Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/11–2547: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Changchun (Siebens) to the Secretary of State

Changchun, November 25, 1947—3 p.m.
[Received December 2—10:06 p.m.]

252. With gradual withdrawal past 10 days [of] main Communist force, estimated by New First Army G–2 as 12 divisions surrounding Changchun on 10 to 15 miles periphery and reputed return to “normally [normalcy?]” at Kirin, believe Communist sixth Manchurian offensive at least in Changchun-Kirin area terminated. General observations re offensive in area follow:

1. Changchun was never attacked in force, and even forementioned encirclement appears to have been in nature economic tactics over military, completion grain seizures and coup de grâce to Kirin railroad rather than preparation for attack on city.

2. Sixth offensive (which began in late September) did not gain momentum in area until relatively late, when part of Communist forces in south moved to attack on Kirin, which lasted from approximately October 20 to November 4. (ReContel 434, November 1, 5 p.m., repeated Department,⁶³ Mukden, Peiping.) 38th and 50th Divisions New First Army were able to leave Changchun between September 27 and 29 for Ssuping in swift move to reenforce to south when Communist main drive began crystallize that direction with initial actions in Chinhsi sector. These divisions, backbone of Changchun defense, returned only November 1 as attack on Kirin reaching climax and continued northward movement Communist forces rumored. Possible interpretation Communists’ lifting siege Kirin and encircling Changchun shortly after return main force to permit completion forementioned economic depredations and lack desire engage forces which General Pan Yu-kun, C. O. New First, informed me were prepared proceed to relief Kirin in event siege there continued.

3. Chief accomplishments Communists during offensive were:

(a) Redestruction Changchun-Mukden railway which reported in press and confirmed by me in course low level flight in observation aircraft over entire length line 2 days before, redestruction to have been within approximately 10 days reopening. Nationalists had expended tremendous sum in repairing line since May offensive and exhausted all remaining available railway construction supplies in area.

(b) Large scale destruction to Kirin-Changchun Railroad, this line particularly vital to Changchun and Kirin fuel economy (re-Condes 97 and 98, November 11 to Department,⁶⁴ copies to Embassy, Mukden, Peiping.)

(c) Widespread and reputedly complete seizure 1947 crops.

(d) Infliction of severe losses on already deficient Kirin garrison (extent of losses not yet known this office) and, according to statement New First Army Chief of Staff, of overall losses of Nationalists in Manchuria larger than overall losses incurred until reputed “annihilation” of Communist seventh column in Hsinmin area about November 3 balance[d] losses in Nationalists’ favor.

(e) Tightening of noose around Changchun by establishment firmer hold on positions in towns near Changchun such as grain centers Nungan and Tehhui.

(f) Serious damage to electric line ex [out of] Hsiao Feng Man to Changchun, leaving Changchun without current (re refCondesps).

As evidence, position Changchun and Kirin substantially weakened as result offensive. Both centers still completely isolated except by air. Changchun in critical economic plight, especially as regards food and fuel, and Kirin reputedly little better off. Changchun food stores for civilian and military needs estimated by Mayor at 6 months and by garrison commander at 3 months with no visible source future accessions except by air from south. Changchun garrison substantially weakened when crack New First 30th Division flown there between November 15 and 18, according to New First C. O. to serve there as nucleus for formation new Nationalist army. This division to be replaced by recruits from China proper flown into Changchun to train with New First.

Re future, believe Changchun secure at least for winter, when extreme cold deterrent to ambitious campaigns, and barring unforeseen outside aid to Communists, for spring, when large scale Communist campaign probable, and when Nationalists themselves may be forced launch an offensive. Despite weakening of garrison city still defended by force estimated by Assistant Military Attaché at 40,000 with some good New First Army troops as nucleus, is strongly fortified, and is within easy range Nationalist air force based at Mukden. During winter at least Communists would presumably see little advantage in attacking strong point in force after experience at Ssuping in May and Kirin in October–November, especially when that point already economically strangled. Heckling raids now being carried out and can expected continue. To date Nationalists give no indication weaken Changchun further or abandon city (Mukden’s Conftel 445, October 14, to Embassy, repeated Department as 314⁶⁵), a tactic which, apart from political considerations and being a hazardous undertaking would seem uneconomic logistically in view apparent improbability successful all-out attack on city and stores and housing held by army in situation where both in acute shortage in Nationalist-held Manchuria. (However, note for information that New First Chief of Staff informed me in “strict confidence” that present munition stocks Changchun sufficient for only 2 weeks in event all-out attack, and that additional munitions would have to be flown in.) While economic situation hazardous, feel that army will fly food in if necessary and that population under martial law will struggle through winter without revolt but with extreme hardship, including some deaths from cold and starvation.

This forecast based in part on assumption Nationalists will maintain present tactics.

Re Nationalist tactics directed by Chen Cheng as observed from Changchun, opine that on whole they were reasonably well carried out, especially in comparison those under Tu Yu-ming and Hsiung Hsih-hui⁶⁶ during fifth offensive.

Thirty-eighth and fiftieth Divisions New First were moved promptly and without loss to Ssuping when majority Nationalist forces that point sent Chinhsi area, and returned Changchun in 2 days’ march (82 miles) when services were no longer needed at Ssuping and reinforcement to north became desirable. Well corroborated fact that these forces completely surprised 1,500 Communist troops at Kungchuling and that substantial Communist forces closed Ssuping–Changchun corridor close behind Nationalist columns would indicate that time of expected move [was] well-guarded secret (in comparison to many Nationalist moves which in past have been rumored and demonstrated to be known to Communist intelligence before they occur) and that swiftness of move foiled possible Communist intentions use favorite tactic attack forces in transit. Kirin defense, concerning which most observers justifiably pessimistic, was successful in face determined siege and attack. Few Nationalist groups were isolated and destroyed piecemeal as in past. Nationalists lost no strongholds. Conversation yesterday with Japanese hospital corps [men] impressed in Communist service and escaped November 7 after 18 months’ service with troops in Manchuria would indicate losses inflicted on Communists substantial (despatch re information given by these men being prepared).⁶⁷ In summary Communists considering badly deteriorated condition Nationalist position Manchuria, opine that in spite losses sustained and signal success Communist campaign economic attrition, from purely military viewpoint at least defense Kiriu–Changchun indicate Nationalists have learned some lessons from past, and that Communists still essentially guerrillas.

Sent Nanking 445; repeated Department as 252, Mukden as 23, Peiping as 27.

Siebens

63. Telegram No. 247, p. 356.
64. Despatch No. 97 not found in Department files; despatch No. 98 not printed.
65. Not printed.
66. Former Chinese Government general commanding in Manchuria and director of Generalissimo Chiang’s Headquarters in the Northeast, respectively.
67. Possibly despatch No. 101, December 21, not printed; it was based on the observations of Japanese hospital corpsmen and reported on the status of Japanese hold-out troops in Manchuria and the efforts both of Chinese Communists and Nationalists to win the support of these troops (893.00 Manchuria/12–2147).