Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Atomic Weapons”
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)
eyes only
personal and private
Dear Chip: It is possible that the President may be making a speech toward the end of this month which will point out the rising threat of atomic warfare and urge the importance of
- (1)
- eliminating by reduction and controls the present destructive capacity of armament; and
- (2)
- eliminating the immediate sore spots which could bring armaments into play.
With respect to (2) the speech might develop somewhat the lines of thought contained in my United Nations speech of September1 with respect to Germany, Austria, satellites, Korea and Indochina.
With respect to (1) it might emphasize that while we cannot now end “distrust” between the two worlds, this does not preclude a downward movement in terms of weapons and armament, conventional and unconventional, so long as this does not appreciably alter the existing balance of power.
The speech as now forecast would be sober, non-provocative and not designed to be a “propagandish” speech. It will probably be made before the General Assembly.
I cannot, of course, guarantee, particularly after the speech writers have had their day, that it will not seem somewhat propagandish to the Russians but this is not the present intention.
This whole program is subject to modification in the light of ideas of Churchill and the French, which are not yet fully developed. We have not yet indicated to them in any way what the President has in mind. We would, however presumably do so before he speaks.
In order that the speech may have the best chance of producing a positive result from the Soviet Union I ask you to be prepared, [Page 1227] upon receipt of a cable from me, (a) to call upon Mr. Molotov and advise him of the President’s intention to make this address and (b) his purpose in doing so and (c) as much of the substance of (1) and (2) as I will indicate in my cable.
You will urge an affirmative reaction and indicate our willingness to proceed with diplomatic channel talks if they so desire either (x) alone or (y) with UK and France.
You may point out that a negative reaction or one which was affirmative only in words but without rapid follow-up would leave a state of tension even greater than that which exists today. The armament race might then mount.
You will please not communicate the contents of this letter to anyone. In cabling you I may refer to this letter as “Frank’s” letter and refer to the numbered lines.2 Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by an “eyes only” cable to me.3
Sincerely yours,