necessary that NATO should itself establish a working group which while not formally a part of the UN Subcommittee will in fact be able to participate effectively in any European-Russian zone negotiations, and have a responsible representation continuously in London or Paris.
- (6)
- We appreciate that it may strain NATO to organize this appropriately. On the other hand, it provides NATO with an important new opportunity.
- (7)
- You may, if you think it can be done in complete confidence, and indicating this procedure is not firm until it is considered by three Western Powers in London, let Spaak know on Tuesday of the general lines of our thinking as above described so that he will know what to expect from the presentation which Stassen et al. will be making on Wednesday. We think you can do this better than Stassen himself who should only function in this matter as part of the Four Power Western team now in London. If, following his talk with other three powers in London, Stassen feels even this confidential and tentative approach is not advisable at this time, Stassen should inform you and Department Niact.
Dulles