840.50 UNRRA/9–545: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:15 p.m.]
9075. Moscow’s 3098 to Department91 concerning the USSR application for UNRRA aid has been repeated to us. We have following comments:
I. 1. The Soviet application was not surprising. We understand that Soviet representatives had some time ago informally inquired of UNRRA regarding possible assistance for USSR but did not pursue this when it was clear that because of shipping limitations relief goods could only be sent at expense of lend-lease war materials.
2. The Soviet were fully entitled to make an application within the terms of UNRRA agreement and council resolutions. It would have been inconsistent with obligations of member countries if one of them had arbitrarily intervened to try to prevent consideration from being given to a Soviet request.
3. The argument that any Soviet request should be turned down in advance on the simple ground that the Soviet should finance all it needs by credits cannot be sustained. Ability to obtain credits does not necessarily disqualify a country from UNRRA aid. Some areas which are getting UNRRA aid are already or may soon be able to get loans for reconstruction purposes. UNRRA aid is for relief and early rehabilitation only.
[Page 1025]4. The argument that Soviet should be refused aid on basis of reports of Soviet removals of goods from eastern territories would apply with much more force against credits than against consideration of UNRRA aid. The quid pro quo for credits is future repayment. The quid pro quo for UNRRA aid is factual demonstration of relief needs.
II. 5. But the issues raised by the Soviet request went much further. It is a fact that no other Allied civilian population suffered hardships and devastation comparable to what the Soviet endured, that no other Allied Army lost so many men as they did and that no other Allied war workers lived and worked on such meager rations as they received. If we were generous in supplying them with goods they were generous in sacrificing lives and homes to speed the success of the common cause.
6. In face of these facts we believe it would have been disastrous if the US had taken the position during the Council meeting that full and free relief should be supplied to two countries which fought against us and our Allies and at the same time the Soviet request to rally [to be summarily?] rejected.
7. If refused, the Soviet could have appealed to the Council and widespread publicity would have been given to this evidence of Allied disunity. The ordinary person everywhere would have pointed to the readiness of the US to give UNRRA free goods for ex-enemy countries and their refusal to support the same treatment for one of our two great Allies which had suffered unparalleled losses.
8. We are convinced that Mr. Clayton acted wisely and to the minimum extent necessary to avoid a complete impasse and we would urge support of his recommendation.92
Sent to Department, repeated Moscow 315.