893.00/11–2447
The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)61
The Consul General has the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum entitled “Objectives and Success of Communist Sixth Offensive” which was prepared today by Vice Consul Fred E. Hubbard.62
As Vice Consul Hubbard states, the objectives of the Chinese Communists in their sixth offensive have been achieved; but at the same time the Chinese Government can state with truth and conviction that its objectives in this offensive have been achieved—the difference between the objectives of the two antagonists being that those of the Communists were positive (i. e., destruction of lines of communication, seizing of food supplies, and attacking the moving columns and isolated bodies of troops), whereas those of the Government were negative (i. e., to avoid loss of any large city or any strongpoint of sufficient importance to endanger the immediate security of the Government tenure in the Northeast). Notwithstanding that the Chinese Government has lost no large city or important strongpoint thus far in the sixth offensive, the Government has suffered smarting and demoralizing defeats in that it has suffered serious losses in men, area, communications, industry (coal mines and electricity supply), economy (food supply and continued demoralization of currency) and prestige.
The failure of the Communists to follow through some of their military successes (for instance, Mukden was wide open to attack and possible capture during the early days of the offensive, particularly the first days of October) may have been the result of poor leadership, insufficient striking force, or inadequate supply, but there were indications that such reticence was planned and not the result of unpreparedness. Time, supplemented by “hit and run” tactics and the constant attrition of Government troops and morale in the Northeast, is favoring the Communists vastly more than the Government.
If time itself is not the reason for such reticence it is interesting to seek further reasons therefor. One of these reasons (and in this the Consul General differs from Vice Consul Hubbard) may be that the Chinese Communists are practicing restraint until it is made known whether the United States will grant large scale military aid to China—in which case the Communists will then hope to receive direct and open aid from the Soviet Union, if they have not already received assurancee of such aid in case the United States gives large scale aid [Page 374] to China. Another of these reasons (and in this the Consul General and Vice Consul Hubbard are in agreement) may be that the Communists are withholding large scale military action against the Government troops until it is learned whether or not large scale American aid will be forthcoming to China, and in the event such aid will not be forthcoming on a scale generous enough to appease the Chinese Government the Communists will then attempt to capitalize on the probable pique of the Chinese and offer to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government looking toward the acquisition of Manchuria by the Communists in return for concessions to the Government in Intramural China.