Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

184. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, April 21, 1957, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, April 21, 1957, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Call by Dr. Matsushita, Special Envoy to United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Matsushita, President of St. Paul’s University, Tokyo (Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to United Kingdom)
• Mr. Shimoda, Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., Embassy of Japan
• The Secretary
• Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

The Secretary invited Dr. Matsushita to call on him at his home today at 4:00 p.m. The Secretary stressed that the President and he feel it is imperative to find some way to stop the creation and possible use of atomic weapons. He said that in his speech on the following day² he would say that the use of such weapons would be disaster.

The Secretary said that the greatest difficulty results in the possession of atomic weapons by the Soviet Government, whose words can not be relied upon. How to accomplish the United States objective is not clear. The United States believes that the only safe method lies in a system of inspection and control. The Secretary informed Dr. Matsushita that Mr. Stassen had reported that the London Conference is slightly more encouraging, but it is still not clear whether a system of inspection and control can be obtained. Until we achieve this, we can not be sure that the Soviets will not get ahead of the free world, which would mean disaster.

Dr. Matsushita referred to the new Japanese proposal to figure out a way to detect the presence of atomic weapons.³ He added hopefully that if such were possible, perhaps the world powers would stop testing and instead develop a system of control.

The Secretary explained that the United States is more concerned about the spread of atomic weapons than testing, because this could put the weapons into irresponsible hands. He added that perhaps too much stress is placed on testing, since if properly handled, testing involved little risk.

Dr. Matsushita replied that there is some disagreement among the scientists. Since the United States has a heavy responsibility in the defense of the free world, it probably underestimates the dangers of tests. Japan, however, which experienced these weapons, perhaps overestimates the dangers. The Secretary referred to the United States initiative in cooperation to establish an international body to accumulate and evaluate information regarding the extent and dangers of radiation.⁴

Dr. Matsushita explained that in his conversation with European scientists he understood that continuation of the tests at the present rate for a long period of time is impossible from the viewpoint of safety. He added that Japan is very much concerned. The Secretary responded that it is a proper subject for concern. However, it is desirable not to view the tests out of relation to other dangers. He explained that the entire armament problem is somewhat like a chess game. He doubts that even the Soviets plan to use the atom bomb. The Soviets are anxious, however, to expand their armament position to the point where the free world feels checkmated and would then have to admit defeat and submit to Soviet domination. The Secretary said that this possibility is a greater danger than the risk of the possible use of the weapons or the risks involved in continuation of the tests. The Free World can not permit the Soviets to develop such a position.

The Secretary said that the situation is made more difficult by the inability of the free world to trust any promises by the Soviets. The Soviets are atheists and use any trick to achieve their ends. He alluded to the fact that the Soviets agreed during the armistice concluding the war with Japan in August 1945 to release all Japanese war prisoners. One month later, however, when Mr. Molotov was asked in London about releasing Japanese prisoners, he replied that that clause was included in the armistice for the sole purpose of obtaining Japan’s surrender. The free world would be foolish to stop the tests merely on the promise of the Soviets to stop.

Dr. Matsushita explained that he could see completely the point of view expressed by the Secretary. In fact, he said, he was in the unfortunate position of having to agree with everything the Secretary said. However, Japan considers continuation of the tests a great danger, although it may not come for some time.

The Secretary explained that much of the testing by the United States has been for the purpose of developing a bomb with very little radiation. The last United States test in the Pacific demonstrated progress in this direction. He explained that widespread availability of atomic weapons could put the weapons into the hands of some countries with little at stake. The U.S.S.R. has a great stake. Through forced sacrifice, the Soviet people have made industrial progress of which they are proud and would not want to have wiped out.

Dr. Matsushita commented that the majority of the Japanese people are sympathetic with and friendly to the United States. The Japanese know that it is in the best interests of Japan to work closely with the United States. However, the Communists take advantage of every possible opportunity. If the Communists were to take the lead in eliminating the atomic danger, this could increase the neutralist tendencies in Japan. Dr. Matsushita explained that he had accepted his assignment by Prime Minister Kishi because he was convinced that liberty-loving people should lead the movement. He added that the United States at times may not like some of the Japanese courses but the long-term interests of United States-Japanese relations indicate the desirability of a sympathetic attitude on the part of the United States. He explained that intelligent people know the Soviets can not be trusted. The Japanese, however, have suffered the atomic bomb and the public is emotional on the subject.

The Secretary referred to a recent statement by Prime Minister Macmillan that the free world remains so because the United States possesses atomic striking power.⁵ The Secretary said that United States policy must take a sober view of the rights and wrongs; we can not have a policy which merely responds to the psychological and emotional waves of another country.

Dr. Matsushita stated that the solution is partly a matter of technique. Responsible people in Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom must continue to put the blame where it belongs. The Secretary responded that the question of technique was initiated following the Bermuda Conference, when it was stated that registration of tests is a first step in the right direction.⁶ The United States and the United Kingdom always announce in advance that a test will be made. The Soviets, however, are not willing either to register or to announce any tests in advance. The Secretary said he is convinced that the Soviets will not be satisfied unless the United States is put in a position of having to discontinue all research on atomic matters. In a free country, this is too great a risk, and re-assembly of scientific workers would be very timeconsuming. He explained that United States policy continuously evaluates all aspects of a course of action and that the United States follows a policy which it believes best not only for the United States but for the entire free world. However, the United States is never rigid in its decision but always willing to follow an alternative course which has been demonstrated to be correct.

Dr. Matsushita expressed his great satisfaction for the opportunity to discuss these matters with the Secretary on such short notice, and he was grateful to the Secretary for giving his time on such an important day as Easter Sunday.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4–2157. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons. This conversation was reported to Tokyo in telegram 2298, April 21. (Ibid., 770.5611/4–2157)
2. For text of Dulles’ speech to the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in New York, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1957, pp. 715–719.
3. Not further identified.
4. Presumably a reference to Resolution 913 (X) on the “effects of atomic radiation,” cosponsored by the United States and adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly on December 3, 1955. See Document 84.
5. In a speech on April 17, Macmillan argued that his government favored disarmament covering both nuclear and conventional weapons, but he rejected the abolition of nuclear weapons “without such a reduction of conventional weapons as would make Europe safe from Soviet aggression.” (The New York Times, April 18, 1957, p. 4)

6. The final sentence of Annex II to the joint statement by Eisenhower and Macmillan, dated March 24, at the conclusion of their Bermuda meetings reads:

   “We would be willing to register with the United Nations advance notion of our intention to conduct future nuclear tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 212)