Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy–Armaments”

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

Washington, October 30, 1953.

• Subject:
• Conversation with Admiral Strauss

Admiral Strauss wishes to discuss with you the possibilities of a new approach to the international control of atomic energy. The attached memorandum briefly reviews:

a. The problem;

b. The plan endorsed by the U.S. for dealing with it;

c. The Russian position; and

d. A suggestion for a new approach which Admiral Strauss has privately put forward.

Robert R. Bowie

[Annex]

Memorandum for the Secretary

I. The Problem

A plan for the international control of atomic energy must deal with: nuclear raw materials, installations for producing nuclear fuels (i.e., the explosives themselves minus the bomb containers), nuclear fuels and installations for producing power. From the point of view of international security these materials and installations are all dangerous, though in varying degrees. The problem of dealing with them has five components:

1. How to achieve disclosure of materials and installations.

2. What system to devise for the control or disposal of the materials and installations disclosed by each nation so as to prevent their use in war and yet not defeat legitimate expectations for peacetime uses.

3. How to police the arrangements made for the control or disposition of disclosed materials and installations so as to ensure compliance while they are in effect.

4. How to ensure that activities in installations and with materials other than those disclosed by the nations are not carried on secretly.

5. How to protect the national interest against the event of open repudiation by the other side of the entire control agreement and resumption of the atomic armaments race.

II. The U.S. Plan

The plan to which the U.S. adheres—that is, the Baruch plan as modified somewhat and overwhelmingly endorsed by the United Nations—proposes that existing materials and installations remain available for peaceful development. It proposes that a strategic balance be maintained in stockpiling fuels in Russia and in the United States. At the time it was under active consideration, its adoption would very likely have resulted in the distribution to the Soviet Union of some part of the U.S. stockpile. Further production of nuclear fuels—that is, further refining and separation of uranium and production of plutonium—would be restricted and might even be stopped completely if an international agency found that it was unnecessary for peaceful purposes. Should any new production go forward, it would be carried on by the international agency itself on the territories both of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union. All fuels and large installations everywhere in the world—that is, piles and plants other than small power plants, perhaps, and the small piles used for research and medical purposes—would be internationally owned and for all intents and purposes always in the possession of the international agency.

International ownership and management of all sizeable installations and international ownership and possession of all nuclear fuels ensure that no warlike use can be made of them without immediate notice to the world. But the striking fact is that any nation could at any time and with ease take possession of fuels and installations found within its territory. Such a nation could then convert the fuels into weapons and resume further weapons production. It is estimated that within three months to one year after seizure, stockpiles of weapons capable of doing serious damage could again be in existence. There is no safeguard against such an eventuality. But the strategic balance which is to be maintained in the management of peacetime operations is intended to ensure that neither the U.S. nor Soviet Russia could seize a preponderance of the world’s fuels and facilities, placing the other country at a disadvantage; a disadvantage, however, as of the time of seizure, not necessarily in relation to the position held at the time the plan went into operation.

The U.N. plan thus attempts to ensure against surprise atomic attack; it makes no pretense of ensuring against eventual atomic warfare. At the time of breakdown of the plan through seizure, there would be a heavy premium upon the speed with which each nation could reconvert to war production. There would also be a heavy premium upon striking the first blow, if possible, simultaneously with seizure. Consequently, there is initially a premium on secretly withholding as much material and fuel as possible as well as any facilities that can be kept secret, and, while the plan is in operation, there is a premium on secretly manufacturing weapons and fuels. A nation which has kept back or secretly manufactured enough weapons for a fairly heavy initial blow and enough weapons containers to enable it to follow up the initial blow fairly promptly with seized fuels will be more likely to risk seizure. The efficacy of the plan’s assurance against sudden atomic attack depends, therefore, in large measure on its provisions for early notice of clandestine activities outside known installations and on accurate verification of initial disclosures of fuels, materials and installations.

The problem of initial disclosure of Russian capabilities hardly existed at the time the U.N. plan was under active consideration. It is acute now, and, in the Disarmament Commission last year, we proposed disclosure by stages over a period of time. But the fact is that our means of verifying what the Russians have are not such that we can ever be certain that they haven’t kept back sufficient fuel to make at least a small number of bombs and perhaps a thermonuclear weapon. Non-disclosure to this extent must therefore be assumed.

Clandestine activities are guarded against in the U.N. plan by regular inspections of danger spots on each nation’s territory, by spot aerial surveys and by inspections for cause, on warrant from an international court.

III. The Russian Position

The Russians, of course, have never accepted any part of the U.N. plan. They have proposed that everyone solemnly sign a convention agreeing never to produce another atomic weapon and never to use one. They have proposed further that existing weapons be destroyed. This however means merely destruction of weapon containers, which are quickly and easily produced. The Russians do not propose destroying nuclear fuels or the installations required for refining, separating and producing them, for they lay quite a bit of emphasis on peaceful development of atomic energy. They propose that each nation go on at will producing and stockpiling nuclear fuels, which are the explosive without the container, and that a system of inspection ensure that no finished weapons are manufactured. The inspection they would allow is such as will not interfere with what they term the internal affairs of a nation, and they propose to retain authority to exclude inspectors from their territory and from parts of their territory. This plan, of course, offers no security whatsoever.

IV. Admiral Strauss’ Suggestion

Admiral Strauss’ suggestion is that existing fuels be delivered by each nation, at semi-annual periods, into the hands of an international agency for storage in a remote insular or mainland place. The fuels would be stored in liquid form so that their recovery would be time-consuming and cumbersome. A sea-going tanker of the largest present size could carry only the equivalent of less than one critical mass of fuel in solution. Production in each country—both refining and separation of uranium and production of plutonium—would cease.

This disposition of the fuels—when final delivery in escrow is made—solves the problem which arises under our existing plan when a nation seizes the fuels found within its borders. If we maintain adequate conventional forces, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Russians could effect a seizure and then move back to the homeland the gigantic fleet of tankers or tank cars necessary to transport large amounts of fuel. There is, however, the risk that if Russian seizure should succeed it would be seizure of the preponderance of fuels existing in the world rather than of a strategically balanced portion of them. Before it is fully operative, the Strauss suggestion would have the effect of continually reducing U.S. and Russian stockpiles, thus, at a given time, perhaps increasing the risk of local aggressions. It may do so ultimately as well, but so might atomic plenty and stalemate.

The Strauss proposal thus offers assurance that existing nuclear fuels will not be used against us in quantity either suddenly or, unless we lose a conventional war, at all. As under the U.N. plan, however, an inspection mechanism would be necessary to ensure that, having placed existing fuels in escrow, the Russians do not simply proceed to build up a new stockpile with which, when they are ready, they could deliver a surprise attack. But immediate notice of use of disclosed facilities for warlike purposes would as easily be forthcoming under the Strauss proposal as under the U.N. plan. For Admiral Strauss would stop all further production of nuclear fuels. Resuming production, once stopped, is not a simple matter and is easily noted. Inspection for activities carried on secretly in new or undisclosed installations presents the same problem as under the U.N. plan. But the fact that a surprise attack with secretly manufactured fuels could not be followed up or accompanied, as under the U.N. plan, by seizure and quick use of existing stockpiles would put less of a premium on carrying on secret activities.

Nuclear fuels needed for power production would be released from the place of deposit as and when needed. Existing supplies are amply sufficient to serve peaceful purposes for the foreseeable future. There is, of course, a danger that some fuels will be misused when released. Inspection to guard against diversion in small quantities would admittedly be more difficult than under our existing plan, which would keep the fuels nearly always in international hands. But the danger is largely one of diversion of small quantities of fuels for purposes of secret weapons manufacture. It has been pointed out that this is a considerably less profitable venture under the Strauss proposal than under the U.N. plan. So is a sizeable diversion of fuels, against which there are a number of other deterrents as well.

Facilities for the production of power are, at least at present, exceedingly costly (a single installation of 100,000 kw. capacity runs to about a hundred million dollars). The fuels used quickly become contaminated, requiring time to reconvert them into explosives, and the installations once in operation become, of course, an integral part of the economy, which would suffer some disruption if power production were stopped entirely. Also, sizeable diversion could not easily be carried out secretly, for the stoppage of power production in an area is noticeable.

In sum, unlike the U.N. plan, the Strauss proposal, once fully operative, offers fairly safe assurance that currently existing fuels will not be used in war, and it does so without preventing the peaceful development of atomic energy. It offers no more and no less assurance against surprise attack in relatively small force than does the U.N. plan. Some small secret diversion of fuels released for power production, some initial withholding of fuels and some clandestine manufacture are not definitely excluded by either plan. But the Strauss proposal does make all these operations less profitable by making it impossible for them to be followed up quickly with use of existing stockpiles.

Robert R. Bowie

1. The source text is accompanied by a typed, unsigned, and undated note, which reads: “Mr. Bowie says this just hits the ‘high spots’ but might be helpful before you see Admiral Strauss this morning. Admiral Strauss’ proposal is at Page 6.” According to the Secretary’s appointment book, he met with Bowie and Strauss at 10:10 a.m., Oct. 31. (Princeton University Library, Dulles papers, “Daily Appointments”)