58. Editorial Note
Minutes of a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) on July 30 indicate that the following discussion of the situation in Guatemala occurred:
“Mr. [Allen] Dulles indicated that despite the spate of cables, he was still unclear as to exactly what had taken place. He noted that the assassin had a known record as a Communist and had been dishonorably discharged from the Army. He stated, however, that it [Page 144] was strange for him to have in his possession incriminating documents if he had planned the assassination, and also noted that some question had been raised about the feasibility of his shooting himself with his own rifle. Mr. Dulles continued further by noting the extraordinary readiness of the Guatemalan Government to handle the situation, … Mr. Dulles stated that there was some feeling that this action had been the trigger for a rightist coup. Mr. [Hugh] Cumming pointed out that State also had certain reservations about the story as explained by the Government. He noted that it is not usual for organized Communists to go in for assassination unless the specific gain will counter the adverse reaction. He also noted the Communists usually do not leave such a recognizable record as in this case.
“The Chairman suggested, in view of the alerting difficulties experienced in connection with the news of the President’s assassination, that each agency look carefully into its present alerting mechanism.” (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776)
The Intelligence Advisory Committee was created in 1947 to serve as a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements among the intelligence staffs of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Staff. The IAC consisted of the heads of these intelligence staffs and was chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence.