Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

241. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State⁰

Helsinki, May 30, 1963, 11 p.m.

375. In call today on Max Jakobson, Chief of Foreign Office Political Section, I raised question of timing and purpose of Kekkonen speech advocating Scandinavian nuclear-free zone (Embtel 373).¹ Pointed out that part Finnish press already emphasizing fact that speech came two days after Khrushchev urged nuclear-free zone in Balkans, and in wake of NATO meeting in Ottawa, and that, barring explanation, some might conclude Kekkonen working one side of street while Khrushchev working other. Emphasized that I asserting this frankly and without instructions from Department because Kekkonen had indicated to me that he wanted avoid US public reaction toward Finland similar to that toward Yugoslavia (Embtel 359).²

Jakobson made these points:

1. Kekkonen speech totally unrelated any proposal by Khrushchev. Kekkonen had said for some time Finland must express views this subject and had decided during Yugoslavia visit that should be soon.

2. When reports on Nilsson visit to Soviet Union indicated no test ban agreement in sight, Kekkonen decided he must speak.

3. Kekkonen deliberately waited until after Ottawa conference so no one assume he trying influence Denmark, Norway and weaken NATO. Kekkonen and advisers “very aware some might think speech indicated collusion with Russians”.

4. Said speech given with clear knowledge there would be “no tangible results.”

5. Most important, Jakobson indicated, (this very sensitive) was Kekkonen feeling that he had to make it clear that Finland unwilling ever to be repository nuclear weapons for any power. Clear implication was that Kekkonen foresees possibility that, as reaction to MLF, or new Berlin crisis, Soviets might demand Finland permit stationing Soviet nuclear weapons Finnish soil, thus provoking political crisis similar to and perhaps worse than that of 1961. Kekkonen feels that speech gives Russians “advance notice.”

Whether speech represents nationalistic shrewdness on Kekkonen’s part, or whether he softening Scandinavia for what we perceive to be “Soviet charm offensive,” I do not pretend know. But believe it wise at this juncture for us to accept Jakobson explanation at face value, barring evidence contrary.

Jakobson spoke at length about fact Finland “takes Western friendship for granted” and “perhaps speaks too much about need for Soviet friendship.” He and Kekkonen obviously aware of growing criticism and uneasiness in West. My view that we should show no nervousness, no excess distrust, for period, while giving government chance to explain and show effectiveness its tacks.

It essential source be protected.³

Rowan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 Fin. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Moscow, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, and Reykjavik. Ambassador Gufler left post on April 18. Carl T. Rowan, whom President Kennedy appointed as Ambassador on March 9, presented his credentials on May 21.
1. Telegram 373, May 29, reported on Kekkonen’s initial public proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. (Ibid., POL 15–1 Fin)
2. Telegram 359, May 21, reported the substance of Rowan’s discussions with Kekkonen during the presentation of his credentials. (Ibid., POL 17–1 US–Fin)
3. In telegram 233 to Helsinki, June 3, the Department of State replied that it concurred with Rowan’s recommendations and noted that the Kekkonen proposal had received a cool reception from the other Scandinavian states, obviating the need for any formal initiative with Finland by the United States. (Ibid., POL 15–1 Fin)