The discussion brought out various issues and the areas of agreement and
disagreement thereon which would be submitted to the President and which
are described in the attached sheets.
[Attachment]
2.4 All signators
(except the US, UK, and USSR) to agree they are prohibited
from the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.
Suggested Issues:
- 1.
- To what extent does the spread of nuclear weapons
capability to fourth countries present a substantial threat
to US security?
- 2.
- How should the use of nuclear weapons by fourth nations be
treated?
Basis of Agreement or
Disagreement:
- 1.
- Quarles, Radford (and apparently
Strauss)
questioned whether spread to fourth nations is a serious
threat to US security. The Secretary, Allen Dulles and Stassen considered that the
spread does entail serious risks for US security and that no
undue concessions were being made by us on this
point.
- 2.
- All agree that the proposal should be modified to allow
the use of nuclear weapons by fourth countries in case of an
attack on the same basis as they would be usable by one of
the three countries possessing nuclear weapons.
- 5.
- Upon the establishment of satisfactorily functioning
inspection system and the cut-off on production of nuclear
materials for weapons purposes, the USSR, UK, and US
will commence agreed equitable proportionate transfers of
fissionable materials in successive increments from previous
production over to internationally inspected and supervised
non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling either national
or international; provided, however, that these transfers
shall be carried out to only a limited degree and each of
the three will be maintaining a very substantial nuclear
weapons capability in so far as the terms of the treaty for
the partial agreement is concerned.
Issues:
- 1.
- What should be the basis of the respective transfers by
the US, USSR, and UK?
- 2.
- Should the amount of the specific transfers be stated in
an initial agreement or determined later?
Substantial Consensus:
The initial agreement should fix the ratios, and preferably the exact
amounts, of the specific transfers by the US, USSR, and UK. As an initial negotiating position, the US should
request that the USSR transfer
amounts equal to our own transfers. The UK transfer should be nominal. If agreement cannot be
reached on the above basis of equality, Stassen should request further instruction.
6. Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 1958),
the USSR and US and other states
concerned will move promptly to install and begin to operate an
aerial inspection system in accordance with the approved Eisenhower method in initial zones,
including
- a)
- all of the Soviet Union north of the Arctic Circle
(including the Murmansk Kola Peninsular and Dikson areas)
and all of the Soviet Union east of 108 degrees East
Longitude (from Lake Baikal to Bering Straits); and an equal
geographic area of Alaska, Canada, and Western US.
- b)
- all of the Soviet Union west of 27 and one-half degrees
East Longitude (Minsk–Zhmerinka line) and all of the
territory of Europe between 2 and one-half degrees East
Longitude and 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude and
between 42 degrees, 20 minutes, North Latitude and 63
degrees North Latitude. (Labelled as the Russian and
European zone for convenience in this cable.)
Suggested Issue:
Scope of aerial and ground inspection zones.
[Page 548]
Areas of Agreement or
Disagreement:
- 1.
- In view of the effects on our NATO allies and the complexity of the multi
national interests involved, the European-Russian aerial and
ground control zones should be treated separately from the
US-USSR zone in so far
as possible, and should be handled in a way allowing
Europeans to have a full voice in the development of the
position.
- 2.
- As an initial negotiating position for American-Russian
aerial and ground control zones, the US should propose that
our side include continental US, Alaska, and Canada, and the
Soviet side include all Soviet territory. If the Soviets
continue to refuse to deal on this basis the US should move
to a limited initial zone—in order to start an inspection
technique—which would comprise roughly the entire area north
of the Arctic Circle, all of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands,
the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the Kuriles Islands. Stassen felt that since the
Russians have come forward with an offer of inspection over
a large area of the USSR,
the US should counter initially with an offer of a large
area of the US before moving to a very limited inspection
zone. Stassen also
believes that the Soviets will not agree to a US-USSR inspection zone without
simultaneous agreement on a European zone.
- 10.
- Within the following nine months after furnishing the
blueprints (estimated July 1959), the USSR and the US would (in the
manner outlined by US JCS in
the Secretary of Defense letter of October 30, 19565) place in internationally
supervised national storage in disarmament depots 15% of the
major designated armaments reported in their blueprints,
including nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles, and would reduce
their armed forces to two and one-half million and would
bring the level of their military expenditures down by
15%.
Issue:
What kind of reductions in armaments should be provided in the
agreement in the initial stage while the inspection system is being
installed?
Basis of Disagreement:
- 1.
- Quarles believes
that the agreement should leave to each country to decide
for itself what armaments should be put in depots. He
asserted that the timing of inspection would not justify any
specific prior agreement regarding types and amounts of
weapons to be mothballed.
- 2.
- Stassen considered
that the agreement should specifically provide the amounts
of designated armaments to be put in mothballs on the ground
that this was necessary as a beginning and would not entail
undue risks in view of the method of mothballing, the size
of the reductions, and the immediate subsequent
inspection.
Paragraphs 16, 19, 20, 21, and 22. These paragraphs all deal with a
second phase following the successful implementation of the first
phase.
Issue:
Should our position contain such detailed provisions regarding a
second phase of reduction?
Consensus:
- 1.
- It is not wise to spell out in this much detail a second
phase of reduction.
- 2.
- US should state that it would be prepared to negotiate for
major reductions in armaments and armed forces if the first
phase succeeded.
- 3.
- Stassen thought a
reference to a floor of 1.5 million was most desirable;
Quarles felt the
figure should not be less than 2 million.
- 18.
- Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty
(estimated as July 1958) all signators would be committed to
a temporary suspension for 12 months of all nuclear tests
and during such 12 months to cooperate in the design of an
agreed inspection system which would support the nuclear
materials cut-off commitment, and which would also verify
either an agreement for limitation on the amount of
fissionable material released per year into the atmosphere
by the three in future tests, or to verify a continued
limited suspension of tests. The agreement to be so drawn
that a failure to agree upon and to install the inspection
system involved for these two commitments or the failure to
agree on either a limitation of tests or further suspension
of tests beyond the 12 months would automatically result in
no legal commitments against tests after the 12
months.
Issue:
Should nuclear tests be suspended, even temporarily, prior to
adequately inspected cut-off of output of nuclear weapons and the
beginning of inspected transfers from weapons stockpiles to peaceful
uses?
Basis of Disagreement:
- 1.
- Strauss considers this
issue should be answered “no”, but suggested some intermediate
positions.
- 2.
- Stassen considers his
proposal to be necessary for coping with the Fourth Nation
problem and for obtaining Russian agreement.
- 3.
- Quarles believes that
the agreement should contain (a)6 positive provisions, including setting up
an International Commission to monitor and eventually to control
tests and (b) undertaking that next tests would be 12 months
ahead coupled with a U.S. statement that we might cancel tests
if there were further agreement.7
- 23.
- The signators agree that within three months after the
effective date of the treaty (estimated to be October 1958) they
will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to
design inspection controls (and upon reaching an agreed
definition, to install them) to fulfill a commitment that
sending objects through outer space and sending unmanned objects
over distances in excess of medium range at any altitude, shall
be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, and further
designed to verify and insure compliance with a commitment not
to build or to install intercontinental ballistic or guided
missiles or rockets.
This paragraph deals with the control of rockets intercontinental
ballistic and guided missiles.
Issue:
Should this type of weapon be separated out for special
treatment?
Basis of Agreement and
Disagreement:
The Secretary, Allen Dulles,
and Stassen favored this
paragraph which reflects existing policy already put forward in the
Disarmament meeting. Quarles
expressed some doubt.
