Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, files of the Office of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

secret

Washington, September 24, 1953.

• Subject:
• Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad

• Reference: NSC Action No. 867¹

The enclosed report by the Operations Coordinating Board on the subject prepared in response to the National Security Council directive to the Psychological Strategy Board contained in NSC Action No. 867 is transmitted herewith for consideration by the Council of the recommendations contained in pages 6–10 thereof at its meeting on October 1, 1953.

Also enclosed is Annex B to the report. Annex A to the report is not being distributed.² However, a copy is on file in this office for reference.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Acting Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (Jackson) to the National Security Council

secret

Washington, September 23, 1953.

• Subject:
• Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad

• Reference: NSC Action No. 867

A study of the reported decline in U.S. prestige abroad is transmitted herewith for the consideration of the National Security Council in response to the directive of the Council to the Psychological Strategy Board (NSC Action No. 867).

This study was approved by the Operations Coordinating Board at its meeting on September 23, 1953.

It is requested that distribution of this paper be limited to those persons who regularly attend meetings of the National Security Council or the Planning Board.

C. D. Jackson

[Enclosure 2]

Study Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

secret

[Washington,] September 23, 1953.

Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad

Introduction

1. For practical purposes, our prestige may be defined as “our ability to influence other people because of their attitudes toward us, as distinguished from our ability to exert influence through the use of special incentives”. Prestige concerns the weight other people give to our views in forming their own, and therefore is an important factor in determining the degree of cooperation which we can obtain.

2. Prestige is not synonymous with popularity or sympathy. However, popularity is a significant component of prestige, especially insofar as the popular vote for persons or policies favorable to U.S. interests may be influenced by the popularity of the U.S. itself. Other components of prestige include the respect which other people have for our power and success, their confidence in our intentions and our judgment and their admiration for our behavior.

3. It is impossible to gauge precisely the nebulous and fluid state of American prestige. The fabric of inter-acting causes is infinitely complex and full of intangibles. Moreover, any evaluative analysis of our prestige may contain elements of bias, and thereby risk being discounted as a disguised criticism or apology for U.S. policies and actions. Nevertheless, since an accurate appraisal of American prestige is essential to the intelligent choice of policies and tactics, such an appraisal can be valuable if approached with objectivity. The appraisal which follows claims only that partial degree of truth which results from honesty of effort and the filtering out of prejudice by participation of many minds.

4. In formulating corrective courses of action it must be remembered that many of the causes of current antipathy to the U.S. are deeply rooted in human nature or spring from historical events that cannot be undone. The actions herein recommended are offered, therefore, in the expectation that while they should enhance the present prestige of America, they are not panaceas for all our troubles.

Analysis of the Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige

[Note: The following highly condensed summary is drawn from summaries (Annexes A and B) of reports on foreign attitudes furnished by American officials and intelligence officers. These should be consulted for details and qualifications essential to understanding the bald statements that follow.]³

5. Chronology (Start of the decline; low point; trends in past Action 867, questions a, c, & d):

a. Europe: The recent decline began approximately three years ago, became accelerated during the latter half of 1952 and in several important countries U.S. prestige is currently at or near a postwar low.

b. Far East: From a low point in 1949 at the time the Nationalist government was driven from Mainland China, there have been a series of sharp rises and declines in U.S. prestige. During the past six months the trend was steady until adversely affected by our stand over Indian participation at the Korean peace conference.

c. South Asia: With exception of Pakistan steady decline from 1947 which has become accelerated in India during 1953.

d. Arab World: U.S. prestige remains low, but may be recovering slightly from severe low reached at time of Arab-Israeli war.

e. Latin America: Following a sharp decline 1945–48, there was a considerable recovery by 1951 followed by renewed fall until early 1953. During past six months the decline has been arrested and in certain countries a marked improvement achieved.

6. Current Appraisal of our over-all Prestige by Selected Countries:

	Generally Satisfactory	Improvement Desirable	Disturbingly Unsatisfactory
Europe	West Germany	United Kingdom	France
	Netherlands		Italy
	Spain	Austria
	Turkey	Sweden	Denmark
		Belgium
		Switzerland
		Greece
Elsewhere	Korea	Canada	India
	Formosa	Japan	Indonesia
	Philippines	Pakistan
	Thailand	Arab States
		Argentina
		Chile

7. Major Causes (Reference NSC Action 867, question b; causes of lesser importance are listed toward the end of each group):

a. Europe

(1) Distrust of American leadership whether from reasons of jealousy, fear of domination, uncertainty as to our constancy and judgment, or confusion as to what our policies are, e.g. difficulty of reconciling high NATO goals with U.S. military cutbacks.

(2) Revulsion against what many think are manifestations of a dangerous anti-democratic trend in the U.S., particularly attacks on personal liberty and integrity attributed to anti-Communist hysteria; enhanced by bewilderment at the apparent failure of the Administration to clarify its position convincingly. The attitudes described in (3) and (5) below are aggravated by this revulsion.

(3) Increased feeling that American intransigeance stands in the way of a general relaxation of tensions, to which declining fear of Soviet aggression contributes.

(4) Resentment at basic U.S. economic policies and the paradox they involve, particularly:

(a) Strong desire for “trade not aid” frustrated by doubt whether the U.S. will do anything substantial to lower trade barriers and otherwise aid Europeans to earn dollars.

(b) Convinction that our efforts to prevent strategic trade with the Bloc are unnecessarily restrictive and are doing the free world’s economies far more damage than the Bloc’s.

(5) Doubts as to our long-range determination to “stick with” Europe—a composite of annoyance at what is considered excessive concern with Far East, drawing far-fetched conclusions from our attempts to persuade European nations to increase their own efforts, and worries as to whether Americans have permanently forsaken isolationism.

(6) Resentment against unilateralism on the part of U.S., particularly failure to consult NATO partners as “equals”, and against the application of pressure to yield to U.S. views, particularly on what Europeans regard as minor matters.

(7) Terms and application of U.S. Immigration Acts which are considered degrading.

(8) Labor’s impression that U.S. economic aid programs have not been administered with due regard to the interests of lower-income groups.

(9) Statements by certain members of Congress and private citizens and publications which Europeans consider offensive, or which they mistakenly interpret as indicating the trend of U.S. policy.

b. Middle East and Far East

(1) Racial sensitivity and antipathy to Western powers, Persistent belief, despite U.S. professions to contrary, that U.S. regards Asiatic people as inferior, that U.S. tends to patronize Asia, and that U.S. policies and practices do not accord Asiatic governments genuinely equal status with Western powers.

(2) Suspicion that the U.S. is essentially imperialist, or at least unsympathetic with nationalist aspirations. This suspicion is intensified whenever we side with European powers in a dispute with an Asiatic country.

(3) Economic policies—virtually the same as 7.a.(4) above.

(4) Distrust of American leadership. This ranges from the factors discussed under 7.a.(1) above to mere resentment that we are not in accord on particular current issues.

(5) Subordination of East-West struggle to concentration on special national and regional interests, accompanied by belief that U.S. policies ignore these interests.

(6) Feeling of no real stake in the East-West struggle and consequent resentment at pressure by U.S. to participate therein.

(7) Among Arab States resentment at U.S. favoritism for Israel.

c. Latin America

(1) Feeling of being neglected and “taken for granted” (experience with respect to economic aid) and patronized by U.S.

(2) Economic policies—similar to 7.a.(4), but with emphasis more on U.S. tariff policies than on East-West trade controls.

(3) Growth of virulent nationalism often misdirected into Yankee-phobia.

(4) Same as 7.b.(5).

(5) Same as 7.a.(9).

Recommendations

8. Executive Branch Actions

The following actions should be undertaken by the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government in the near future:

a. In forthcoming speeches by high-level governmental officials, including the President, emphasize: (1) U.S. determination to continue cooperation with other free nations; (2) U.S. interest in international economic and political problems as well as collective defense; (3) peaceful purposes of U.S. policies, and intention of U.S. to continue seeking relaxation of international tensions through peaceful negotiation.

b. Strengthen efforts to disassociate the Administration from political extremist viewpoint identified in the foreign mind as “McCarthyism”. Seek opportunities to emphasize basic vitality of American democratic institutions and to demonstrate America’s tolerance and sympathy for divergent and non-conformist viewpoints.

c. Speed Randall study on U.S. economic policies, with purpose of obtaining completed report in time to permit Congressional action in 1954.

d. Implement NSC 152/2 in such a manner as to encourage East-West trade not clearly detrimental to the East-West power ratio.⁴

9. Executive-Legislative Actions

At the 2nd session of the 83rd Congress the Executive Branch should seek:

a. Liberalization of U.S. trade and tariff policies.

b. Enactment of a revised mutual assistance program which will: (1) shift emphasis from “aid” to “cooperation”; (2) provide assistance to Europe primarily as a “contribution” to a common defense enterprise, geared if possible to a three-or-four-year defense plan; (3) indicate the intention of the U.S. to continue for an extended period of time limited economic and developmental assistance to Asia, Africa and South America; (4) minimize legislative “conditions” on aid.

c. Creation of an Atlantic consultative assembly composed of legislates of the 14 NATO countries, to discuss common Atlantic problems.

d. The Executive Branch should seek through informal contacts greater responsibility in Congressional investigations and emphasis on points stressed above in 8.a. in speeches of Congressional leaders.

10. General Principles to Guide Conduct in Foreign Relations

In relations with foreign nations, and in dealing with domestic issues which have a critical impact abroad, the U.S. Government should:

a. Repeatedly stress the peaceful intentions of the U.S. Government and its willingness to “meet the Soviet bloc half way” in seeking a settlement of international differences and a relaxation of tensions. Avoid outright condemnation of “neutral countries” or rigid insistence that they must be “for us” or “against us”.

b. Emphasize U.S. interest in non-military cooperation with other nations. In UN, NATO, OCB and other international organizations, seek to extend cooperative activities in non-defense spheres.

c. Try to maintain a genuine partnership relation with allies abroad; avoid appearances of “unilateralism”; expand practice of consultation with allies on important issues (before U.S. position has crystallized) accept and carry out joint obligations imposed by alliances on basis of equality; encourage greater initiative by allies and give sympathetic treatment to their proposals.

d. Be more selective in exerting pressures on foreign governments; avoid applying pressures publicly and rely primarily on confidential high-level negotiations. In international bodies, gracefully accept consensus of majority on secondary issues, and conserve U.S. influence to promote major U.S. interests. Coordinate negotiations with foreign governments to minimize multiple pressures on different subjects at the same time.

e. Avoid statements or actions which nourish impression abroad that the U.S. is “hysterical” on subject of Communism, that essential U.S. liberties are in danger, or that the government and people of this country do not distinguish between Communism and other leftist or non-conformist doctrines.

f. Stress evolutionary aspect of movement toward self-determination for colonial peoples, meanwhile making clear U.S. interest in ultimate self-determination for all such peoples. Work with both colonial powers and dependencies to promote amicable relationships and advance latter’s evolution toward self-determination, but avoid favoritism in conflicts between colonial powers and dependencies.

g. Administer existing customs, tariff and other trade laws as liberally as possible, and avoid any unilateral actions restricting trade beyond limits mandatory under legislation. In particular, avoid the sudden application of restrictive measures under circumstances which may cause injury or embarrassment to foreign traders.

h. Seek maximum liberalization in interpretation and administration of existing immigration laws. Explore possibilities of early revisions which might eliminate special sources of irritation.

i. In planning and administering non-military aid programs, emphasize “people-to-people” assistance to maximum extent possible.

j. Attempt to avoid identification of U.S. policies and actions with “militarism”; guard against public statements by U.S. civilian and military officials which sound belligerent or appear to assume the inevitability of war; seek to assure restrained and balanced publicity concerning events having a military flavor (such as bomb tests, acquisition and construction of U.S. bases, troop maneuvers, shipments of MDAP materials, etc.).

k. Repeatedly emphasize consistency, continuity and bi-partisan-ism of basic U.S. foreign policies and seek occasions to demonstrate essential unity of government and nation in supporting such policies.

l. Take maximum advantage of President Eisenhower’s personal popularity abroad, demonstrate his leadership of his party and the nation as a whole, and exploit appropriate opportunities for Presidential utterances on foreign policy.

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

secret

[Washington, undated]

Annex B

The purpose of this paper is to present an analytical summary of current European public and governmental attitudes toward the United States, based on official and unofficial reports from abroad.

General Situation

At the present time there are several serious divergences between American and European attitudes. During the last year, the trend of European attitudes has been distinctly unfavorable to the United States interests and objectives.

This trend varies considerably among different countries, and there are several countries in which no perceptible change in governmental and public attitudes has been found. Taking Europe as a whole, however, there is evidence of declining confidence in United States leadership, growing resentment against American policies and actions, and a decrease in American popularity and prestige.

There is no evidence that the immediate situation is desperate or that the present trend of European attitudes is irreversible. The basic amity and status between the United States and Europe is deeply rooted in many common interests. By broad historical standards United States prestige remains near its peak. There is a vast reservoir of good will and admiration for the United States among the majority of the population of free Europe. The personal popularity of President Eisenhower, in particular, is very high. While there is suspicion of United States motives in certain quarters, most Europeans do not seem to mistrust our basic intentions and motivations. Rather, they seem primarily concerned about the ability of American statesmen, operating within the political, constitutional and psychological complex of American society, to translate their motives into concrete and realistic policies and programs which will serve the mutual interests of Europe and the United States.

Significant Attitudes Unfavorable to the United States

Current European sentiments toward the United States are compounded of a hodge-podge of intermingled attitudes, interests and suspicions, often irrational and sometimes contradictory. Certain European fears and antagonism relating to the United States are natural and inevitable products of different cultural systems and different national interests. For example, the European stereotype that Americans are politically immature in international affairs, Europe’s fear of domination by the “U.S. colossus”, and the latent European jealousy of American wealth and power have deep psychological roots. Attitudes of this kind have long existed, and will probably continue to exist. There are many other negative attitudes, however, which appear to be directly related to recent events.

No generalizations about European attitudes would be fully applicable to all the countries of free Europe. In certain countries views about the United States are strongly influenced by local issues and circumstances, such as the Trieste question in Italy, French sensitivity concerning America’s anti-colonialism doctrine as it relates to North Africa, and the bitterness of German Social Democrats over what they consider to be the United States Government’s active assistance to Chancellor Adenauer’s election campaign. However, it is evident that there are several general attitudes which cross national lines, some of which prevail throughout free Europe. The most significant of these are as follows:

1. Virtually all segments of European society share a pervading fear that American policies and actions will eventually result in an all-out war with the Soviet bloc, or in an indefinite prolongation of the “cold war”. It is difficult to exaggerate the profound yearning of the Europeans for a reduction of international tension.

Most Europeans are fully convinced that a war between the East and the West would be synonymous with the destruction of Europe, regardless of the eventual victor of such a war. Therefore, they tend to be extremely sensitive to any action or development which, in their evaluation, increases the risks of war or obstructs the relaxation of international tensions. There is considerable doubt in European minds that the United States Government will be able, in light of American public attitudes, to seize and exploit promising opportunities for improving relations between the East and the West.

Few Europeans believe that the United States wants war or that we would willingly prolong East-West tension. However, after many years of war and crisis, Europeans are inclined to wishful thinking about the Soviet threat and are responding, in part unconsciously, to the Soviet “peace offensive”. Concurrent with this reaction to Soviet gestures, the fear is growing that United States policies will not be sufficiently flexible to put Soviet peace moves to a fair test. While President Eisenhower’s April 16 speech⁵ was favorably received throughout Europe, Europeans have interpreted other American statements and actions, including our continued emphasis on the undiminished Soviet threat, as evidence of strong reluctance to alter present policies.

Many Europeans are especially fearful that the policy of “rolling back the iron curtain” involves a substantially increased risk for European security. Since it is widely believed that the liberation of Soviet-dominated areas can be accomplished only by military victory over Russia, Europeans fear that a United States commitment to the policy of liberation means an indefinite period of tension eventually climaxed by war.

While some of the earlier fears aroused by the “containment vs. liberation” argument have now been allayed, many Europeans remain fearful that United States policies toward China and Eastern Europe will indefinitely prevent the United States from finding a basis for a negotiated settlement of differences with the Soviet Union. The apparent hesitancy of the United States Government to endorse Prime Minister Churchill’s original proposal for four-power talks, and the criticism with which United States officialdom has greeted successive moves of the Soviet “peace offensive”, have gravely disturbed the large body of Europeans who are anxious that no stone be left unturned in the search for peace.

2. Europeans have been inclined to believe that Americans take a naive and unrealistic approach to the problem of Communism. At present, there is a strong feeling that the United States is suffering from an acute attack of anti-Communist hysteria. This feeling is found even among political sophisticates. Many less enlightened citizens with memories of Hitler still undimmed, fear that the violent United States reaction to the. Communist menace is pushing the United States down the road to fascism.

It appears that the domestic political phenomenon known as “McCarthyism” has done much to weaken American prestige and tarnish American leadership. In this sense, “McCarthyism” not only applies to the activities of Senator McCarthy himself, but to all other indications that the United States Government and its people are intolerant of non-conformity and are motivated by fierce and unreasoning hatred of Communism. It is reported that the controversy over United States libraries abroad has made the American Government appear ridiculous and childish in foreign eyes, and that “star chamber” congressional investigations have raised grave questions about the internal political health of the nation to which other free peoples have looked for leadership. Some Europeans, in fact, fear that the United States, long regarded as the world’s foremost exponent of freedom and democracy, is in the process of betraying its own democratic traditions. In brief, “McCarthyism” has become synonymous with neo-fascism in European minds and is regarded by some European leaders as Communism’s greatest present asset in Europe.

It is evident that the political influence of Senator McCarthy himself has been distorted and exaggerated, and thus “McCarthyism” has provided an extremely effective propaganda theme for the Communists and crypto-Communists. The effects of “McCarthyism” are particularly serious among European Socialists and other non-Communist leftists who fear that American thinking tends to “lump together” Communism, Socialism and all other unorthodox philosophies. In conjunction with obvious and energetic Soviet efforts to revive a “popular front” spirit among European leftists, it is possible that “McCarthyism” will alienate a vital segment of European public opinion and thereby diminish the prospects of maintaining middle-of-the-road coalition governments sympathetic to American objectives and interests.

While governmental leaders and other well-educated persons usually make a clear distinction between “McCarthyism” and the position of the United States Government, even those individuals sometimes ask why the President does not denounce the Senator publicly and directly.

3. It was to be expected that the advent of a new Administration would produce many uncertainties in European minds as to the future course of United States policy. On the whole, it appears that these uncertainties are not so great today as they were six months ago. However, lacking a full understanding of the inner workings of the American political system, many Europeans have been disturbed about reported conflicts between the Executive Branch and the Congress, and some are disappointed at what they regard as “weakness” in the Administration’s leadership.

It is difficult for Europeans to understand how basic American policies can be attacked in public speeches by congressional leaders of the President’s party. This lack of understanding produces doubts as to the Administration’s ability to obtain acceptance and support of its policies. While it appears that most Europeans have great respect for the President’s motives and opinions and welcome any direct assertion of presidential leadership, many feel that the President’s leadership has not yet been sufficiently manifest.

4. Europeans are disturbed by what they regard as inconsistency and lack of realism in certain major United States policies.

European governmental leaders find it difficult to reconcile the judgment of United States military leaders that minimum NATO military requirements are much greater than the forces now available, with the decision of the United States Government to reduce its national defense and mutual security appropriations. Moreover, they also see an apparent inconsistency between Secretary Dulles’ emphasis on the need for a “long-term approach” to NATO defense planning and the recent demands of prominent congressional leaders that all foreign aid be terminated in 1954.

While most Europeans seem to agree in principle, or at least pay lip service to the principle, that strategic trade with the Soviet bloc should be controlled, they feel that the United States has gone too far in trying to stop trade in goods which afford little or no advantage to the Soviet bloc. Congressional investigations concerning trade with China aroused considerable European criticism. Europeans believe that the United States is highly inconsistent and unrealistic in pressing for reduced trade with the Soviet bloc while taking no effective measures to open United States markets to European products.

Most of the people and statesmen of Europe disagree fundamentally with America’s Far Eastern policies and consider our attitude toward Communist China wholly unrealistic. Few Europeans favor support of Chang-Kai-Shek. Many are convinced that there can be no realistic basis for a successful negotiation of differences in the Far East until the United States modifies its policies toward Communist China.

With regard to the USSR, Europeans are inclined to believe that the United States has over-emphasized the military aspect of the struggle against Communism at the expense of the political and economic aspects. There is a widely-held conviction in Europe that direct Soviet aggression in Europe is unlikely and that the “cold war” will eventually be decided on political and economic grounds. In countries where the internal power of Communism is strong, such as Italy, the provision of large sums of United States aid in the form of military assistance, accompanied by insignificant grants of economic aid, is sometimes interpreted as a “cart-before-the-horse” approach to the over-all problem of European security.

5. Second only to their deep dread of war is the persistent concern of Europeans about the stability and health of their economies. Europe’s economic health is dependent upon international developments to a far greater extent than is true of the United States. At the present time, it is evident that the burdens of rearmament, the chronic dollar shortage, inflation, high taxes, a leveling-off of production, and a stagnation of living standards at the 1950 level, have all combined to revive among many Europeans a sense of hopelessness approaching the despair which they felt in the early postwar period.

While Europeans regard NATO’s armament program as a major source of economic strain, there is no evidence that they attribute their basic economic ills directly to the United States. However, a large number of Europeans are convinced that European economic health can be attained only through the leadership and active cooperation of the United States. For this reason, they are deeply concerned about the state of the American economy and about America’s foreign economic policies.

It seems axiomatic to Europeans that they cannot simultaneously maintain strong military defenses, accept decreasing amounts of United States aid, limit trade with the Soviet bloc, and depend upon existing commercial relations with the United States. In certain countries, United States economic assistance is considered to be the only possible solution to their continuing economic problems. The Greeks and Turks, for example, feel that they cannot possibly maintain the present level of military strength without substantial United States aid, regardless of other economic developments. The French are equally convinced that they cannot continue the war in Indo-China without increased aid.

Other countries believe that substantially increased access to American markets would compensate for the loss of United States aid, and have enthusiastically welcomed the slogan of “trade not aid”. However, many of these enthusiasts are disappointed in the failure of the United States Government thus far to take concrete measures to permit greater exports to the United States. Since cuts in aid have preceded significant revisions of American trade policies, Europeans fear that the United States may be adopting a “no-trade, no-aid” policy which would make their economic position impossible.

There is much evidence that the Europeans find continued United States economic aid psychologically galling. In fact, it is probable that the aid program has contributed substantially to European resentments against the United States. Direct military assistance is less disturbing, since Europeans regard deliveries of military end-items as a reasonable and natural American contribution to a common program. In any event, despite the unpleasant features of American aid, most Europeans are convinced that such aid is necessary unless and until there is a sweeping liberalization of United States trade policies, and Europeans are rather gloomy about the prospects that these policies will be liberalized sufficiently to compensate for projected and anticipated cuts in aid.

6. The Europeans are keenly sensitive to any and all indications that American interest in Europe may be lessening. It is feared that increased American interest in Asiatic problems may not be in addition to, but rather at the expense of, continued interest in Europe.

Cuts in United States assistance to Europe, in addition to direct economic effects, have indirectly disturbed Europeans as an indication that the United States interest in Europe is waning.

To those Europeans who have traditionally associated the Republican Party with isolationism, every indication of a slackening United States interest in Europe is a cause for alarm. Some Europeans are inclined to distort the significance of relatively minor events, such as official appointments. There is a persistent fear that the United States will eventually “withdraw” from Europe, and this fear has a considerable negative influence on European attitudes toward internal European problems such as the EDC.

7. Paradoxically, many of the same people who fear a decrease in American interest in Europe also fear United States “domination” of Europe. There is considerable resentment of incessant United States pressures on such matters as rearmament, bases, unification, East-West trade, etc. While recognizing their dependence on the United States and demanding “stronger United States leadership” Europeans simultaneously desire to retain maximum political, cultural and economic independence. Hence, they resent slights to their sovereignty or actions which they interpret as interference in their internal affairs. Communist propaganda that the United States seeks to reduce the European nations to the status of satellites often fall on fertile ground.

8. Europeans are disturbed by what they interpret as tendencies toward unilateralism on the part of the United States Government. Many Europeans feel that the United States does not regard NATO as a true partnership of equals and will not accept a genuine partnership relation—that we wish to devise the rules of the game but will not play by them. United States pressures, on Other governments to accept elaborate questionnaires for the NATO Annual Review, accompanied by United States delay in answering such questionnaires, has been cited as an example of this tendency. Moreover, it is clear that the United States is held chiefly responsible for NATO’s failure to develop greater cooperation in non-military activities under Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO governmental leaders make frequent reference to the importance of full consultation on important policy matters among the NATO governments. It is evident that several of these government leaders believe the United States has failed to consult its partners on matters of vital concern before establishing its own firm and irreversible position on such matters. Any United States action in the international sphere which is taken without consultation with, or without full regard for, allied interest, is likely to be interpreted not only as an injury to allied sovereignty but also as a tendency on the part of the United States to “go it alone”.

9. A number of Europeans are disturbed by the heavy volume of criticism of European countries emanating from members of the Congress and from the American press. Repeated statements that the Europeans “won’t fight”, that they are “soft” on Communism, that they are loafing on the job, that they won’t pay their taxes, etc., have created bitter resentment in Europe. From these criticisms, Europeans have gained the impression that the American people are not getting the real facts and are consequently dissatisfied and disgusted with Europe.

Factors to be Borne in Mind in Future Relationships with Europe.

The existing state of European attitudes does not appear to be acutely dangerous to United States interests, but may become so if the present trend continues. For example, there is no immediate threat to the basic integrity of NATO. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that unfavorable attitudes toward the United States can be expected to limit the degree of cooperation which can be obtained from our allies.

World leadership is not, by nature, a popular role and the United States is not engaged in a “popularity contest” in Europe. However, to the extent that European public attitudes affect the ability and willingness of European governments to cooperate with us in pursuing our policy objectives, these attitudes are highly significant. It is already apparent that an overtly “pro-U.S.” position is no longer politically profitable in many parts of Europe. To put it bluntly, many politicians can “get more votes” by opposing policies identified with the United States than by supporting such policies. If resentment and suspicion of the United States produces this kind of reaction among an increasing percentage of the electorate, it is probable that we will face the most formidable obstacles in securing ratification of EDC, building a more adequate NATO defense system, limiting trade beneficial to the Soviet bloc, and achieving other important objectives.

Unfavorable European attitudes toward the United States gain added significance when viewed in the light of the almost perpetual political instability which seems to be “built into” the constitutional structures of certain European governments. The margin of parliamentary support for responsible center parties in such countries as France and Italy is precariously thin, and even under the best of circumstances these governments face great difficulty in making decisions on important issues. For this reason, there is always a possibility that relatively minor disturbances in political relationships may be decisive in their effect upon critical decisions.

Analysis of the present political climate in Europe strongly suggests that certain particular actions and developments would probably be instrumental in altering or modifying European attitudes along lines more favorable to United States interests, and that these considerations should therefore be borne in mind in planning and conducting future United States relationships with Europe. Factors which would appear capable of producing a more favorable trend of opinion in Europe include the following:

1. Repeated and convincing emphasis by the United States Government of its sincere desire to find peaceful settlements of East-West conflicts, and on the essential flexibility of United States policies and tactics in dealing with the USSR and other Communist-dominated areas.

2. The achievement of a standard of behavior in domestic political affairs which would enable the United States to stand forth clearly as an example of political comportment to be respected and imitated by other countries. (In particular, this would involve a convincing demonstration that the philosophy of “McCarthyism” is not typical of American thinking, governmental or public.)

3. A united front among American statesmen on basic foreign policy issues, in Congress and the Executive Branch, together with greater emphasis on the President’s firm leadership of his party, the government and the nation as a whole. (It is clear that the President’s great personal popularity in Europe represents a valuable asset for protecting and promoting United States interests, and can be more effectively exploited.)

4. Demonstration by United States governmental leaders of understanding and sympathy for the traditions, interests and problems of the European nations, of the determination of the United States to maintain a genuine “partnership” relation with its allies, and of the willingness of the United States to engage in more frequent and more substantive policy consultations with the nations of free Europe, both multilaterally and bilaterally.

5. Reconciliation and explanation of apparent conflicts in United States policies, including a program to achieve a more rational relation between actual United States defense and mutual security efforts and our stated military objectives in Europe.

6. Full United States cooperation with the European nations in long-term economic and military planning, in order to assure the latter of the essential stability of United States policies and to give them a more satisfactory basis for their internal planning. This would involve a demonstration of US willingness to participate in, rather than merely to urge, efforts to deal with political and economic problems of mutual concern.

7. Minimization of “pressure tactics” by the United States Government in its dealing with Europe. Where United States interests make such pressures necessary, it appears that more satisfactory results will be attained by applying the pressures cautiously and confidentially rather than overtly.

8. Action by the United States Government to avoid the appearance of lecturing or “preaching” to allied nations in official pronouncements or through United States propaganda media.

9. Liberalization of United States imports of European products, combined with assurances that liberalized trade policies will be maintained over an extended period of time.

10. Agreement by the United States to an expansion of East-West trade in items not of significant strategic value to the Soviet bloc and under circumstances which provide an economic advantage to the West.

11. Liberalization of United States immigration laws, including technical revisions to eliminate special sources of irritation.

12. Indication of willingness by the United States Government to consider continued economic aid to allied nations which have problems not presently capable of solution on any other basis.

13. Emphatic action by the United States Government to indicate its continued interest in free Europe, its firm intention to continue to make a fair contribution to the common defense system for an indefinite period, and its desire for a broader and more permanent “community” relationship in the North Atlantic area.

1. Same as the directive issued at the 157th meeting of the NSC, July 30, 1953, pertaining to the reported decline in U.S. prestige abroad; see p. 1466.
2. Not found.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. Here follows paragraph 8e which reads: “Seek to repose greater responsibility on our NATO allies to determine what they will actually do in their own defense and develop a concrete program.” This passage has been crossed out in the source text and a handwritten notation in the margin reads: “deleted by OCB.” This deletion was officially confirmed in a memorandum by NSC Executive Secretary James S. Lay to the NSC, dated Sept. 29, 1953. (Eisenhower Library, files of the Office of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1952–61) This paragraph had been a subject of debate for some time. See the memorandum by MacArthur, dated Sept. 22, 1953, p. 1526.
5. For information on President Eisenhower’s address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Apr. 16, 1953, entitled “The Chance for Peace” see volume ii. The text of the speech is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 19531 (Washington, 1964), pp. 179–188, and Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599–603.