Office of the Historian

181. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

London, April 13, 1957—3 p.m.

5610. In addition to normal distribution please pass to Admiral Strauss, Dr. Libby and Robert Cutler. USDEL Disarmament No 119. Subject: Nuclear Tests.

1.
USDEL, with thorough discussion by its members including State, Defense, and AEC members, has been endeavoring to carefully examine the nuclear test situation from the standpoint of the security interest of the U.S. On the basis of such examination, the chairman of the USDEL forwards the following observations.
2.
A number of govts beyond the nuclear three are at the point of making decisions to fabricate and test nuclear weapons.
3.
A strong majority and perhaps as much as two-thirds or more of the UN General Assembly are in favor of the cessation of nuclear tests at least until more knowledge of the health factor is obtained.
4.
The USDEL at the UN was able to avoid a vote on this issue at this Assembly through referring all proposals by unanimous agreement to the subcommittee, and this is not likely to succeed again if the subcommittee does not make concrete progress.
5.
The spreading of nuclear power plants will place into the hands of many nations the most important materials for future nuclear weapons fabrication.
6.
It is important to the future US national security that nuclear weapons should not be spread into many hands.
7.
It is important to US national security that the US should be able to carry out tests in the spring of 1958 without the necessity of defying UNGA resolution in order to do so.
8.
The unusual world wide public interest in nuclear testing can be used as a favorable element in obtaining the adherence of non-nuclear states to a treaty along the lines of US policy on the stopping of production of nuclear material for weapons purposes, and for the general abstention from nuclear weapons capability on the part of such non-nuclear states.
9.
There is a better prospect of obtaining Soviet agreement to a limited treaty generally along the lines of US policy now than there has been at any point in the past eleven years.
10.
Therefore, it is suggested that consideration begin to be given in Washington to a US position which would provide,
(a)
If an agreement is reached for the establishment of an effective international control and the establishment of a control body to administer such control, satisfactory to the US, and
(b)
If such a limited agreement includes the commitment to cease producing nuclear materials for weapons purposes and to begin transfers along the lines of US policy, and
(c)
If the limited agreement includes the beginnings of reductions of armaments including nuclear delivery capabilities, and of armed forces and military expenditures under inspection along the lines of US policy, and
(d)
If the agreement includes the beginnings of serial inspection, a commitment to progressively expand it, and improved safeguards against surprise attack,
(e)
In that event, the limited treaty may include, effective as of August 1, 1958, or as soon thereafter as the treaty enters into force by the ratification of the essential govts in accordance with their constitutional processes, a limited suspension of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests for 12 months, such limited suspension to be verified by the control organ, and during such limited suspension the control organ, with a requirement of unanimous major power vote, shall either establish a new limitation agreement under inspection, or a continuing cessation under inspection, or the limited suspension shall automatically terminate and all states will be free as now to test by national decision.
Whitney
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–1357. Secret.↩