Atomic Energy Files, lot 57 D 688, “IAEA Policies”
Memorandum by Gerard C. Smith1 to the Secretary of State
- Subject:
- The Bearing of the Proposed Atomic Energy Legislation on the President’s UN Atomic Energy Proposal.
The President’s message of February 172 asking for atomic energy amendments stated that legislation to cover the President’s international pool proposal would be requested at a later date.
When Deputy Under Secretary Murphy testified before the Joint Committee on May 7, he pointed out this fact and stated that until the negotiations looking to the consummation of the President’s plan were further along, the Department of State was not in a position to recommend legislation.
I was advised on May 20 by a representative of the Joint Committee that it would be helpful if in his public statement Secretary Dulles did not make the point that we were not asking for legislation to implement the President’s proposal at this time.
On May 21, Mr. Morton and I discussed this matter with Senator Hickenlooper and Mr. Cole. It was pointed out to them that legislation to implement the President’s proposal at this time might prejudge any Executive Branch decision as to whether or not to go ahead with the President’s proposal in the event that the Russians rejected it finally. Legislative authorization now to participate in such a pool might also set up pressures by other nations for the United States to establish such an agency even without Russian participation.
Mr. Cole felt that the chances of passage of the bill would be increased if it permitted implementation of the President’s proposal, but only if it did not bear a UN label. It should be noted that the President’s December 8 speech called for an agency to be set up [Page 1443] under the “aegis” of the UN. Senator Hickenlooper was silent on this score.
Senator Hickenlooper and Mr. Cole agreed to eliminate the language permitting the implementation of the President’s plan pending a decision in the Executive Branch as to the desirability of its inclusion in the proposed legislation.
This raises the question of whether a decision can or should be made now as to whether or not to proceed with the international pool idea regardless of the ultimate Russian position. If such a decision were to be affirmative the needed authority should be included in the bill unless it is decided that the UN label might at this time hurt the chances of the other atomic energy amendments. To aid in the solution of this question, the following statement of advantages and disadvantages is submitted:
Advantages
The propaganda advantage. Such a course of action would indicate to the world an unselfish American position in this vital matter of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It would indicate an American intention to internationalize the constructive uses of atomic energy, even though such a course was not directly tied into the lessening of cold war tensions or to disarmament. Such a move would, to some extent, counteract the bad effects of the fall-out accident in the Pacific last March. Such a course would, to some extent, counter-balance the communist plea for outlawing the use of nuclear weapons. It would put Russia in a bad light if it had refused to participate in such an important international activity. It would avoid the great disappointment which a decision not to proceed would entail. It probably would be a very popular move politically in the United States. It might be a valuable integrating element to counteract the centrifugal forces appearing in the Western alliance.
Disadvantages
The President’s proposal had two main aims: (1) to lessen the tensions of the cold war as a first step toward real disarmament negotiations; (2) to syphon off weapon level material from the stockpile of the competitors in the arms race. Without Russian participation, these two purposes of the President’s proposal could not be met. In fact, the opposite result might obtain. Cold war tensions might increase as a result of a propaganda coup by the United States. Diversion of United States weapons grade material to an international agency without a corresponding contribution by the Russians would not be a step toward disarmament. To the extent that the security of United States classified information turned over to the proposed international agency was less than when it [Page 1444] had been in the sole possession of the United States, the Soviet espionage function would be made easier. To the extent that such information was declassified to permit international use, the Soviet espionage function would be made unnecessary. If we proceed without the Russians it would leave them the option at all times to join the pool or not, which ever suited their interest best.
By proceeding without the Russians, we would lose the leverage of being able to say that Russian rejection of the President’s proposal has prevented the nations of the world from having access to the peacetime advantages of atomic energy.
We would make our off-shore raw material procurement job more difficult in that technology and fissionable material would be available to foreign nations from the international agency which otherwise they could only get from the United States in return for their raw material. This seems the most significant disadvantage.
Time has not permitted clearance of this matter with other offices in the Department. This will be done on Monday, May 24.
Conclusion
Unless, after further study, the political and psychological advantages are considered paramount, it is recommended that, in the event of ultimate Soviet refusal to participate in the President’s plan, such an international atomic energy agency not be established at this time. As a practical matter, the development and construction of nuclear power reactors will require the skills, knowhow, and capital of nations with advanced industrial systems. It is doubted that the existence of an international agency such as the President contemplated would result in the construction of power reactors throughout the world faster than if such an agency did not come into existence. In the absence of Russian participation with resultant improvement in the outlook for peace, it is believed to be more advantageous for America to directly assist in meeting the nuclear power aspirations of the various countries of the world in return for their allegiance and material support—especially in a matter of uranium and thorium supplies. Although such a course would result in an immediate loss of a propaganda opportunity, in the long run it is thought to be more to our advantage to keep the pressure on the Soviets by continually urging that their refusal to participate in an international agency is preventing the world from having the benefits of nuclear power. It is suggested that our information services should be able to demonstrate to the world that the disappointment of the great expectations raised by the President’s speech is directly due to the Soviet rejection rather than to any American failure to act. United States information services should be able to convince large portions of the world that an international [Page 1445] atomic agency without Russian participation would not be a step toward international control of atomic energy and would not lead to a lessening of cold war tensions.
If such a recommendation were accepted, it would seem well not to have any legislative authorization included in the atomic energy amendments of 1954. If such authority was legislated now, it might make such a negative decision more unpopular and subject it to pressures for reversal.