711.5611/5–1754
The Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson) to the
Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, May 17, 1954.
Dear Mr. Secretary: By Action No. 1106–h,1 the National Security
Council requested that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Director,
Central Intelligence Agency, report to the Council on the desirability of an
international moratorium on future testing of nuclear weapons.
In order to assist in the preparation of the report directed by referenced
NSC Action, there is attached herewith a
copy of a memorandum dated 30 April 1954 which contains the views of the
Joint
[Page 1438]
Chiefs of Staff on this
question. These views had been requested before you raised the subject
during the NSC meeting of 6 May,2 and were received coincidentally with the meeting. I
concur in the views and recommendations expressed therein and consider them
to be a sound basis for United States Policy.
I am sending copies of this letter and attachment to the Chairman, Atomic
Energy Commission, and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, for their
information. I am also sending a copy to Mr. Cutler asking that he show it to the President.3
Sincerely yours,
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
top secret
Washington, 30 April 1954.
- Subject:
- A Proposal for a Moratorium on Future Testing of Nuclear
Weapons
- 1.
- This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated 16 April
19544 regarding a
proposal for a moratorium on future testing of nuclear
weapons.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined this proposal in the light
of the factors discussed below, which they consider should be
governing in arriving at a United States position on this
subject.
- 3.
- United States policy with respect to the regulation, limitation,
and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments (NSC 112) states, in part, as follows:
- a.
- “In the light of the present world situation the security
interests of the United States demand that the first step in
the field of regulation of armaments and armed forces be
achievement of international agreement on at least the
general principles involved.”
- b.
- “International control of atomic energy is inseparably
related to international regulation of armed forces and all
other forms of armaments.”
- c.
- “The international control of atomic energy must be based
on the United Nations Plan or some no less effective plan.”
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A basic
requirement in the United Nations Plan and in the United
States position is that there be established a competent
international authority for the control and administration
of adequate safeguards.
- 4.
- A moratorium, either complete or limited, on the testing of
nuclear weapons would constitute a step in the international control
of atomic energy. If this proposal were to be adopted, the initial
concrete action toward such control would have been taken without
the benefit of prior international agreement on the general
principles involved, without relation to any international
regulation of armed forces and all other forms of armaments, and
without there having been established a suitable international
control body. Were the United States to depart from its position,
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider to be sound, it could be
expected that soon thereafter pressures would be brought to bear for
further and progressive limitation on the military application of
atomic energy, without the universal acceptance of a comprehensive
disarmament system which would provide effective safeguards to
insure compliance by all nations and to give adequate warning of
possible evasions and violations.
- 5.
- There is no reason to expect that the Soviet Union would adhere in
good faith to an agreement to suspend future tests. On the contrary,
based on the entire pattern of past performance, it is certain that
the Soviets would evade and circumvent such an agreement, and that
they would violate or abrogate the agreement at any time they
considered it would be to their advantage to do so. Moreover, any
charges of Soviet violations, even though substantiated with
scientific data, would most certainly be categorically denied by
them.
- 6.
- It is believed that the United States has, at present, an
indeterminate advantage over the USSR with respect to the technical
status of thermonuclear weapons development. While a moratorium on
tests of such weapons might, at first thought, appear to maintain
this advantage, a moratorium would not prevent the Soviets from
advancing their theoretical studies so as to approach the present
stage of development in the United States. The advantage which the
United States is believed now to hold might then readily be
neutralized should the USSR elect to violate or abrogate the
moratorium agreement and conduct proof tests of their theoretical
studies.
- 7.
- While it is recognized that certain political advantages might
accrue to the United States in making or accepting a proposal for a
moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, it is believed that
any political advantages would be transitory in nature, whereas
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the military
disadvantages probably would be far-reaching and permanent.
- 8.
- In the light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider
that it would not be to the net advantage of the United States to
propose or to enter into an agreement on a moratorium on the testing
of nuclear weapons. It is recommended that the United States adhere
to the position that it will not enter into any agreement providing
for the limitation of atomic armaments outside of a comprehensive
program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of
all armed forces and all armaments, conforming in general to the
principles set forth in NSC
112.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur
Radford
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 