Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East, Volume III

711.942/327: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 27, 1939—7 p.m.
[Received November 27—1:10 p.m.]

630. 1. Members of my staff and I have recently held informal talks with well informed Japanese, including officials, on the problem of improving American-Japanese relations in anticipation of the approaching expiration of the treaty of commerce and navigation. The recurrence of certain thoughts in the statements of these Japanese is probably significant in the sense that these thoughts can be correlated with certain definite facts and worked out as a program to be followed out by the Japanese Government. We have arranged these thoughts and facts in some form of logical sequence with a view to forecasting to some degree the course which the Japanese Government will try to set, as follows:

(a) The issues between the two countries fall into two categories, the first being those which directly involve American nationals in China and American economic, financial, and cultural interests, while those in the second category comprise problems which although less directly affecting American material interests are fundamental in character. Most of the issues of the first kind can be adjusted, that is to say, bombings of American properties can be stopped, interference with American business can be eliminated, et cetera, and there can be brought about a condition of which it might be said that American tangible interests and rights were being respected. If however, the restoration by Japan of conditions reconcilable with all the principles established under the Nine Power Treaty¹⁵ is to be a condition precedent to the negotiation of a new commercial treaty, the possibility of Japan meeting any such condition, must be ruled out, for the reason that the evacuation of the areas and other measures necessary to give effect to the principles of respect for China’s territorial and administrative integrity can not be a practicable proposition until the new regime to be set up under Wang Ching Wei¹⁶ is able to stand on its own feet.

(b) As it was the United States that took [the initiative?] to terminate the present commercial treaty, Japan looks to the United States to initiate the negotiation of a new treaty. The Japanese nevertheless recognize that it is Japan which created the conditions which made necessary the terminating of the present treaty and Japan is therefore prepared to go as far as possible toward removing those conditions. With that end in view a vigorous effort will be made to settle the outstanding specific issues.

An Interdepartmental Commission to pass on claims has already been set up and is now functioning, stringent measures are being taken to prevent bombings and other depredations on American nationals and property and cases of interference with American commercial activities are to be adjusted.

(c) With reference to the expressed readiness of the American Government to consider proposals looking toward the revision by agreement of the Nine Power Treaty, the Japanese Government cannot agree to revision of the treaty by the conference method for the reason that those countries party to the treaty with unimportant interests in China would have as much voice as the Great Powers and having little at stake and no responsibilities would be obstructive of any agreement. The possibility is, however, under contemplation of there being opened preliminary bilateral negotiations with the United States, France and Great Britain respectively with a view to the holding of a conference at some future time to give effect to any agreement which might result from such negotiations. These negotiations, nevertheless, can not be initiated until such time as conditions involving the tangible interests of the foreign powers are substantially repaired, thus placing Japan in a better position to meet any new and important violation of the Open Door.

(d) There is little likelihood that the Japanese Government will clarify its position until after the Wang central regime has been set up and the relations between that regime and the Japanese Government defined. The Japanese Government does not expect that the American Government will recognize that regime as the Government of China, but it hopes that in view of the extent of the [apparent omission] which is to be controlled by the regime, has brought American interests therein and the substantial number of American governmental agencies in that area, there can be some working arrangement with that regime in connection with the problems which are bound to arise in connection with the customs, currency, et cetera.

2. I am sending today a number of telegrams each bearing in varying degree on the subject of this message. A subsequent telegram presents phases of considerations which arise out of this material.

Grew

15. Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.
16. Former Deputy Leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), who deserted Chungking in December 1938.