840.50 UNRRA/8–2945: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 30—1:12 a.m.]
3098. I have not seen the recent interchange of cables with Clayton which led up to the decision referred to in circular August 24, noon89 that UNRRA would recognize allocations of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics together up to 250 million dollars.
I concurred with the Department’s thought that it is unnecessary to give the Soviets UNRRA assistance and that their needs should be taken care of through credit facilities. It is therefore not clear to me why it is advisable to deviate from this opinion.
From a political standpoint if UNRRA assistance is to be given to the Soviets I would consider it far better to do so direct to the Soviet Government rather than to become involved in the fiction that the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics are independent economic units. This Embassy has no information to justify such a conclusion. I am fearful that the precedent of accepting the theory of their economic independence will be used to our detriment in political or other questions in the future. In addition if it is decided that UNRRA [Page 1023] shipments should be made to the Soviet Union I feel that they should be made on a reimbursement basis.
On the question of whether UNRRA assistance should be made to the Soviets at all I feel I should expand the reasons given in my No. 2820 August 9, 3 p.m.
Preliminary reports indicate that the over-all Russian food situation will be better during the next 12 months than in the past in spite of the loss of lend-lease shipments. Part of this is due to the extraction by the Soviets of agricultural products including livestock from Soviet occupied and liberated areas and the fact that the occupying Russian armies live off the land. In addition the Soviets are making trade agreements with the neighboring countries under their political control without regard to their effect on the economic conditions in the west. As a result of these Soviet policies we are faced in Germany and Austria with the necessity of importing food from the west as against obtaining it from these countries themselves or from the countries from which agricultural products had normally been obtained. We find ourselves therefore forced to furnish food to several countries either directly or through UNRRA.
If the Soviets had cooperated in reestablishing normal interchange of goods in Europe I would have taken a different view of UNRRA assistance to the Soviet Union. As they have not agreed so far to this policy and are unlikely to do so it seems we should protect United States interests by offsetting our obligations in other parts of Europe through declining UNRRA shipments to the Soviet Union.
I am not familiar with the items other than food which the Soviets are requesting from UNRRA. In this connection I feel we should bear in mind that the Russians are stripping the occupied countries of large quantities of clothes, agricultural machinery and plant equipment et cetera under the guise of war booty. The effect of this in Germany and Austria will be to increase the difficulties in reestablishing economic life on a self-sustaining basis and add to the cost to the United States in this connection.
Another aspect of the problem is the fact that the Russians in spite of the shortage of labor on the farms and elsewhere are maintaining an enormous military establishment. Only 13 classes are to be demobilized before the end of this year—55 to 43 years of age. I hear repeated stories of the discontent of the Russian people over their not obtaining more consumer goods. UNRRA aid may well tend to permit the Soviet authorities to maintain a larger army than they otherwise would by assisting to fill the gap which the Russian people appear to be demanding for a more comfortable existence.
I realize there may be many reasons with which I am not familiar that have led Clayton to make his recommendation. On the other hand before final decision is reached I hope our over-all relations with [Page 1024] the Soviet Union will be given full weight. Having observed carefully the effect on the Soviet Government of our generous lend-lease policy over the past 4 years I have not found that we have obtained any benefit in good-will on the part of the Soviet Government in connection with their actions which affect our interests. During the war we have obtained in my opinion full value for our lend-lease shipments through the strengthening of the Soviet war effort. However now that the war is over I see no gain to the United States in dealing with the Soviets on any other than a realistic reciprocal basis. I have found in my experience that such a policy is understood and respected by the Soviet Government and is more apt to obtain reasonably satisfactory results.
I have discussed this message with General Deane90 and he concurs. Sent Department as 3098, repeated London to Winant for Clayton as 428.