Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum for the President by the Secretary of State1
- Subject:
- Atomic Speech
I
Talks at the London Conference, and with Hallstein (Germany) and Alphand (France) here, and the probable action on EDC in France by January, all lead me to the conclusion that we ought not seriously to seek discussions with the Soviets until decisions have been taken on EDC.2 If U.S.-Soviet discussions were started or impending before then—
- (1)
- Their pendency would almost surely arrest any positive action on EDC or possible alternatives.
- (2)
- The Soviets would concentrate on breaking up Western defense arrangements rather than on trying to reach a constructive settlement.
I think there may be a fair chance of some settlement with the Russians if we have a firm foundation in Western Europe—but not before.
II
If this view is accepted, it means that we should not at this time make publicly or privately the far-reaching proposals which were envisaged by the State Department draft paper, but that these moves should be held back until after the first of the year.
Soviet propaganda at the present time is emphasizing and coupling the two subjects of atomic weapons and bases and we should avoid presently creating a situation where we might have to accept [Page 1235] or refuse an invitation to discuss these two topics. Acceptance would have the paralyzing effect on Western European plans above referred to. Refusal might seriously hurt our standing and influence in friendly countries.
III
I submitted the State Department paper to the Planning Board, as you requested.3 Their cogent comments compel me to conclude that it is probably a mistake to try to make serious proposals by means of a public speech. The specific and simple terms desirable for a speech are not a good basis for beginning negotiations. Either they seem to give away too much of our case or else they seem to be primarily propaganda, which would be likely to provoke only a propaganda response. I think, therefore, that when the time comes, the approaches should be primarily private.
IV
I can visualize as acceptable, and perhaps desirable, at this time a Presidential speech which would (1) describe the atomic danger; (2) make clear our determination, so long as this danger exists, to take the necessary steps to deter attack, through possession of retaliatory power and the development of continental defense; and (3) reemphasize in general terms our willingness to discuss limitation and control of armaments, both conventional and atomic, in the U.N. machinery, and the present sore spots such as Korea, Indochina, Germany, and Austria.
- The source text bears the following handwritten notation: “C.D. is taking up with Sec. Dulles”, and is initialed by the President. It is accompanied by a note from Ann Whitman, Presidential secretary, to Robert Cutler, dated Oct. 24, which reads: “General Cutler: C.D. Jackson asked me to send this to you. Will you please return for my files?”↩
- Regarding the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings at London, October–November 1953, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1709. For documentation on U.S. interest in the establishment of a European Defense Community, see ibid., Part 1, pp. 571 ff. Walter Hallstein was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the German Federal Republic. Hervé Alphand was French Representative on the North Atlantic Council.↩
- See the summary of the Planning Board discussion, Oct. 19, p. 1227.↩