Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East, Volume III

711.942/331: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 28, 1939—2 p.m.
[Received November 28—8:50 a.m.]

634. My 630, November 27, 7 p.m., second paragraph.

1. In the various informal talks which we have had at the Foreign Office and with Japanese close to the Government, who have expressed anxiety with regard to a possible treatyless situation, we have been emphasizing in every possible way that time presses and that before the current treaty of commerce and navigation expires there must be substantial and measurable improvement in Japan’s attitude toward American rights and interests before the question of new negotiations can profitably be approached. As indicated in our 630, there exists some realization of Japan’s responsibility for having created a condition which led the United States to take action toward terminating the treaty, while the recent marked decrease in the volume of telegrams from China offices reporting bombings of American properties and interference with Americans evidences to some degree the effectiveness of measures which the Japanese state are being taken to improve conditions. However, such progress as has been made along these lines is, as I am pointing out to Japanese, for the most part negative in character and there has been a discouraging lack of initiative toward following a course in China sufficiently mindful of American interests to allow the United States to consider negotiations looking toward a new treaty. Although we have pointed out that the establishment of the proposed Wang Ching-wei regime would further complicate matters by the injection of a new issue, the Government seems to be unwilling to clarify its position with regard to American and other foreign rights in China until that regime has been set up.

2. On the other hand reported statements by Senator Pittman and other prominent persons forecasting the granting by Congress of authority to the President to impose embargoes on Japan are also having a discouraging effect. Threats of this character and the disapproval expressed by Senators Borah¹⁷ and Vandenberg of the imposing of embargoes have respectively excited the extremists and lent them encouragement and those reported utterances are equally contributory toward increasing the confusion which exists with regard to relations with the United States. Such confusion and the resulting pessimism afford fruitful ground for the thriving of inducements which the Soviet Union, supposedly abetted by Germany, is believed to be holding out to Japan.

3. The course which appears to be advocated by Senator Pittman and others appears to be to vest the President with power to impose embargoes before any move is made toward negotiating a new treaty. If this is the course which is eventually followed (without regard to any concrete and substantial improvement made by the Japanese Government in the conditions which admittedly brought about the notice of termination), I can only foresee a progressive deterioration in relations. This country is not in a position nor in a mood which will permit it to retreat under threats. There is a great deal to be said for embargoes as a punitive measure but if they are imposed there must be adequate preparation for their logical and almost inevitable consequences. On the other hand if they are to be imposed as a corrective measure the conditions under which they are laid down should be such as to enhance the probabilities of effectiveness.

4. Assuming that it would be our objective to bring about a correction of existing conditions before considering penalties, I respectfully submit for your consideration the need for determining (if that has not been done) the minimum conditions to be fulfilled by Japan as a condition precedent to the opening of negotiations for the regulating of American-Japanese commercial relations. If those conditions are fulfilled, I would recommend that some trade arrangement be completed as a manifestation of American desire to bring about an adjustment of relations, and that ratification or other implementation of such arrangement be withheld pending further evidence of both willingness and capacity on the part of Japan to safeguard American rights and interests in China. I believe that the psychological effect of such a gesture, even if it were found possible in the meantime to start negotiations without necessarily bringing them to an early conclusion, would exert a powerful and salutary influence in Japan. The question of holding in abeyance implementation of the Pittman resolution, should that proposed resolution pass the Senate, would obviously then depend upon developments.

5. As the Department is aware, I am not prone to paint problems in sensational colors. Nevertheless, the prevalent pessimism with regard to the possibility of meeting American conditions, the diminishing prospects of an early conclusion to the China conflict, and the prospects of diverting to China the military resources which would be released by even a temporary arrangement with Russia are factors which should be dealt with clearly and resolutely if the situation is to be kept from deteriorating beyond repair.

6. To sum up I feel very strongly that if and as there emerges concrete evidence of a desire and intention on the part of the Japanese Government to improve Japanese-American relations by progressive steps having considered at least some of our outstanding controversies in China, it will be the recommended part of wisdom to encourage such a trend by offering evidence of admitted desire on our part for a concrete improvement of relations, thereby removing from the extremists the argument now prominently advanced that friendship with the United States is impossible. Our position is obviously that the present parlous state of Japanese-American relations is due to Japanese action and that the onus lies squarely upon Japan. My point however is that favorable results can more readily be achieved by such steps on our part as will tend to facilitate Japan’s efforts to improve those relations provided that Japan indicates the will and the intention to proceed in that direction.

7. The fear of isolation furnishes a powerful argument to those in Japan who are now advocating a rapprochement with Soviet Russia.

Grew

17. Ranking Republican member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.