Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

183. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1957¹

Washington, April 20, 1957

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Robert Bowie, S/P
  • Mr. Andrew Berding, P
  • Mr. Walter N. Walmsley, IO
  • Mr. Charles Stelle, S/P
  • Mr. Gerard Smith, S/AE
  • Mr. Ronald Spiers, UNP
• Disarmament Staff
  • Governor Harold Stassen
  • Mr. Robert Matteson
  • Col. Ray Firehock
  • Col. Benjamin Willis
  • Mr. John Lippmann
• Atomic Energy Commission
  • Mr. Lewis L. Strauss
  • Admiral Paul Foster
  • General Starbird
  • Mr. Edward Gardner
• USIA
  • Mr. Abbott Washburn
    Central Intelligence Agency
  • Mr. Allen Dulles
    Department of Defense
  • General Alonzo Fox²
  • General Herbert Loper

The Secretary said that disarmament negotiations in London seemed to be sufficiently serious and have enough potentiality to warrant a stock-taking over the Easter recess. Whereas he had tried conscientiously to follow the cable reports which had been received, there was no substitute for personal talks.

The Secretary asked Governor Stassen to begin with a summary of the situation as he appraised it.

Governor Stassen said that he appreciated the opportunity to have a direct exchange of views and thanked the Secretary for the chance to return for this session. After he had received the Secretary’s cable,³ he had discussed the status of the negotiations separately with the heads of each of the other Western Delegations. He would like to give a very brief background statement and then focus on several of the key issues. He said at the beginning of the current negotiations the other Western Delegations had felt that in view of the current atmosphere the situation was almost hopeless, that there would likely be a short series of meetings and a quick adjournment. He had then counselled a careful exploration before reaching adverse conclusions. Gradually it became apparent that the Soviets were showing some interest in the possibility of reaching a first step agreement. At that point several of the other delegations and particularly Moch swung to an opposite extreme of optimism. Governor Stassen said that he had then cautioned against too optimistic a reaction and had pointed up the many difficulties in the way of an agreement, even for a limited first step. He said that at the recess for Easter another phase in the negotiations was just beginning. There was a substantial element (mostly trade and commercial) in the UK and France, which was against the reunification of Germany. They feared the future competition and were concerned of new future danger from Germany. They blamed Germany for their present difficult status. Since they believed that a first step disarmament agreement would facilitate reunification, these elements were opposed to such an agreement and were beginning to bring their influence to bear on their respective governments. Macmillan had sounded a somewhat different note in his statement in Commons last Wednesday to the effect that too narrow an agreement would be undesirable.⁴ The U.S. Delegation had begun an endeavor to convince the UK and France of the soundness to their national interest of a first step agreement which would be in the U.S. national interest. There were some other counter-balancing elements in the total situation since Adenauer had given a favorable view of U.S. policy as it was being presented in London in a public statement a week ago.⁵

Governor Stassen referred to the fact that Zorin had asked to see him on April 12 and had told him that the U.S. proposals were receiving serious study in Moscow.⁶ Three days later Zorin informed Moch about his Easter recess trip to Moscow.⁷ In Governor Stassen’s view the important thing to look for now was what Zorin would come back with. There were certain important indications of a changing attitude on the part of the Soviets. They seemed to be ready for more inspection than heretofore, although they seemed also to be uncertain as to how much inspection they could accept and what its effect might be on the Soviet system. They recognized dangers to their regime in the opening up for inspection. They were also seriously thinking of what the effects of reductions might be on the European scene. They appeared to be worried about public resistance against the Soviet in East Germany and Poland. Secondly, the Soviets seemed to be worried about the development of a multiple nation nuclear weapons capability. In his view, the Soviets were now giving serious thought to reaching a limited agreement. He thought that there was a reasonable probability that through arduous and careful negotiations a small first step that would be in the U.S. interest could result. He emphasized that by the nature of the situation such an agreement could not be overwhelmingly in the U.S. interest. However, he stressed that the Soviets had indicated the separability of certain of the points which had been heretofore the greatest obstacle to reaching agreement, such as the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and the abolition of all foreign bases. Governor Stassen thought that the developments in London were relevant to four U.S. objectives that the Secretary of State had enunciated: (1) stopping the spread of nuclear weapons development on the part of other countries; (2) reducing the possibility of surprise attack on the U.S.; (3) a beginning of the opening up of the Soviet Union; and (4) setting the stage for later negotiations on some of the outstanding major international political problems with which the U.S. was concerned. These, Governor Stassen said, were the U.S. foreign policy objectives which could be advanced by a limited first stage agreement without an unacceptable U.S. price in return. We have now reached a crucial turning point. When Zorin returns it may be either to close up the Subcommittee negotiations or to enter on a new stage of tough bargaining. Governor Stassen said that the latter eventuality would require a careful overall review of U.S. policy on disarmament in Washington.

The Secretary asked for more detail about what might be in such an opening step. Governor Stassen said that it would consist of first, a cutoff of nuclear production for weapons and, secondly, some kind of a limitation or cessation on nuclear testing. Governor Stassen emphasized that he did not think that any first step would have great significance in terms of the reduction of nuclear capability for either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. themselves. The important factor in his view, was what could be done in order to get the “fourth countries” to go along, sign the treaty, and stay out of the nuclear weapons production field. He was of the opinion that there would have to be some further movement in the U.S. position if this was to be accomplished. With respect to the cut-off on nuclear production, Governor Stassen said that the Russians were worried about the fact that there was no limitation in the U.S. position on further production of nuclear weapons from existing stocks of fissionable material on hand at the time of the cut-off and that the UK and France were also suspicious of this question in the U.S. position. Something will have to be done to assure other countries that we are not contemplating the continuing production of unlimited supplies of new weapons from fissionable materials on hand after the cut-off date.

The Secretary asked for Stassen’s views on what the first step on nuclear testing would consist of. Governor Stassen reviewed the present U.S. policy on this question and observed that this would not be attractive enough to get the “fourth countries” to go along. The Soviet Union has moved slightly in its own policy, having indicated a willingness to accept a limited moratorium if a complete cessation were not acceptable to others. Governor Stassen then explained the meaning of his suggestion contained in Disarmament Telegram 119.⁸ He said that Moch had told him that France would be ready to test its first weapon within two years, and that if some definite action were not taken by at least six months before the end of this period, it would be impossible to stop France from developing a weapons program. This would mean that Germany would also insist on going into production, and that the spread to many states would be almost inevitable. Governor Stassen emphasized that his twelve month limited suspension proposal would entail only a limited risk during the portion of year during which a nuclear inspection system was being installed.

Mr. Strauss observed that there would be other substantial penalties involved in acceptance of such a policy. Once a moratorium had been accepted it would not be easy to resume testing and a year of development would have been lost. The Secretary observed that he did not see how the “fourth country” problem would be solved if only a one year suspension were involved during which time countries could go ahead on the preparation for resumption of testing. Governor Stassen said that during these twelve months an inspection system to insure that all new fissionable production went for non-weapons purposes would be in the process of installation. The “fourth countries” would have taken commitment not to produce weapons. They would want to see how it worked out with the three nuclear weapon states. The treaty would include the escape clause for suspension or withdrawal if it did not work out. He thought that if, at the end of the twelve months period the three testing Governments had agreed on a system for test limitation of a small amount of fallout per year for each of the three, the “fourth countries” would be willing to stay with the agreement, depending, of course, upon the nature of the health reports which were then being received. Mr. Strauss observed that the U.S. was now in a position to make a family of weapons which would not produce as much strontium 90. This would not have been possible without a vigorous testing program. A discussion of the most recent British Atomic Scientists report on the health factor ensued.⁹ Mr. Strauss minimized the health danger. Governor Stassen said that a major international scientific debate on this was underway; he had read the reports and believed the most that could be said was that the scientists did not know with certainty the extent of the health danger either genetically or of bone cancer and leukemia.

At the Secretary’s request, Governor Stassen went on to the problem of conventional weapons, stating that the U.S. Delegation had put the emphasis, as urged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on nuclear weapons delivery systems. He had in the Subcommittee given alternative explanations of methods of accomplishing such reductions, as explorations and without commitment of the U.S. Government, such as the placing of 10 percent of these armament systems in “disarmament depots” while the inspection system was being installed. He noted that the Soviet Union had not objected to his proposal.

The Secretary asked what connection had been made between the armaments and the manpower reductions. Governor Stassen replied that it was felt by the Joint Chiefs that until a report on what the Russians had was received it would be impossible to work out a meaningful arms-manpower formula. That was why the U.S. proposed that an armaments report “blueprint” would be made during the third month of the agreement. This report would serve as the basis for negotiation of an arms-manpower formula. In the interim, governments would accept an arbitrary 10 percent cut. The Secretary observed that the calculation of such a formula need not be influenced by what the Russians have and that a formula could be arrived at through a process of simple reasoning. The Secretary said that he was concerned lest the U.S. end up with manpower reductions which would be meaningful for us but not for the Russians. He stressed again that the only effective limitations were limitations on armaments. The Secretary asked whether Governor Stassen had discussed with the Soviets a system of selective arms reduction which would concentrate on specific long-range delivery systems. Governor Stassen said that he had, and that the Russians had agreed that we should concentrate on the important arms categories, although they had, of course, made no firm commitments and neither had we.

Returning to the question of nuclear testing, Mr. Strauss said that he wished to emphasize the distinction in his mind between cessation and limitation. He would be willing to go along with a limitation on testing but he felt that cessation would mean the end of the U.S. weapons development program since scientists would drift away from the laboratories. The Soviets, on the other hand, were under no such handicap. They could break any agreement and end up far ahead of us. Some type of limitation, either on the size of weapons, the number of shots, or the amount of fallout produced, was an entirely different matter, in his view. Governor Stassen said that he thought it would be possible to keep the laboratories going under the system he proposed in Disarmament Telegram 119 if at the end of a year an agreed and monitored limitation were put into effect. Mr. Bowie pointed out that it could well be our position after further review during the twelve month period that the cessation could go on indefinitely. Mr. Washburn observed that if the moratorium were successful for one year the public pressure against resumption would be tremendous.

General Loper asked whether the first steps to which Governor Stassen referred would include conventional reductions and the provision for transfer of nuclear weapons materials to peaceful uses. Governor Stassen said that it did include these elements, as well as a beginning on aerial inspection and an agreement on its progressive installation.

General Fox explained the JCS view which had been contained in the October 30, 1956 letter to Governor Stassen.¹⁰ Whereas this letter proposed a 10 percent reduction in nuclear delivery systems, to be followed by a further 15 percent second stage reduction, the JCS felt that the U.K. arms-manpower formula should be applicable to all other armaments. This distinction had not been made clear in Governor Stassen’s proposals in London and he wished to emphasize that the JCS felt that there was a point beyond which we should not go in applying the percentage concept.

The Secretary asked how it would be possible to decide just how much 10 percent would be, since we would have no prior information on the total arms the Russians had. Governor Stassen stated that this could be determined on the basis of the report of an armaments “blueprint” which was due within the third month after the effective date of the treaty and which would be verified during the remaining nine months of the first year. The risk involved was self-limiting because of the “operational depot” idea.

Going on to the area of inspection and control, Governor Stassen outlined the U.S. views as they had been presented in London on ground and aerial inspection. The Secretary asked what implications Stassen’s discussions on aerial inspection would have for the dividing line in Germany. Governor Stassen replied that he had been careful to avoid any measurements on the basis of the dividing line. He said that furthermore his discussions of the first step in progressive aerial inspection had been carefully presented as a “concept” and not as a detailed concrete proposal. He said the zone in Europe was described by latitude and longitude, the center was in the area of Vienna and Stockholm and did not fall on the dividing line in Germany. He remarked that the Canadian Cabinet had specifically endorsed the first step aerial inspection suggestions and had agreed to the inclusion of some of Canada in the Siberia-Alaska zone.

The Secretary said that he would give some further time for questions to Governor Stassen, after which he would like to hear the Governor’s ideas about any modifications in his existing instructions which Stassen might consider appropriate. He emphasized that this meeting could not, of course, change these instructions since they would have to be considered by the NSC and the President. The Secretary believed it would be helpful to have Governor Stassen’s views outlined in writing.

General Fox asked when, in Stassen’s time table, the whole of the Soviet Union would be subject to aerial inspection. Governor Stassen said that no position had been taken on this, although he had repeatedly said that the U.S. still felt that it would be preferable to have total aerial inspection from the very beginning. With regard to the Secretary’s request for his ideas as to possible modifications in instructions, Stassen thought that in general it would be best to await Zorin’s return and carefully explore the Soviet post-recess position before we made any new move in U.S. Governmental proposals. However, he did feel that the testing problem would be a crucial one if Zorin came back ready to negotiate further. Secondly, he thought that it would be necessary for us to give an indication of a willingness to set some time or quantitative limits on the further production of weapons from fissionable material stocks that existed prior to the cut-off date upon installation of the inspection system. Mr. Strauss said that the present pipeline ran directly from production facilities to weapons and that there was no excess materials so that this should not present a serious problem. Governor Stassen asked whether we could say that we would accept two months limitation. Mr. Strauss said that he would like to consider this matter further and to discuss it with Mr. Allen Dulles before giving a firm answer, since the Russians might be able to deduce some sensitive information from such a statement. He said that it would be accurate to say that even the material which we will allocate to our allies abroad for power programs will come out of our current weapons production. Governor Stassen suggested that Mr. A. Dulles, Mr. Strauss and he meet on Monday¹¹ to discuss the matter.

Governor Stassen said that he had a few other general impressions which would interest the group. He said that it was clear to him that the Soviet Union was very much concerned about a rearmed and uncontrolled Germany. The Soviet Union was also quite concerned about the “fourth country” problem and had repeatedly expressed its concern about the implications of having nuclear weapons in the hands of “irresponsible” powers not so much by what they could do in total, but the danger that their actions might lead to involvement with the U.S. The Secretary observed that this was an important common ground between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Strauss asked for clarification on a number of the details in Disarmament Telegram 119. He said that he was very reluctant to consider any policy change in this area but that in response to the query of the Secretary of State he would consider the matter most carefully. Governor Stassen pointed out that he had not asked for a decision in this telegram. He felt that any further thought on this matter would have to depend on the nature of Zorin’s instructions upon his return from Moscow. As a result of this trip, the Soviets may well conclude that they do not wish to pay the price in terms of opening up the Soviet Union, for the possible advantages to them in limited agreement. The Secretary said that even if there were no substantial disarmament agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R any steps forward towards the elimination of the “fourth country” problem would justify our taking some risk. Mr. Strauss said that there was no 100 percent assurance that the “fourth country” problem could be solved. He said that in his view France or any other number of countries could build an old fashioned gun-type weapon in a short time even without tests, provided the material was available. Governor Stassen said that there would be little incentive for such a violation if a first step agreement could be reached. The risks of detection would far outweigh the advantage which would be gained by getting a small stock of bathtub-type weapons. If France and Germany would go along with such an agreement, he thought that no other country would refrain from going along. Public opinion in all countries would be on the side of joining such a first step under such circumstances, with the escape clause to fall back on.

The Secretary asked General Loper to have the Department of Defense staff draft a paper on this subject which could be cleared with Governor Stassen before he returns to London on Tuesday.¹²

Governor Stassen said that there was one final question which he wished to raise. The U.S. presently had no position for reductions beyond the 2.5 million. Some indication of a second stage would be necessary if Zorin indicated a willingness to move further. He asked the Department of Defense to begin to study this. General Fox noted that the DOD’s present instructions were that specific discussions of a second stage would depend on the status of solution of political problems.

The Secretary said he thought that it was most imperative to move towards a solution of the “fourth country” problem, towards control of long-distance delivery systems, as well as installation of an inspection system which would guard against surprise attack. In his view, an approach which involved numerical levels of man-power and armaments presented almost insoluble problems. Consequently, he was not certain that a discussion about a second stage would be fruitful and he did not think that we would be able to reach such an agreement in our lifetime. There were other problems which were more capable of being dealt with and he would hope that these problems would not be tied up with those which were less tractable and thus prevent the solution of any of them. Governor Stassen said that he had been urging this approach on Moch and Noble who had a tendency to think in too comprehensive terms. He had cautioned them that if too much were attempted only failure could result.

Mr. Strauss asked if he could have a copy of the latest revision of the draft treaty. The Secretary said that he would not wish to have a treaty discussed in the Subcommittee in London. If this became public knowledge there would be too much excitement in Congress.

Governor Stassen said that only the partial provisions had been discussed with other Delegations and that these did not even have position paper status. They were labelled as preliminary drafts of working papers of partial provisions. Governor Stassen said that he would like to discuss privately with the Secretary the question of Senate representation in London and a few other points. The Secretary agreed, but stated that he felt that Senate representation would be premature, although he would be willing to reconsider the matter if Zorin’s new instructions made this appear desirable.

The Secretary noted that there were a great number of press people waiting outside for the meeting to break up and said that he would like to work out a line with Governor Stassen and Mr. Berding.¹³ He asked that the others say only that the meeting had been held to receive a first hand report from Governor Stassen.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4–2057. Top Secret. Drafted by Spiers on April 24.
2. General Alonzo P. Fox, USA, Military Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.
3. Telegram 7370 to London, April 17, requested Stassen to return to Washington to report personally on the negotiations during the April 18–23 recess. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–1757)
4. In the House of Commons, April 17, Macmillan said, among other things, that he favored full disarmament, and he rejected the abolition of nuclear weapons “without such corresponding reductions in conventional forces as would make Europe safe from Soviet aggression.” (Parliamentary Debates, vol. 568, 5th Series, cols. 2038–2050)
5. In a speech in Cologne on April 13, Adenauer argued that it was unrealistic to renounce in principle nuclear weapons given the present world situation. (The New York Times, April 14, p. 24)
6. Stassen’s conversation with Zorin following the subcommittee meeting of April 12 is summarized in telegram 5597 from London, April 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–1357)
7. Moch’s account of Zorin’s travel plans is reported in telegram 5647 from London, April 15. (Ibid., 330.13/4–1557)
8. Printed as telegram 5610 from London, Document 181.
9. Reference is to the British Atomic Scientists Association’s report on strontium 90, summarized in The New York Times, April 17, 1957, p. 3.
10. Document 164.
11. No record of this proposed April 22 meeting has been found in Department of State files.
12. No Department of Defense paper on this subject drafted before Stassen’s return to London on Tuesday, April 23, has been found in Department of State files.
13. For text of a statement agreed upon by Dulles and Stassen and read by Berding to news correspondents following this meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1957, p. 772.