893.00/11–2447
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to comment further on some of the spiritual or human factors in the Civil War as they are revealing themselves more clearly in the midst of rapidly deteriorating military and fiscal trends. The Communist organizers have a fanatical faith in their cause and are able to inspire their workers and to a large extent their troops and the local population with belief in its rightness, practical benefits and ultimate triumph. As against this the Government employees are becoming ever more dispirited, defeatist and consequently listless or unscrupulously self-seeking. This of course still further alienates the liberal elements who ought to be the Government’s chief reliance. Even the higher officials are beginning to lose hope. The effect on military morale is disastrous. In this drift toward catastrophe they clutch at American aid as at least postponing the inevitable. This is all that such monetary aid can do unless there is also among the Kmt leaders a new sense of dominating purpose, of sacred mission, of national salvation, expressing itself in challenging slogans, arousing them to fresh enthusiasms, leading them to forget their personal fears, ambitions and jealousies in the larger, more absorbingly worthwhile cause. It seems to me that this idea can be urged upon them under two emphases.
- (1)
- Freedom. There can be absolutely no freedom of thought or action under Communist rule. The contentment that comes from a measure of economic security is conditioned on mute acceptance of party dictation. The zeal is generated by what is in large measure false and malicious indoctrination. If the Kmt could appreciate the propagandist value of exposing this and go to the opposite extreme in guaranteeing freedom of speech, publication and assembly, at whatever [Page 372] seeming risk of subversive activities, it would win the loyalty of the intellectuals as nothing else could. The really harmful agitation of Communist agents in newspaper offices, schools or even in Government bureaus, could be safely left to the constructive elements in each unit concerned. An aggressive ideological warfare over this issue by the Kmt might be made tremendously effective. But the Government would have to take an adventurous leap and cease to rely upon its secret service and other suppressive agencies.
- (2)
- The People’s Livelihood. The third of the famous Three Principles is being constantly honored in speeches and published articles. The Communists have gone a long way toward its realization but the Government shows up lamentably in comparison. True, it has had incessant foreign and domestic conflicts, but making all allowance for its difficulties the record to date has been extremely discreditable. If, however, all who do not want China to be communized could be enlisted in a movement to support the Government in effecting better local administration, there might well be a resurgent revolutionary movement that would attack at once graft and inefficiency among Government officials and the wantonly destructive policy of the Communists. Both could alike be described as the present form of treasonable or unpatriotic activity, to be resisted and eliminated as they would a foreign foe by all who love their country.
American aid could be based on the desire to help the populace in Government territory to have the twin benefits of the freedom essential to democracy and the economic welfare which is the only protection against Communist penetration. If conditioned upon hearty Government determination to achieve these two objectives for its people, it would first of all supply the new hope without which the leaders could scarcely recover from their depression of spirit and would give us the strongest leverage in furnishing the desperately needed aid as at each stage there is evidence of progress or in stopping it whenever the forces of reaction or of corruption assert themselves.
As I have been observing President Chiang the impression grows upon me that his controlling fear is of Russia and that this goes a long way toward explaining his behavior. Conversely if he could feel assured that American assistance in its various forms would protect him against this threat I am convinced that he would gratefully agree to almost any conditions we might impose. The two emphases mentioned above he has accepted in principle and, as I believe, sincerely. This is of course the crucial issue for us also. I sympathize intensely with you as you are struggling with the baffling complexities of this as a global problem and I have unwavering confidence that whatever decisions you make will be wise and right. But it may be of some help to you to have this restatement of the Chinese aspect of the total problem in the light of our earlier conversations and my previous despatches.
Respectfully yours,