Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary records, “NSC”
The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to C.D. Jackson, Special
Assistant to the President
secret
Washington, October 30, 1953.
Dear Mr. Jackson: Pursuant toNSC 1511 and in accordance with your
request for assistance from various governmental departments and agencies in
the preparation of a draft Presidential speech on atomic energy, the
Department of Defense has participated in the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments which were directed
toward this end. Early in September, the Ad Hoc
Committee submitted to you what it considered its final substantive draft of
such a speech reflecting the consensus of the views of the departments and
agencies concerned.
At that time, I sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of the Ad Hoc Committee’s draft for their formal
consideration and comment. Having now had an opportunity to study their
comments, I am passing them on to you with my concurrence for whatever use
they may be in drafting any subsequent Presidential address on the subject
of atomic energy. I suggest that you may wish to bring the Joint Chiefs of
Staff comments to the attention of the President.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 1241]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
secret
Washington, 16 September 1953.
- Subject:
- Draft Presidential Speech on Atomic Energy.
- 1.
- In response to the request contained in a memorandum by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 3 September 1953, subject
as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments
concerning the draft Presidential speech which accompanied that
memorandum.2 (For ready
reference, the paragraphs in the draft Presidential speech and the
draft Appendix thereto have been numbered.)
- 2.
- While it is recognized that the President’s speech on this subject
will be directed primarily to the American public, it is considered
to be important, when analyzing the subject matter of the speech
from the military point of view, to take into account the effect
which the speech is likely to have upon our Allies and upon the
government of the USSR.
- 3.
- The proposed Presidential address stems from the recommended
policy of candor toward the American people, the basic objective of
which is to apprise them of the realities of the atomic arms race.
In light of this fact and the probability that the speech will be
widely referred to in the press by its title, it would appear
desirable to give the speech a title more directly associated with
its main topic, such as “The Realities of the Atomic Arms Race” or,
on a broader basis, “The Safety of the Republic” (see paragraphs 3
and 75).
- 4.
- NSC 151, which is as yet not
approved but which is the genesis of NSC Action No. 7993 leading
to the preparation of this speech, states in paragraph 3b under
Recommendations: “It should be recognized that the degree to which
the objective of such a policy [of candor]4 will be
achieved in the initial stages will be affected by the Government’s
ability to inform the public of its views on the programs required
to deal with the dangers involved in the atomic equation.” The
proposed Presidential speech, as now drafted, forcefully describes
the grave threat involved in the continued build-up of Soviet atomic
capability, but does not adequately set forth the government’s views
as to the course along which we should proceed in seeking the
ultimate reduction of that threat by peaceful means.
[Page 1242]
Thus the speech may leave the
American public with a sense of endless burden, fear, and
hopelessness. It is suggested that the speech should:
- a.
- Stress more pointedly the fact that merely “keeping ahead
of the Russians” in the atomic arms race is not regarded as
an ultimate solution to the problem; and
- b.
- Outline in broad terms the measures which are essential to
safeguard the security of the nation in the face of the
Soviet threat, and the means by which the ultimate reduction
of that threat will be sought while keeping to a minimum the
danger of a catastrophic resort to atomic weapons on both
sides.
- (See paragraphs 7, 8, 15, 16, and 35.)
- 5.
- In considering the probable effect of the speech upon our Allies,
two points suggest themselves:
- a.
- Our Allies may feel that the role of the United States is
overstated, almost to the exclusion of credit to our Allies
for their contribution to the over-all defense. It is
suggested that the interdependence of all nations of the
free world be given prominent recognition early in the
speech, before turning to remarks intended primarily for the
people of the United States (see paragraphs 12 and 46);
and
- b.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the
proposed remarks concerning an exchange of atomic
information with our Allies might be interpreted as an
announcement of intent to liberalize United States policy in
this matter. Were a relaxation of controls not to follow in
the near future, a deep disappointment and resentment on the
part of our Allies might well result. Since authorization
for exchange of atomic information will require
Congressional action, it is assumed that assurance of early
and favorable Congressional action will be obtained before
such a change in United States policy is publicly implied.
In this connection, it is recommended that the statement
concerning the TNT equivalent of bombs in our stockpile be
cleared with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy prior to release, since this information may be
regarded as Restricted Data (see paragraphs 61, 62, and
63).
- 6.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there are certain aspects
of the draft speech which might leave an erroneous impression with
the Soviets. While it is stated that the power of the United States
to wreak destruction upon an enemy is greater than that of the USSR,
the draft speech leaves the impression that the inevitable results
to the United States and the USSR of war in the atomic age would be
equally disastrous. There is the implication that the results of
atomic war would be so catastrophic that the United States could not
be provoked into a war in which atomic weapons might be used, or
that the United States would not initiate the use of atomic weapons
in the event of war. Any such impression in the minds of the Soviet
leaders might lead them to believe
[Page 1243]
that further local aggressions could be
undertaken without risk of provoking atomic war. It is suggested
that the draft speech be modified to eliminate the possibility of
such an interpretation (see paragraphs 15, 16, 20, and 76).
- 7.
- In addition to the foregoing general comments, the following
comments of a more specific nature are submitted:
- a.
- The first sentence of paragraph 39 conveys the impression
that our atomic delivery capability is limited to the Air
Force. It is suggested that this sentence be amended to read
“Our own atomic striking power …”
- b.
- Regarding paragraph 48, the extensive early warning net
now under development will serve to detect the approach of
aggressor submarines as well as aircraft;
- c.
- The use of the word “prohibitive” in paragraphs 49 and 77
carries the fallacious connotation that a continental
defense can be had which will in itself dissuade the enemy
from attempting an atomic attack against the United States;
such a belief could result in pressure to allocate a
disproportionate amount of the total available resources to
a static continental defense; and
- d.
- It is recommended that the paragraphs set forth in the
draft paragraphs prepared by Admiral
Parker5
be adopted in lieu of paragraph 35, with the following
modification to the first paragraph (changes indicated in
the usual manner):
“In our stockpile today are bombs which release
energy equivalent to that
of
550,000
more than 500,000 tons of
TNT—which is more than 30
times the power of the [bombs dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.]*
This
larger
bomb
A bomb of this size, if burst
above a city such as Washington, would totally
destroy an area of 2 square miles and heavily damage
buildings within an area of 14 square miles. Lighter
damage would extend the casualty area even
further.”
Reason: To be less specific in
revealing the power of bombs now in our atomic
stockpile, and to remove the inference that the
quoted equivalent TNT value represents the largest
bomb in our stockpile. Note:
This change was suggested by the Chief, Armed Forces
Special Weapons Project.
- 8.
- Subject to the foregoing comments and recommendations, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the draft Presidential
speech is satisfactory for the purpose intended.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur
Radford
Chairman 