Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

600.0012/10–1953

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, October 19, 1953.

1. Pursuant to your memorandum of October 13, 1953,¹ certain pages suggested for inclusion in a forthcoming Presidential speech on means for reducing the atomic threat: (1) were submitted to Planning Board members and advisers on October 14, (2) under special security precautions, limiting consideration to themselves as individuals without consultation with their Chiefs, (3) for an expression of views as to the consistency of the proposals set forth in the pages with U.S. security interests. The pages so distributed are being returned to the Council office for impounding.

2. The proposals in question apparently seek: (1) a reduction in military strengths by the Soviet bloc and by the free world, through control of atomic weapons and through limitation of conventional weapons, to be proportionally similar on each side and to be effectively safeguarded; (2) a removal of the specific causes of instability through mutual withdrawal of troops from key danger areas now occupied and by limitation by the U.S. of bases overseas.

3. It was the opinion of the Planning Board members and advisers that

a. (preponderant view) the proposals were not sufficiently clearly expressed to be fully understood by them on careful reading;

b. (preponderant view) if the proposals mean what is stated in par. 2 above and could be effectively implemented as a total and nonseparable program, which is highly theoretical—their carrying out would not prejudice U.S. security interests;

c. (majority view) serious doubt that the proposals could be stated with sufficient clarity in one form or another so as to be readily understood, without danger to the U.S. security;

d. (strong minority) the proposal of disarmament to a tyrant so soon after his having exploded a thermonuclear device would be widely interpreted as defeatism on part of U.S.; and making the package proposals at this time would not help our cause.

4. For what it may be worth, I attach a memo of additional views of my own which I read to the Planning Board and as to which several expressed agreement.

Robert Cutler

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler)

top secret

Washington, October 19, 1953.

Comments by RC on Draft, Dated Oct. 13/53, of Pages for Proposed Speech

1. The virtue of making the proposals lies not so much in the likelihood of their acceptability by the other side, but in the opportunity provided to the U.S.—once the proposals have been made and not accepted—to put into effect a new and better (for the long run) basic policy than that we now have.

2. Pursuit of our existing basic policy over a long period is likely to break down the free world’s economy, dislocate its individual liberties and free institutions, and provoke it through frustration into armed conflict. The new proposals offer the opportunity for a new road more safely to travel over many years to come.

3. There are, however, serious difficulties in the statement of the proposals as written:

a. They are not sufficiently clearly expressed to be understood, even as a diplomatic message.

b. As a speech by the President, the audience of world peoples would be unable to grasp what he was talking about; and hence the speech would fail of its great purpose.

c. If this great proposal is to be made as a last best hope of the world, its message must be clear beyond a doubt to John Q. Citizen.

d. The proposals are not sufficiently expressed as an indivisible package, so that there is danger that the USSR might accept one part (e.g. the limitation of US bases overseas), to the prejudice of our security.

e. Specifically—

(1) the language in par. 7 (“restricting the military strength equally on both sides”) is capable of a dangerous quantitative interpretation, not intended or acceptable.

(2) query if the last sentence of par. 9 is not so general that it might be accepted by the USSR—, but the USSR would then make unacceptable specifications which, when not accepted by the free world, would lead to charges of bad faith.

(3) the mutual withdrawal of forces (and reduction of overseas air bases) is so diffused and glancingly expressed in pars. 15–18 as to miss fire. In par. 19, the Asian proposal rests entirely on the earlier paragraphs so that if they are not clear the Asian proposal cannot be understood either.

1. Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson papers, “Atoms for Peace Evolution”)