Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The Far East, Volume IV

761.94/895

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 1741

Tokyo, March 18, 1936.
[Received April 6.]

Sir: In the Embassy’s confidential despatch No. 1694 of February 20¹⁴ the factors were enumerated which led to the conclusion that a recourse to war was not at that time intended by either Japan or Soviet Russia but that the border situation remained menacing. Now, after a change of Government in Japan brought on by the violence of February 26, the situation requires reexamination.

In the main the factors enumerated before the Incident still obtain. The Japanese Army is not equipped to fight the USSR with good prospects of success; its leaders, for this reason if for no other, are believed to remain opposed to a war in the near future. The danger of an imminent war, deliberately provoked by the Japanese, could only be acute if the younger officers were in control of the Government, a condition contrary to fact.

According to a telegram^* to the Department from the Embassy at Moscow the “Kremlin feels that although the Japanese Government has no desire for an immediate war with the Soviet Union, there is a grave danger that some incident may occur which might strengthen the hands of an aggressive and active minority in Japan which is of the opinion that if the Soviet Union is to be eliminated as an important factor in the Far East that elimination must take place this year”. February 26, however, was not an incident of this kind. Although many of the reforms demanded by the insurgents have been included in the program of the new Government^†, a minority which believes that the elimination of the Soviet Union from the Far East must take place this year has not gained control. It is the responsible leaders of the Army who have increased their influence in governing Japan and it is they who have insisted with popular support upon the adoption of a more “positive policy” in foreign affairs. This “positive policy”, as the Prime Minister explained it^‡ to me, means the acceleration of Japan’s policies with respect to China and the USSR. It means that the old policies will be carried on more intensively but it is not a threat of imminent war. The present leaders of the Army may be counted upon not to advocate a war with Russia so long as the present disparity in military preparedness obtains.

Moreover, the implications of the reported rapprochement between England and Soviet Russia and the Franco-Soviet pact have been noticed here; a typical comment is that of the Miyako Shimbun of March 2, “the pact will facilitate the execution of the Soviet’s policy in the Far East”. The pact may be said to provide the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister with powerful arguments in favor of prudence and patience in dealing with the USSR while it also provides the War Office with an additional argument for increased military strength. For the present the danger of war now appears little greater than before February 26, although, as heretofore, the discipline of the younger Japanese officers along the Manchurian frontier cannot be relied on with assurance.^§

Taking a longer view, however, the situation seems more disquieting. The ordeal which Mr. Hirota went through before being enabled to form his Cabinet has demonstrated where a large measure of control now lies. The Army has committed Mr. Hirota to a more “positive policy”; it is urging upon him (as he told me himself^ǁ) an increase of the Japanese forces in Manchuria until they more nearly equal those of the Soviets across the border. This desideratum is freely voiced in the press as are other specific requirements. The following are said by the Domei news agency to be the General Staff’s plans for expansion to commence with the 1937–1938 fiscal year:

1. Increase in the army in “Manchukuo” as the number of Japanese soldiers there is strikingly small compared with the 230,000 Soviet soldiers in the Far East.

2. Perfection of aviation and air defense. The Soviet Army has 4000 airplanes in contrast to but 1000 for the Japanese army.

3. Light machine guns, heavy machine guns, field guns and “infantry cannon”, all inferior to those used by the Soviet Army, will be perfected and as many manufactured as possible.

4. Mechanized equipment will be perfected, for the Soviet Union is one of the leading powers of the world in this branch. Japan is said to have about one tenth as much mechanized equipment as the Soviet Union.

5. Perfection of preparations for chemical warfare is considered important.

The above requirements, it is to be noted, are related to the materiel said to be in the possession of the Russians. Furthermore Mr. Hirota and Mr. Baba, the Finance Minister, are apparently pledged to raise the funds for a program of this nature. It is commonly accepted in Tokyo on the basis of Mr. Baba’s own somewhat ambiguous statements that he will not seek to limit the defense appropriations as strictly as did Mr. Takahashi;¹⁵ it is hinted that he holds office on terms that prevent this. As the Kokumin Shimbun of March 13 stated, “The army has been the main factor behind the recent sensational developments. The outlined policies of the Hirota Government to a large extent represent the wishes of the Military. …¹⁶ The fact that the Army requested a revision of policy was due to no other reason than that the fighting services were not satisfied with the policy which Mr. Hirota had been following as head of the Foreign Office.”

It is difficult to see what Mr. Hirota’s “positive diplomacy” can accomplish in dealing with Soviet Russia. Manifestly he will redouble his efforts to solve the border problems, the fishery dispute and such other questions as may come up for negotiation. As reported in the Embassy’s despatch No. 1740, March 18, 1936, he is already pressing for a definition of the eastern “Manchukuo” border and for the establishment of a permanent commission for the settlement of border disputes. But the USSR is no longer in the weak position of several years ago; it has entrenched itself securely along the Amur; it has served notice by armed force along the Outer Mongolian border and through the medium of Mr. Roy Howard’s newspapers^¶ that the Kwantung Army had best direct its ambitions elsewhere. While probably anxious to settle the border questions by negotiation Soviet Russia may no longer be expected to yield important concessions. Meanwhile the Japanese Army has apparently sufficient influence in the Government to undertake a measurable increase of Japanese military strength in Manchuria so that it may more nearly equal that of the Russians across the border. When this increase is brought about the situation will become more dangerous for two reasons: first because war with Soviet Russia would then give greater promise of success and thus be a more reasonable venture and second because of the mere proximity of two large trained fighting forces. Fortunately, however, this is not an immediate consideration because the Army’s plans are still in the formative stages and because they would, when adopted, take considerable time to carry out.

For the present, on the other hand, there are Mr. Hirota’s assurances that war will not occur while he is in office and his expressed opinion that a Japanese war with Russia would be stupid because both parties would have everything to lose and nothing to gain thereby.^** My interpretation of this remark is that Mr. Hirota foresees the fact that while such a war would accomplish immense damage, it might well result in a stalemate so far as permanent advantage is concerned. Furthermore these assurances are fortified first by the inferiority of the Japanese Kwantung Army in numbers and in equipment to the Russian Far Eastern Army and second by the fact that Generals Terauchi and Ueda^†† as well as the Chief of Staff, Prince Kanin, are believed to be powerful leaders with a high sense of responsibility.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

14. Not printed.
15. Moscow’s No. 45, February 13, 1936, 2 p.m., Strictly confidential. [Footnote in the original; telegram printed on p. 56.]
16. Embassy’s despatch No. 1735, March 19, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch printed on p. 761.]
17. Embassy’s 74, March 13, 1936, 7 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram printed on p. 759.]
18. Mukden’s 196, January 31, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch not found in Department files.]
19. Embassy’s 74, March 13, 1936, 7 p.m. [Footnote in the original.]
15. Japanese Minister of Finance, assassinated on February 26.
16. Omission indicated in the original despatch.
17. Embassy’s No. 1740, March 18, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]
18. Embassy’s 74, March 13, 1936, 7 p.m. [Footnote in the original.]
19. Respectively Minister of War, and Commander in Chief of the Kwantung army. [Footnote in the original. Ueda was also new Japanese Ambassador in “Manchoukuo”.]