Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

182. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, April 17, 1957—4 p.m.

5700. USDEL Disarmament No. 131.

1. In view of Zorin statements at luncheon April 16 (Embtel 5619)² reflecting the importance in Soviet view of spread of nuclear weapons and some search on his part for clarification, a bilateral session was held at Lancaster House in the Chairman’s room following adjournment of the subcommittee session April 16. Stassen, Peaslee, Matteson, Owsley (State), Abbott (DOD),³ Goodby (AEC);⁴ and Zorin and five of the Soviet delegates present. Akalovsky (US) interpreted.

2. Stassen opened discussion with statement he wished to clarify US position in response to questions raised by Zorin at luncheon and in subcommittee, and to invite further clarification by Zorin.

3. Zorin had spoken of US bases, the placing of US nuclear weapons in hands of other states on the periphery of the Soviet Union, and of Soviet view of these as threat to USSR security. Stassen emphasized that US position was defensive, that foreign bases and forces on foreign soil reflected different strategic and geographical situations of Soviet Union and US. Soviet Union had extensive geographical spread from border of Poland to Siberia, from Murmansk to borders of Iran. US in contrast had smaller geographical territory located within one continent. US had vital interests as well as geographical territory to safeguard. US had released the Philippines to full independence and had not taken any additional territory in areas like Africa and Near East after World War I and World War II. As President Eisenhower had stated to Chairman Bulganin at Summit meeting basic vital interests of Russia and the US were not in conflict, it should be possible to maintain peace, and the US must be expected to safeguard its territory and its vital interests in a manner in keeping with its own strategic position.

4. Stassen stated furthermore that Zorin apparently misunderstood present situation in that US had not delivered nuclear weapons to other states, that US law as now on the books prohibits delivery of US nuclear weapons to other states, but of course US law did not prohibit possession of nuclear weapons by US forces on territory of other states with consent of such other states. Stassen also emphasized difference between developments which had occurred and would likely occur in the absence of agreement on the subcommittee’s work, as compared to results which would flow from a sound though limited agreement in the subcommittee’s work.

5. Zorin conceded that strategic positions of US and USSR were quite different, but Soviets proceed from premise that security of US is not threatened because USSR has no bases on periphery of US. Presence of bases along borders USSR on other hand did constitute threat. Zorin referred not only to US bases, but bases of other countries using weapons supplied by US. Presence of units armed with nuclear weapons was special problem for USSR and other countries friendly to USSR. In addition, presence of US troops and troops of other nations stationed in foreign territories—e.g., Germany especially presence of atomic units, made solution of problems affecting US and USSR more difficult. Question of stationing troops was one that has been raised for some time but special problem of atomic units has become urgent only recently.

6. Zorin stated that presence of USSR troops in Germany and Warsaw Pact countries—although this was answer to stationing US troops in Germany and NATO countries—was also an impediment to our reaching agreement in subcommittee and, therefore, USSR proposals contemplated mutual reductions of troops in those areas. Because not realistic at this time, USSR did not contemplate complete troop withdrawal in a limited agreement although this had been previous Soviet position.

7. On prohibition use of atomic weapons, Zorin felt US laws were not enough to solve problem which had become matter for international solution. Neither was article 51 alone sufficient as it was preatomic. USSR has long thought start should be made by undertaking solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons. Now question should be one of how to formulate this solemn obligation in order guarantee security of all nations to some extent at least. USSR considers that formula stated in their proposals May 10, 1955 should go long way towards satisfying all requirements or at least some restrictions should be agreed.

8. As regards prohibition use nuclear weapons, Stassen stated that leaving matter for decision of Security Council was not acceptable since any one of 5 permanent members could stop use which would mean increased danger of conventional war on part of other nations counting on veto in Security Council preventing use of nuclear weapons. Any beginning of a conventional war by other states would include a danger of spreading to a major nuclear war.

9. Zorin suggested reduction of forces of major powers—especially United States and USSR—in Europe should lessen tension and permit solution of political problems and development collective security agreement in this part of world. Establishment of zone of limitation and inspection of military forces and armaments should set stage for collective security agreements, and political settlements. He said the United Kingdom had earlier proposed this.

10. Stassen inquired whether this element of Soviet proposals was considered indispensable part of any limited general agreement in subcommittee work or merely a desirable part.

11. Zorin replied that answer to this question would depend on determination of a number of parallel questions. Zorin further countered with question whether United States considered it possible to include something of these proposals in an eventual agreement.

12. Stassen replied he would not give categorical answer today but wished to acquire more thorough understanding of Soviet position in matter since it was after all Soviet proposal. Stassen stated that negotiations affecting political questions such European security and other European problems would not take place in subcommittee. He asked, however, whether problems to which Zorin referred as being easier of settlement included reunification of Germany.

13. Zorin reiterated point that reduction in armed forces stationed in foreign territories—particularly in Germany within a limited general disarmament agreement—would facilitate solution of various problems of regional security and that this armaments limitation can and should be negotiated in subcommittee.

14. Stassen restated that solution of political and European problems are not subject for subcommittee discussion.

15. Zorin said Soviets do not suggest solution of political problems be sought in subcommittee, but only that settlement of question of stationing of forces would lead to settlement of political problems. As regards problems establishing zones of armaments limitation and inspection this is included directly in subcommittee’s terms of reference and has previously been proposed by Western powers including especially the United Kingdom.

16. At conclusion of meeting Zorin confirmed his intention return Moscow over Easter recess and that in fact he might wish stay even day or two longer in which case Roschin⁵ (Counselor, Soviet Embassy, London) would carry on in his place.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–1757. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Ottawa, and Tokyo.
2. Reference should be to telegram 5691 from London, April 17, not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Colonel Thomas W. Abbott, USAF, Adviser to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.
4. James E. Goodby, Office of International Affairs, AEC, and AEC Adviser to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.
5. Aleksei Alekseevich Roshchin, Soviet Minister-Counselor to the United Kingdom.