761.94/894
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following review of certain developments affecting Soviet-Japanese relations since the Embassy’s despatch No. 1716 of March 4, 1936.10
Siberian-“Manchukuo” Border
According to a despatch from Moscow to the Asahi on March 9 the Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Stomoniakov, gave to the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Ota, a “qualified assent” to the Japanese contention that the Manchu-Siberian border must be defined. On the 13th Mr. Stomoniakov is reported to have handed to Mr. Ota a note containing the Soviet Government’s views on the scope and task of the projected mixed commission to settle the Chinchangkou Incident* but the contents of the note have not as yet been made public. On the 17th the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo confirmed that the Soviet plan for the proposed commission which had been agreed to by [Page 81] “Manchukuo”, Japan, and Soviet Russia had been received and stated that the plan appeared to be practical.
From a Moscow despatch published in Tokyo on March 18 it now appears that the negotiations between Mr. Ota and Mr. Stomoniakov are being accelerated. Mr. Ota is reported to have proposed the establishment of a commission to be composed of representatives of “Manchukuo” and the USSR and charged with the task of re-demarcating the frontier from Lake Hanka on the eastern border of “Manchukuo” to the Tumen River where the USSR, “Manchukuo”, and Korea meet. He is further reported as saying that if this proposition is agreed to, the Japanese Government is ready to accept at once the USSR’s proposals regarding the formation of a standing mixed commission for examination of border incidents occurring along this section of the frontier. In reply, Mr. Stomoniakov is believed to have inquired whether Japan is willing to bring about the formation of similar commissions to deal with the conflicts along the Outer Mongolian border. He then told Mr. Ota that he assumed that commissions for the prevention of incidents would be formed for the entire Soviet-Manchurian frontier and not merely for separate sections. The negotiations just outlined have caused the Asahi to comment that they are an expression of the “positive diplomacy” to which Mr. Hirota’s Cabinet is pledged.
Meanwhile there appear to have been two incidents of minor importance along the frontier. On March 13 a Domei report from Hsinking declared that the “Manchukuo” Foreign Affairs Commissioner at Heiho protested to the Soviet authorities against the armed occupation of the island of Panchantao in the Amur River. On the same day a Moscow report from Habarovsk was published in Tokyo stating that on March 5 a Japanese-”Manchukuo” patrol fired on Soviet workmen across the Amur who were making an excavation. The patrol then crossed the river into Soviet territory and inspected the excavation.
Mongol-Manchu Border
There have been no reports of fighting along the Outer Mongolian border for a period of more than one month although Japanese reinforcements are said to have been concentrated nearby. There has, however, been an apparent change in the former policy of the USSR not to reveal the nature of the relationship existing between the Outer Mongolian Government and that of Soviet Russia. It will be remembered that on February 23 a report in the Asahi alleged that the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had been definitely informed that the USSR had accepted responsibility for the independence of Outer Mongolia.† This report appears now to have been confirmed in a [Page 82] conversation between Mr. Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard newspapers and Mr. Stalin11 on March 3.12 According to the version of this unusual interview which was widely published in Japan Mr. Stalin told Mr. Howard that the USSR must stand ready to help the Mongolians in the event of a Japanese attack. On March 13 a further report from Moscow declared that General Demid, the War Minister of Outer Mongolia, had publicly stated that as a result of the recent visit of Outer Mongolian officials to Moscow, definite assurances had been received that the USSR would aid Outer Mongolia if it should be attacked.
In addition to the new development mentioned above, the correspondence between Outer Mongolia and “Manchukuo” concerning the border fights during February continued during the past two weeks. Under date of March 6 “Manchukuo” answered the Mongolian note of February 29 proposing the establishment of a commission of investigation. The reply is said to have given “Man-chukuo’s” assent in principle to the proposed commission but to have denied responsibility for the incidents in question, to have inquired as to the location of the proposed commission as well as to which incident would be dealt with, and to have affirmed a desire for a policy of “the good neighbor” vis-à-vis Outer Mongolia. On March 16, according to a Domei report from Hsinking, Outer Mongolia’s reply was received with “signs of dissatisfaction” on the part of the “Manchukuo” authorities. According to a Moscow report which was published at the same time in Japan the reply reaffirmed Outer Mongolia’s wish to settle the incident of February 12 first and then, if successful, to proceed to the consideration of other incidents. It was further proposed by Outer Mongolia that the commission should meet alternately at Tamskume and Kansurmiao on the Outer Mongolian and “Manchukuo” sides of the border respectively. The dissatisfaction of the “Manchukuo” officials with this proposition appears to be caused by its failure to comply with “Manchukuo’s” wish to open formal diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia.
If no other comment is justified at this stage of the negotiations it may, however, be said that the Mongol-Manchu border question is gradually being revealed in its true light as a conflict of interest between Soviet Russia and Japan with each country less reluctant than formerly to acknowledge its concern in the matter.
Arrest of Japanese Staff of Soviet Embassy in Tokyo
Taking advantage of the unusual conditions prevailing in Tokyo as a result of the incident of February 26, the police arrested eleven [Page 83] Japanese interpreters, translators, and language teachers connected with the Soviet Embassy. The arrests, which became known on March 12, were for alleged subversive activities including the gathering of detailed information during the suppression of the insurgent movement in Tokyo. So far as is known, with the single exception of an employee of the Chinese Embassy, no Japanese connected with other Embassies and Legations in Tokyo were molested. The arrests are reported to have been the subject of immediate but unavailing protests from the Soviet Embassy here and the Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. As the men have not been released, the Soviet Embassy has been handicapped in carrying on its normal routine.
According to biographical sketches published in the Asahi most of the arrested employees have previously been detained by the police because of radical activities. Several at least have been members of Communist societies in Japan. Members of the Diplomatic Corps have voiced the opinion that the Japanese authorities have been waiting for an opportunity to remove these undesirable elements, and that they determined on the present as a favorable opportunity. Visitors to the Soviet Embassy have long remarked on the unusual type of Japanese to be seen there and it is not difficult to believe the police contention that these people are in fact Communist sympathizers. In connection with this incident reference is made to the Embassy’s telegram No. 55, March 3, 6 p.m.,13 in which the Soviet Ambassador’s opposition to the assignment of a private detective to protect him during the present emergency is set forth. As indication of the extraordinary atmosphere which apparently prevails at the Soviet Embassy a member of the British Embassy assured a member of my staff that whenever the Soviet Ambassador leaves his Embassy by car with his Japanese detective seated beside the driver, an armed Russian (rumored to be a GPU man) sits beside the Ambassador to protect him from his protector. This story originated with a member of the Soviet Embassy staff who sought to illustrate thereby the perfidy of the Japanese!
For a brief discussion of the probable course of the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia as affected by the February 26 Incident and the consequent change of Government in Japan, the attention of the Department is invited to the Embassy’s Strictly Confidential despatch No. 1741 of March 18, 1936.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 1716, March 4, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 1716, March 4, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Secretary General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.↩
- See telegram No. 76, March 2, 6 p.m., Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, p. 288.↩
- Not printed.↩