Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, C D. Jackson papers

Memorandum of Discussion at the Planning Board of the National Security Council¹

top secret

Washington, October 19, 1953.

Summary of Discussion of State Draft of Part Two of Presidential Speech²

The State draft for the second part of the Presidential speech was discussed by the Planning Board members and advisers as individuals, rather than as representatives of their agencies. The need for the utmost security was emphasized by General Cutler.

1. Mr. Bowie made the following points concerning the draft:

a. The draft was prepared on the assumption that a speech has to be made, and that there is a conceivable settlement which can be offered to the USSR without endangering U.S. security interests.

b. The draft is not primarily a propaganda speech. It is a serious proposal which the Russians might accept. It contains the maximum concessions consistent with U.S. security interests.

c. It is doubtful whether a speech is the proper way to initiate any serious negotiations with the USSR. The State Department would prefer not to have a speech and not to try to explore Soviet views³ in public concerning a possible settlement. Its preference would be for quiet talks. The objectives of explaining our position to the public and testing Soviet intentions concerning a settlement may be so incompatible as to prevent their being achieved in a Presidential speech.

d. Assuming that a Presidential speech is necessary, then a discussion of the dangers of the H-bomb and of our intention to protect ourselves against H-bomb destruction must be combined with a statement of our desire to reach an agreement which would prevent general hostilities.

e. The President’s April speech was acclaimed by the public, but it was not helpful as an indication to the Russians of those matters on which we would be prepared to negotiate. It is not possible to write a speech which states specifically what the United States is prepared to offer and expect to get any discussions with the Russians as a result. The speech is purposefully vague and does not put all our cards on the table, since it is not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The objective is to make it as a “come on” to the Russians, but not give away one’s negotiating hand.

f. If the Russians refuse a serious offer which honestly tests their willingness to negotiate, then we must draw the appropriate conclusions.

g. The proposal in the draft seeks:

(1) Control of nuclear weapons.

(2) Reduction of conventional weapons in some equal way. This is admittedly difficult but will have to be done if any disarmament is undertaken.

(3) Clarification for the Russians of those points on which we are not prepared to make a deal, for example, EDC, since this is the best way to handle German rearmament.

(4) Assurance to the Soviets that Western power will not be used against them unless they initiate aggression.

h. The withdrawal of U.S. troops is linked to control of nuclear weapons, because we cannot withdraw our forces at the same time the Russians do without abandoning our bases. Obviously we cannot abandon forward bases until nuclear weapons are controlled.

i. The reference to Asia in the draft is intentionally fuzzy because this question contains so much Congressional political dynamite. It is believed that concessions on Asia would be accepted by Congress if they were part of an over-all settlement. However, if specific offers were made, and not tied into a “package”, considerable domestic opposition might develop.

j. Distrust may not be dissipated by disarmament, but unless there is an attempt to seek a settlement of some kind involving disarmament, then it must be admitted that there is no prospect of any improvement in relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

k. Criticism of the draft on the grounds that it is not dramatically expressed is unimportant, since the purpose was to present the substance and, if agreement was reached on the content, the speech writers could write an appropriate speech.

l. Criticism of the content of this draft means in effect that no speech can be made which is not damaging to our security interests.

m. The draft does not seek effective abolition of nuclear bombs, but rather their reduction and control. No control is foolproof. Fewer nuclear weapons will decrease the possibility of their use.

n. The draft is aimed at the American people and would make clear to them why the budget cannot be balanced. It is also aimed at our Allies in an attempt to convince them of our serious intention of seeking a settlement.

o. The draft clearly explains the proposals and was understood by the President when Secretary Dulles read it to him. Attempts to make it clearer and easily understood by the uninformed citizen make it less useful as a device to test Soviet intentions.

2. Colonel Bonesteel stated that he, Mr. Nash and Admiral Page Smith were very concerned about the draft for the following reasons:

a. Disarmament does not reduce the risk of war, nor does the existence of nuclear weapons necessarily increase the likelihood of war.

b. The draft is unclear as to whether we are proposing proportional or quantitative disarmament.

c. The draft goes very far toward offering to withdraw our troops, but does not stress the mutuality of withdrawal.

d. Only secretly and through diplomatic channels can we test Soviet willingness to negotiate.

e. Everyone is concerned about how to work out a settlement with the USSR but an offer of disarmament is not the proper posture for the U.S. to take in seeking peace. This is proved by all of our knowledge of how the Russians operate.

f. There is an implication in the draft that Germany is the country to fear—that the U.S. and the USSR can work out a deal together to hold down the Germans. The effect of this position in Germany would be very serious.

g. The long range effect of an offer of a settlement to withdraw made in this form would be to blow up NATO.

h. The draft touches on the five points which have constituted for several years Vishinsky’s position in the United Nations.

i. The effect on our Allies and the free world would be disastrous. An offer of this kind made as the second part of a speech describing the horrors of the H-bomb would be interpreted as evidence of basic fear and a desire to reach a settlement, rather than stand up to the increased Soviet military capability.

j. The position of the United States would be that of offering to disarm even though we agree there has been no basic change in Soviet intentions, but merely because they have the H-bomb. This is not the way to deal with a tyrant. Such an offer would make the Russians highly suspicious at the same time that it would confuse the free world.

3. General Gerhart asked what thought was behind this draft. He saw it as containing an offer of concessions of unknown magnitude in an attempt to get “peace”. He cited the difficulties of proportional disarmament and pointed out that if the Planning Board members could not understand exactly what was involved, the Soviets could twist the offer to their own ends. He accepted the description of the proposal made by General Cutler in his memorandum. He foresaw serious consequences if the offer were misunderstood. In the United States he said it might slow down the whole productive effort if the average man concluded that we were beginning to disarm immediately. Abroad, he saw a very serious effect in those countries where we now have bases, if we offered now to negotiate with the Russians about whether we would leave these forward bases. He said that the proposal as now stated would be inimical to the national interest. This defect would continue until specific details of the proposal were stated without vagueness. He did not know how to answer the question as to whether the proposal would be acceptable if it were taken as a package by the Russians, because he did not understand what the package involved. He agreed with Colonel Bonesteel as to the undesirability of linking in the same offer to negotiate, a description of the potentiality of nuclear weapons.

4. Mr. Amory agreed with General Cutler’s summary of the proposal. He said that the reduction of armaments maintaining the same balance of military power was not achievable, since balancing of armaments of military power could not be made precise. He doubted that “proportional” disarmament was possible. He said that a speech could be made, but it should not be this one which is too vague. He suggested that the speech contain specific illustrations as to how we disarm. He felt that if the speech contained no more than this draft it would be a “turkey” and the reaction would be that it was no more than a restatement of the same generalities.

5. General Porter⁴ said he felt the draft was fuzzy on the question of how we achieve disarmament, and that the references to neutralized areas were unclear. He believed that the speech should not be based on disarmament and suggested that the draft say we wanted to spend our money developing peaceful uses for atomic energy, but that we were prevented from doing so because of the Soviet threat to our security. He suggested that the speech be built around our efforts to arrive at a settlement which would permit us to use atomic energy to benefit mankind, rather than for destructive purposes. He urged that no attempt be made to deal with “relative” or “balanced” disarmament, which he felt was an impossible task.

6. Mr. Tuttle⁵ pointed out that the draft would change existing policy by reopening a discussion of disarmament in the United Nations forum, which the Council had decided not to do, and by easing existing pressures on the USSR. He added that his reading of the speech led him to believe its purpose was to reassure the free world that the United States was not intransigent. He wondered whether we have not committed ourselves in the draft beyond the point where we could negotiate a settlement which would not be harmful. He feared that an attempt to state our position clearly would be harmful. He said that our Allies might be led to believe that we were determined to balance the budget at all costs, even to the extent of the compromises listed in the draft. He feared that the Allies would say we were making this proposal in an attempt to save money or to deal with a U.S. recession.

7. Mr. Finley⁶ said he believed the draft could be understood completely by the average man. He indicated that his impression was that we were asking for a one-sided withdrawal of Soviet troops.

8. General Cutler read a memorandum stating his initial views,⁷ and emphasized the vagueness of the proposals, especially the last paragraph, as well as the danger of the Soviets accepting the package and then attaching conditions which we could not accept. In the discussion he made clear that in his view the disarmament would be “proportional” and that we would get from the Russians a quid pro quo for our withdrawal from forward bases and positions. He pointed out that theoretically, acceptance of a package proposal would not harm the national interest, but that great difficulty arose in stating the package in such a way as to be understood by the average man and yet be foolproof as far as Russian attempts to misuse it for their own purposes. He said that the President’s present thinking concerned a statement of our position, sufficiently clear but not damaging to U.S. security interests which would be accepted or turned down by the Russians. If turned down, this offer would be our last hope and we would reconcile ourselves to life in an atomic world in which the Soviet threat would be ever present.

1. Drafting information and distribution are not indicated on the source text. For information on the origins of and the major decisions stemming from this discussion, as interpreted by Robert Cutler, see Cutler’s memorandum to the Secretary of State, Oct. 19, infra.
2. The specific draft under reference has not been identified. For information on the development of the Atoms for Peace speech, see the memorandum for the files, Sept. 30, 1954, p. 1526.
3. The rest of this sentence was corrected by hand in the source text. It formerly ended: “Soviet views concerning possible public settlement.”
4. Brig. Gen. E. H. Porter, USAF, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5. Presumably Elbert P. Tuttle, Treasury Representative on the Planning Board.
6. Presumably Robert L. Finley, ODM Representative on the Planning Board.
7. See the annex to the memorandum by Cutler, infra.