72. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Call of the Polish Ambassador Concerning Polish PL480 Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Edward Drozniak, Polish Ambassador
  • Dr. Marian Dobrosielski, Counselor, Polish Embassy
  • Mr. Julius L. Katz, EE

The Ambassador stated that he had conveyed the Secretary’s remarks to Foreign Trade Minister Trampczynski and to Foreign Minister Rapacki.1 Mr. Rapacki had requested the Ambassador to express his gratitude that the Secretary had taken the time personally to interest himself in the negotiations. He also asked the Ambassador to convey to the Secretary his best wishes for a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. Both Ministers, the Ambassador continued, had reviewed the negotiations and after careful study had concluded that it would be possible to rearrange certain plans so as to assure the availability of some hard currency for agricultural purchases in the US. The Polish delegation had received instructions which go quite far in this respect. The Ambassador expressed the hope that the Polish request could again be carefully considered with the view to changing the proportion between the US offer and the cash purchase requirements. The Polish delegation would be in touch with the US side on Thursday, December 27.

[Page 148]

The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for the greetings from Mr. Rapacki and stated that he would personally review the US position after the new Polish proposal had been received. The Secretary pointed out that there was one element in his mind which he had not mentioned earlier but of which the Ambassador should be aware, that is the relationship to the MFN problem. If the PL 480 agreement were on a good solid businesslike basis, it would be helpful with respect to the MFN problem.

The Ambassador stated that there was one more comment Mr. Rapacki had made. He expressed deep appreciation that the Secretary had stressed the economic aspects of the agreement. The Ambassador drew attention to the fact that following the Congressional storm of last summer the Polish Government and press did not react despite the many harsh words used in the Congress. In this connection, he asked the Secretary to use his influence to see to it that this transaction not be used to harm Poland’s relations with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary observed that he and the Ambassador had discussed this matter before. He had also discussed it with Mr. Rapacki in Geneva.2 We wished to develop our relations with Poland to the maximum extent possible, without regard to other issues which were not entirely within the control of either Poland or the US. Within certain limits, which we hoped will broaden, we could do that. At times, however, this might not be possible. The Secretary had discussed this frankly with Mr. Rapacki and pointed out that if Poland became intimately involved with the most difficult aspect of certain serious problems, e.g., Berlin, the limits of possibility would be narrowed. We, of course, had certain domestic problems which caused things to be said which might better be left unsaid. But we would try to be careful to take into account to the extent possible Polish sensibilities. The basis for our improving relations lay not in reconciling the ideological differences between us but in the enduring friendship between our two peoples. We should try to avoid the ideological problems and to stress those areas where we could broaden our relations. It should be recognized, however, that we both had our political problems.

Concurring with the Secretary’s remarks, the Ambassador stated that he appreciated the problems. We are realists, he said.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.4841/12–2662. Confidential. Drafted by Katz and approved in S on January 7, 1963.
  2. See Document 71.
  3. See Document 55.