460.509/7–2254: Telegram
The United States Special Representative in Europe (Hughes) to the Department of State1
Polto 132. Subject: CG Meeting—Appraisal of Results. CG meeting just concluded (Polto 118 to Washington rptd London 33, pouched other posts2) marked important milestone in brief history economic defense program. Controls of strategic trade to the European [Page 1231] Soviet bloc can now be considered to be basically adjusted for “long haul” ahead. Enforcement agreements still require implementation and U.S. undoubtedly will wish eventually propose further strengthening; but International Lists should remain relatively stable so long as no major change occurs in international situation. While U.S. did not obtain all that it desired in the various conferences and meetings beginning with London bilateral in November and generally concluding with this CG, in opinion USDel overall control objectives of U.S. were substantially met and, at least equally as important, the voluntary informal multilateral control system (which, with dimunition U.S. aid and growing domestic pressures favoring increased trade, now depends for survival almost entirely upon conviction all participants that trade sacrifices entailed are strategically justified) was maintained and perhaps even strengthened. Previous refusals of U.S. to adjust position in CG/COCOM to conform with what other PCs considered realities of situation had gradually built up reservoir of ill will which lately had been in state of almost continuous overflow. As result of what others considered “U.S. inflexibility” on relatively minor matters PCs had generally been going, or threatening to go, own ways on items of particular interest to them, e.g., Italians on ball bearings; Danes-Dutch on shipping; U.K. on machine tools. If this general tendency had continued, little doubt usefulness of COCOM would have been permanently impaired.
Only remaining major problem before COCOM—shipping impasse—is probably too far advanced to be satisfactorily resolved by U.S. attempts to invoke “new spirit” of COCOM. However, opportunity does exist when COCOM reconvenes restore U.S. prestige and regain U.S. leadership of organization by carefully evaluating future proposals and avoiding former tendency take “firm” positions which U.S. knew would eventually have to be modified. When an issue can be forcefully demonstrated as pertinent to bloc’s war potential USDel believes COCOM remains receptive forum for presentation and cooperation can be expected; generalized statements however will have no more appreciative audience than previously.
Conduct individual PCs during CG meeting illustrative their “wait and see” attitude towards U.S. leadership. Only Canada actively supported U.S. positions across the board. U.K. proferred highly restrained support on issues firmly and explicitly agreed in advance and opposed U.S. on others. France followed approximately same course in more involved manner. Italy spoke up on two occasions in behalf of U.S.; Turkey quite helpful on issues on which informed. Other dels were generally silent with notable exception Danish who supported U.K. position when not engaged in initiating own attacks on U.S. Dutch also firm ally of U.K. Limited participation [Page 1232] by majority dels might be attributable to variety of reasons: occasional concurrence with specific proposal; general unwillingness to get in middle between U.S. and disagreeing PC; and basic feeling whole course of meeting had been prearranged on tripartite basis leaving them to large extent as spectators except on matters of vital importance to them individually.
USDel hopes Washington seriously studying what future course of U.S. in this field should be Separate cable outlines immediate problems as foreseen from here. Equally important is need to reappraise situation in light conclusions now agreed to and development of new approach to this problem designed insure increased cooperation among PCs.