Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 141st Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, April 28, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

April 28, 1953

Present at the 141st meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret), Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

[Here follow agenda items 1–6: “Developments at Recent NATO Conference,” “The Situation in Indochina,” “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China,” “Latin America,” “National Security Policies in Relation to Cost,” and “The President’s Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors”.]

At the conclusion of the discussion Mr. Cutler stated that he had a matter to call to the Council’s attention, although it was not, strictly speaking, NSC business. He stated that the day before yesterday a telephone call had been received from an individual in Senator McCarthy’s office. This individual had inquired whether the Council had a “civilian advisory board” and whether, as he had been informed in an anonymous telephone call, the members of this board had been given access to classified security information without the proper clearances, and in particular, whether a certain … had been a member of this board. The anonymous telephone caller had stated that … was unfit to have access to such security information, owing to certain personal weaknesses. Mr. Cutler then read a letter which he proposed to send to Senator McCarthy in reply to this inquiry.²

Immediately upon conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s recitation, the President stated his strong objections as a matter of principle to sending any such letter or any letter whatsoever to Senator McCarthy. What went on in the National Security Council and what advice the President sought from consultants to the National Security Council was solely the President’s business and the President’s responsibility. If Senator McCarthy proposed to take on the National Security Council, he was taking on the President. Accordingly, Mr. Cutler was to do no more than to make a telephone call to Senator McCarthy explaining the President’s position on this matter.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)³

[Washington,] April 30, 1953.

Memorandum re Senator McCarthy

1. The facts relative to the inquiry made by Mr. Surine, of Senator McCarthy’s office, are contained in Mr. Coyne’s memo to Mr. Lay, April 27/53.⁴

2. Thereafter, a proposed draft letter for me to send Senator McCarthy was prepared, dated April 27/53.

3. On April 28/53 I spoke to the President and the National Security Council relative to the telephone call made to Mr. Surine of Senator McCarthy’s office and read the proposed letter which had been drafted for me to sign and send to Senator McCarthy.

The President entirely rejected the idea of writing a letter and making an explanation such as was contained in the drafted letter. The Council agreed with the President.

The President wished me to telephone Senator McCarthy and say that the National Security Council is advisory to the President; that any civilians whom the President calls upon as Consultants for the Council are responsible to the President and he sees to their being checked and cleared; that the President uses the agencies of the Government to assist him in such checking and clearance.

4. I telephoned Senator McCarthy’s office at 1:30 PM and at 6 PM on April 28 and at 11 AM and at 2 PM on April 29. He was always out. He telephoned me back at 4:50 PM on April 29.

5. I told Senator McCarthy that I was calling because Mr. Surine had called the NSC office about civilian advisers to the NSC; that I had talked to the President and was calling him at the President’s instructions; that the President had personally requested seven citizens to serve as Consultants to the NSC in March; that they had served (identifying them and their occupations) for 2–3 weeks; that the matter of their security clearance and checking was the President’s responsibility; that he used the agencies of government in checking and clearing them. The Senator said he knew nothing about the matter; said he would tell Surine of my call. He seemed to have no interest in the matter or in pursuing it; gave me the impression that this was a routine check by one of his office staff. He was very friendly in tone and conversation. I inquired for his health, as he had been very poorly when I last saw him, just before we went into Wisconsin during the campaign. He recalled the meeting, seemed very clearly to remember me, called me “General”, and ended up by inviting me “sometime to come and have that glass of beer we talked about” (at Peoria, I suppose).

6. I reported to the President that I had carried out his instructions and told Mr. Coyne, if Mr. Surine called again to say that at the President’s direction I had talked with the Senator.

Robert Cutler

1. Drafted on Apr. 29 by Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC S. Everett Gleason.
2. No copy of the letter has been found.
3. Copies to NSC Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr. and J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security.
4. Not found.