Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece⁰

Washington, July 10, 1958, 12:15 p.m.

124. Embtel 54.¹

1. Your understanding Department’s position on Cyprus as set forth paragraph 1 reftel² is accurate reflection of our current thinking and short-term objectives and your moderating influence on Greeks is deeply appreciated here.

2. We are very much aware of difficult position in which you are placed by Averoff’s constant pressuring for our comments on substance his proposals. We have strong and we believe overriding reasons for not wishing to comment. We believe greatest hope for Cyprus settlement now lies in discussions based on UK plan under NATO aegis. By giving Averoff our views on substance we will in effect be drawn into bilateral negotiations with Greeks outside NATO context and before NATO discussions have commenced. It may be desirable for us to take position vis-a-vis Greeks and Turks on substance as discussions unfold. We do not believe we should do so before course discussions becomes apparent and certainly not before discussions have commenced.

3. FYI only, our present thinking on substance of Averoff’s proposals (Embtel 3730)³ runs along following lines:

A. Averoff’s first proposal that advisors to Governor be chosen by two communities rather than by two Governments should be useful contribution to discussions. Proposal appears to fit into area of maneuver mentioned Hood-Rountree talk (Deptel 49)⁴ i.e., between Greek desire to avoid giving Turks juridical status on island and Turk desire to avoid excluding partition as eventual solution. Ankara’s 35 to Department⁵ indicates GOT would not object such proposal while Foot has hinted (hinted 437 to Department)⁶ that such modification might be possible.

B. Averoff’s second proposal that enosis and partition be excluded from plebiscite choices offers less chance of contributing to discussions. Doubtful whether GOT would agree now to solution which does not to some extent recognize GOT interests in Cyprus and our hope is that this can be achieved in some way short of partition. Those solutions proposed to Turks by British thus far this year (Foot proposals, Turkish base cum self-determination, and current proposals) all offer GOT stake on island either immediately or in future. Turks will be little inclined to surrender apparent gains they have thus achieved. Macmillan’s recent Parliamentary reference to Lennox-Boyd 1956 statement⁷ will also make this proposal difficult one for UK to handle. With respect to independence, we believe central point is not Turks’ unwillingness to accept major guarantees against enosis but rather Turks’ insistence on more than paper guarantees for what they regard to be their legitimate security interests. We fail to see how sanctions against enosis will provide such guarantees.

4. We hope foregoing will be useful to you. You will note it is within context of Topol 4623 as modified⁸ and Deptel 49. End FYI.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–758. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Blood and Jones. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.
1. In telegram 54 from Athens, July 7, Riddleberger outlined his understanding of U.S. policy toward Cyprus and reported that the Greek Government was slowly adopting a more flexible position on the island’s future. (Ibid., 747C.00/7–758)
2. The relevant portion reads: “When I left Washington, I was under impression that partition was not favorably regarded and I assume that attitude has not altered. Therefore we have not pushed partition here but have strived for GOG concessions which would accord guarantees which GOT might eventually accept, while carefully refraining from espousing any specific solution. In this line of action which keeps our flexibility, we have had, it seems to me, at least a partial success in Athens.”
3. See footnote 2, Document 242.
4. See footnote 3, Document 244.
5. Telegram 35 from Ankara, July 3, commented on the latest Greek proposals for modifying the British plan and warned that “we must point out that any GOG-USG–HMG triple play such as suggested by Averoff bound to confirm Turkish suspicions, always latent [1 line of source text not declassified] that gang-up against them on Cyprus is brewing. Nothing could be better calculated to vitiate results of efforts exerted by most NATO and other free world ambassadors Ankara to induce Zorlu to see advantageous points in UK plan.” (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–758)
6. Telegram 437 from Nicosia, June 21, reported that Foot hoped to delay implementation of the British plan in order to continue discussions with Makarios. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–2158)
7. Macmillan made this statement on June 26 during a Parliamentary debate on the Cyprus plan. For text, see House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 590, cols. 727–735.
8. Topol 4623, June 13, transmitted the text of a statement that the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was to read at the June 16 NAC meeting concerning Cyprus. The text included a statement of general support for British efforts and urged that British proposals be the basis of subsequent discussions. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1358) In Polto 4693, June 17, the Department of State outlined its views on procedure for tripartite meetings under NATO auspices. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–1658)