59. Memorandum of Discussion at the 333d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 1, 19571
Present at the 333rd Council meeting were the President of the United States; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Attorney General (participating in Items 2, 3, 4 and 5); Mr. Frederick Mueller for the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Items 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; Mr. William M. Holaday, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director, Bureau [Page 145] of the Budget; Mr. Ralph Spear, Federal Civil Defense Administration; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Cutler and Dearborn; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat.
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1. “Definition of the Term ‘Mobilization Base.’”]
2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
The Director of Central Intelligence said difficulties might arise in Guatemala as a result of the assassination of President Armas. The Defense Minister2 was in virtual control of the country at present, even though nominally the Constituent Assembly was in charge. The Defense Minister had been characterized as having a good heart but no guts. He would probably be a good candidate for the Presidency in the elections to be held a few months hence, although he was technically barred by a law requiring candidates to be out of the government for six months preceding the election.
Mr. Dulles said the full story of the assassination had not yet been revealed. The Communist infiltration into the President’s guard was the result of incredible negligence. The United States had a record of the man alleged to have fired the shot, indicating that he was a Communist. The United States, of course, did not know that he was in the President’s guard until the assassination occurred. The assassination was kept secret for twelve hours by a news blackout established so quickly that it must have been planned in advance. All witnesses to the assassination are now under house arrest or are unapproachable, and the country is in a state of siege.
Mr. Dulles felt that a genuine Communist coup would not have been handled in this way. The old Communist gang in Guatemala appeared to be pleased but surprised by the assassination. Mr. Dulles thought it would be wise for U.S. officials to be cautious in their comments on the assassination until its true history was revealed. He added that it was quite likely that the transfer of authority to a new President would be accomplished in a peaceful manner after the elections.
[Here follows further discussion.]