330.13/5–2154
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)1
- Subject:
- Agreement Not to Use Nuclear Weapons Except Against Aggression, Prior to Establishing Disarmament Control Machinery.
Discussion
- 1.
- Jules Moch, French representative on the Disarmament Commission subcommittee now meeting in London,2 in a closed meeting of the four Western Powers on May 17, apparently tentatively agreed with the United States that a convention describing control machinery to supervise compliance with a disarmament agreement should stipulate that the agreed reductions and prohibitions would not become effective until the control machinery was established and operational, say, one year following ratification of the disarmament treaty. If prohibition is to be physically effective, control machinery must be set up and actually operating. Mr. Moch then made the further proposal that all states should agree not to use nuclear weapons “except in retaliation for armed invasion of any kind”. Our delegation has urgently requested instructions on the Moch proposal prior to May 24, stating they are inclined to oppose any proposition that prohibitions on weapons be accepted before the control machinery is in operation (London’s 5184, May 18).3
- 2.
- In an Aide-Mémoire handed to the British Embassy on May 12, 1954,4 there occurs the most recent statement of the U.S. position: “For their part, the Western Powers are individually prepared to renew their solemn assurance that they will not use either weapons of mass destruction or any other weapons except to repel aggression. Nor will they threaten to employ these weapons or use them in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
- 3.
- This projected undertaking not to use these weapons “except to repel aggression” is less restrictive than Moch’s proposal to prohibit their use “except in retaliation for armed invasion of any kind”. “Aggression” can be both direct and indirect, as the General Assembly has already recognized in a previous resolution. If the Moch concept were accepted and if the United States should have to intervene in a situation like, for example, Indochina, it might be precluded from using atomic weapons (assuming this was practical) against an aggression which is not less dangerous and reprehensible because it lacks some of the components of “armed invasion”. Therefore, for maximum flexibility it is advisable to maintain the present United States position as stated in the May 12 Aide-Mémoire.
- 4.
- The Delegation’s instructions direct it to concentrate on establishing the real Soviet intentions with respect to disarmament and to identify general principles on which agreement might be reached before negotiating on the concrete aspects of a disarmament program. It remains of great importance to establish whether the Soviet Union is any more ready than heretofore to accept and apply in good faith those safeguards which must attend disarmament before raising a proposal of the nature Moch suggests and in the context he proposes. At the least, the discussions in London and the opportunity this affords to diagnose Soviet intentions should proceed a while longer before such a proposal is made.
Recommendations
Moch should be told that the United States would be willing to agree that all states should not use nuclear weapons except to repel aggression, within this period of one year following ratification of an agreed disarmament treaty, but believes it would be better to make the kind of declaration described in our May 12 Aide-Mémoire to the United Kingdom. The Delegation should suggest it would be advisable to follow the present tactics outlined in paragraph four above. A telegram stating these views is attached [Page 1442] for your signature (Tab A), having been cleared with Defense and AEC.5