Office of the Historian

840.50 UNRRA/8–2945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

Washington, September 8, 1945—noon.

1978. Reurtel 3098.93 Factors involved in the decision on UNRRA assistance to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian S.S.R.’s included:

1.
These republics had definitely been granted separate membership in the United Nations organization at San Francisco,94 had to be [Page 1026] granted separate membership in UNRRA, and presumably will be granted separate membership in other United Nations organizations. This is a political decision that admittedly has little economic justification.
2.
Having made the political decision, any UNRRA aid to these geographical areas, where most of the devastation and distress exist, would have to be extended to these republics.
3.
Some of the economic arguments for any assistance to any part of Russia—pros and cons—were included in Clayton’s tel of August 6 from London.95
4.
Russia, it is true, has substantial gold holdings, credit potentialities, and—most important—a great power of recuperation. On the other hand, Russia, especially in the two republics, has made greater physical sacrifice, suffered more devastation, and lowered its already low standard of living below that of any refeat any European nations.
5.
The availability of external credit is not regarded under the UNRRA plan established at Atlantic City in 1943 as a necessary reason for denying free assistance. Resolution 14, Section 18 states:

“It shall be the policy of the Administration that an applicant government shall not be required to assume the burden of an enduring foreign exchange debt for the procurement of relief and rehabilitation supplies and services.”

6.
The Russian case differs only in a matter of degree from those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and China. China has substantial gold and dollars, already has received large U.S. credits, will receive additional credits, and always has been considered a proper recipient of UNRRA aid. We are now considering reconstruction credits to Poland and Czechoslovakia.
7.
The UNRRA administration had let it be known that it had always considered Russia eligible for UNRRA assistance.
8.
The unfortunate publicity re Russian request would have made a flat turn-down politically very difficult.
9.
The Washington Post and other U.S. papers had favored UNRRA aid to Russia.
10.
The Canadian delegate96 publicly favored aid to Russia, and moreover stated that the Canadian people would regard a turn-down as an indication of strong anti-Soviet attitude, which might jeopardize Canada’s further financial participation in UNRRA.97
11.
The termination of lend-lease98 hardened the attitude of the Russian delegates.
12.
The Russian argued privately that the contrast between our attitude on Italy and Austria, and on Russia was intolerable and threatened to bring this point before the Council.
13.
Clayton became convinced that Russia would break up UNRRA, by forcing some form of Council action on the Soviet proposal, and by vigorously opposing the Italian action which was essential to Congressional approval of the additional contribution to UNRRA, unless some trade was made. The Russians insisted on their full request of $700 million right up to August 24.
14.
It was found possible to provide $250 million out of the funds of UNRRA—including the additional one percent contribution—without reducing other programs and giving Italy and China the amounts we had proposed.
15.
Clayton had offered to recommend the solution finally agreed to the Department provided the Russians withdrew their large request, admitted Italy,99 agreed to go through all of the UNRRA procedures including the arrangements for UNRRA missions in their areas, and permitted the establishment of effective program control over all UNRRA operations. This the Russians, on August 24, agreed to, and it became possible amicably to finish up that day the work of the UNRRA Council meeting with resolutions enabling a satisfactory completion of its job in Europe and the Far East.
16.
We thus felt the whole UNRRA negotiation with the Russians had been quite successful, and that the entire results of the Council meeting had been rather better than we had hoped for.

Dept recognizes that this incident was only one step in a broad series of political and economic dealings with the Russians. We did protect all of the UNRRA principles, saved UNRRA, and at the same time achieved an understanding with Russia whereby her continued pressure for additional aid from UNRRA should be entirely eliminated, and her request very substantially cut down. Dept is moving to implement item XX of the Berlin Protocol re Eastern Europe,1 and is separately instructing you and General Draper2 re reparations. Other economic conditions are being drawn up for inclusion in any Eximbank credits to Russia along lines of Clayton’s Potsdam memo to you.3

Acheson
  1. Dated August 29, p. 1022.↩
  2. See Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 947, 966–968, 976, 990–992; also Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, index entry under United Nations Organization: Membership, p. 1608.↩
  3. No. 7910, p. 1003.↩
  4. Lester B. Pearson.↩
  5. See telegram 8010, August 9, 2 p.m., from London, p. 1006.↩
  6. Transfer of materials under straight lend-lease terminated at 12:01 a.m. on September 2, 1945. On general termination of lend-lease, see vol. vi, pp. 1 ff.: for documentation on the lend-lease program to the Soviet Union, see vol. v, pp. 937 ff.↩
  7. Reference here is not to the admission of Italy to membership in UNRRA, since Italy never became a member nation, but rather to agreement to Resolution 73 of the Third UNRRA Council, “A Resolution Relating to a Program of Relief and Rehabilitation in Italy”; for text, see Woodbridge, UNRRA, vol. iii, p. 143.↩
  8. For text, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1497.↩
  9. Brig. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., Director of the Economics Division of the U.S. Group, Control Council for Germany. See telegram 1964, September 6, 7 p.m., to Moscow, vol. iii, p. 1283.↩
  10. Not printed.↩