248. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State0

137. Embtel 120.1

1.
Karamanlis returned yesterday afternoon2 and last night Averoff conveyed to me, after consultation with Prime Minister, GOG position [Page 687] on Cyprus procedure. He explained that because of political situation here GOG could not agree to NATO intervention nor allow any impression to be created of NATO arbitration. This in effect would exclude any advisory committee procedure unless and until broad outlines of settlement were already agreed after which NATO could confer its blessing. This GOG decision did not however exclude informal discussions with Spaak as previously outlined (Embtel 50 paragraph 2).3 Foreign Minister said he could be bold on substance but must be cautious on procedure. He then asked me if I had any reaction from Washington to his suggestions.
2.
In reply I confirmed what I had said to Prime Minister on July 10 (Embtel 100 paragraph 2)4 and said this could be taken as our answer. In addition, I said Foreign Minister should not overlook another important aspect in pressing us for replies on substance and that was attitude of Makarios. USG had to date no indication that Averoff suggestions would be acceptable to Archbishop even if we were in position to comment on substance. Foreign Minister replied he was 90 percent sure Makarios would accept.
3.
In face of Greek rejection of advisory committee, I asked Foreign Minister how he thought Greek suggestions should be pursued. He affirmed Melas-Spaak informal conversations and if these showed any promise negotiations could be pursued through diplomatic channels. I pointed out this would first involve talks between Greek and UK Governments. Averoff agreed and expressed hope that the US would intervene directly with UK to support his suggestions.
4.
Bearing in mind paragraph 2 of Deptel 124,5 I made no comment on this idea nor did I press again for advisory committee, particularly in view of London’s 138 to Department.6 It may well be that we should encourage direct GOG-UK talks at this time and I did not want to discourage this by continuing to argue case for advisory committee.
Riddleberger
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–1558. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.
  2. Telegram 120 from Athens, July 13, reported that important differences over Cyprus appeared to exist between Averoff and Karamanlis and that Riddleberger was seeking clarification on the Greek Government’s position. (Ibid., 747C.00/7–1358)
  3. From a July 10–14 personal visit to Geneva.
  4. Document 244.
  5. Document 246.
  6. Document 245.
  7. In telegram 138 from London, July 9, Whitney advised that the United States would have to take a position on the substance of the Cyprus problem but recommended that it first get talks on Cyprus underway among the three interested parties. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–958)