Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

460.509/4–2954: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Paris, April 29, 1954—6 p.m.

4139. Excon. Re Deptel 3854, April 27² Embassy deferring action on ref Deptel until Department has had opportunity to consider Polto 1720³ and following Embassy comments:

(1) Charpentier has noted reference to “peel-off” in concluding paragraph latest Thorneycroft message and reiterates views recorded in Embtel 4038.⁴ He planning invite Schumann’s attention thereto as soon as feasible with consequent possibility latter may enter Thorneycroft–Stassen correspondence with objection of his own. Given firmness of French understanding of what transpired at London and subsequent CG agreement, there is risk that for the US now to reveal that a private understanding was reached between heads of US/UK Delegations during course of trilateral meeting of which third participant was not then (and up to now has not been) informed not only will entail embarrassment to US but more importantly may seriously prejudice future possibilities of Franco-American collaboration in this and other fields.

(2) Department will recall earlier French sensitivity over circumstances that despite general agreement with US views last November on course to be pursued in CG and anticipation that tripartite meetings shortly thereafter to be held, US and UK during succeeding three months carried on bilateral discussions, including shipping control matters, without informing French thereof. French were only informed of these interim developments after newspaper accounts had become so extensive that neither we nor British could deny their accuracy.

(3) This French sensitivity was considerably assuaged by invitation to participate in London discussions where, we believe, they have presumed they were treated on basis of complete equality and kept fully and frankly informed of all relevant personal and official discussions. Should they now be informed in accordance ref Deptel that this assumption is contrary to fact, they will inevitably regard with jaundiced eye any assurances that US in future will keep them thoroughly courant with respect to future US actions in this field.

(4) Embassy fully appreciates dilemma posed by Stassen’s personal commitment to British as described in ref Deptel. Nevertheless, impressions of official US positions subsequently conveyed in official trilateral discussions in London and subsequently in CG involve serious matter of principle in our dealings with French which may extend to other CG countries. Shift in US position (as understood by others) at this time appears likely to be construed by French and others as special favoritism for British. As indicated Embtel 4038, Charpentier has already interpreted Thorneycroft’s pressure as motivated by desire fill Russian orders on hand soonest regardless of economic defense considerations, notably simultaneous need for strengthening COCOM control mechanisms.

(5) Embassy invites attention to circumstances that in tri del meeting Coulson was apprised day before CG meeting of US-French preference for “en masse” procedure on pragmatic grounds and had opportunity then or in course of succeeding two days to refer issue to Thorneycroft for reconciliation with Stassen prior to ultimate adoption CG resolution. He appears to have been given some latitude to move from Thorneycroft’s position, for as indicated Polto 1720 he suggested in CG that deletions take place after full category review rather than item by item. He also agreed with emphasis in CG document 1563 on “en masse” treatment with interim recommendations for deletions highly exceptional. There would appear therefore to have been either some flexibility or some lack of understanding at the official level within the UK Delegation as well, as to the nature and significance of the Stassen–Thorneycroft agreement. Even after Coulson’s return to London he appears (Lontel 4663⁵) to have thought agreement with Stassen was reached during trilaterals rather than informal bilaterals.

(6) At this time, to attempt to unwind record of official trilateral discussions at London and in CG and reverse US official position, as it has heretofore been understood, on grounds earlier understanding with UK is over-riding, is likely to provoke embarrassing questions, including reference to significance of US professions to French of desire for tripartite unity. Expressions of US appreciation for general French support during trilaterals and CG now would raise question as to which US position they are deemed to have supported. Indeed present dilemma in part stems from fact that French did agree with US and overwhelming majority of other countries in CG on merits of “en masse” approach.

(7) Emb endorses view expressed in para A.1 of Polto 1720. In its view Stassen might readily acknowledge validity of Thorneycroft understanding of luncheon agreement but emphasize this was not conveyed by either party to French, or clearly reflected in trilateral conclusions, that French construe official record of London discussions as controlling, and their subsequent actions based on such interpretation. French willingness to defer pressing for immediate imposition of transactions and transit controls may be modified in fashion contrary to UK interests or desires should Thorneycroft persist in demands for full implementation of his personal understanding with Stassen. Moreover, other CG PC’s may interpret reversal of official US position in a fashion uncomplimentary to both the US and the UK, which would not enhance the ability of the two countries jointly to influence other partners or induce these objectively to appraise their obligations and personal sacrifices in the interest of the common defense effort. As UK will appreciate, there are broader issues at stake. We would hope that it could now reconsider its position in the context of developments subsequent to the bilateral London conversations.

(8) Should foregoing (para 7) personal appeal to Thorneycroft (not to be repeated to Schumann) fail to induce UK to reconsider, Embassy proposes following:

a. In private communication to Thorneycroft (not to be repeated to Schumann) Stassen say that the CG instruction does not necessarily conflict with the private understanding, provided the UK proposals for deletions are reasonably limited in number and truly exceptional. In such cases US would be prepared support UK proposals. However, should UK propose immediate peel-off of all items agreed in COCOM for eventual decontrol and should US support these proposals in accord US–UK agreement, the existence of this understanding soon would be perceived by all PC’s with possible unfortunate consequences outlined above.

b. In communication from Stassen to Thorneycroft with copy to be made available to Schumann, Stassen merely say CG instruction appears to meet Thorneycroft’s concern and US prepared sympathetically consider any proposals for immediate deletion of items agreed by COCOM no longer to merit any control.

c. No statement be made to French along lines of ref Deptel. Necessity for any private statement to them will depend upon subsequent developments and should be tailored to meet specific cases involving UK deletion proposals as they arise, i.e., US emphasis in discussions with French would then be on merits of specific proposals rather than on obligations stemming from prior, undisclosed personal agreement.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed; dated Apr. 27, 1954, it recommended that the United States, in responding to the British complaint that the United States had reneged on its agreement to delete progressively categories of International List items, attempt to persuade the British Government to reconsider its position. (460.509/4–2754)
4. Not printed; dated Apr. 23, 1954, it reported that Charpentier had “no doubt whatsoever” that any deletions from the International Lists would be made only at the completion of the review of those Lists, according to the agreement made with Governor Stassen at London in late March. (460.509/4–2354)
5. Dated Apr. 22, p. 1148.