242. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State0

11. 1. Foreign Minister asked me to call urgently today which afforded opportunity to reiterate our attitude as laid down in Department telegram 3915.1 He then spoke as follows:

2. He thought it important that any NATO discussion avoid appearance of pressure. He had communicated his suggestions as set forth in Embassy telegram 37302 to UK Ambassador who was departing for London today. He found Allen personally receptive who would discuss in London to see if anything could be done with Turks. Averoff thought he should now go to Paris to consult with Spaak who could then begin tater le terrain in NAC and ascertain preliminary reaction to GOG proposals. He thought this could be done in secret and he would like to do it in full accord with US and UK. If it appeared that some progress was possible, GOG would then ask for mediation by US (likewise in full accord with UK). If US found any merit in GOG suggestions, he realized this might be interpreted as US-Greek front against UK and Turks and therefore possibility of US mediation, if it appealed to us at that stage, should be discussed with UK. He said he knew Secretary was due in Paris on July 53 and suggested that after talking with Spaak appointment with Secretary be arranged.

3. I replied that I was not yet in position to comment on substance of Greek proposals which had been reported to Department and I was not aware of Secretary’s schedule while in Paris. Averoff thought his suggestions corresponded to our ideas of proceeding under NATO aegis while still meeting political problems here and asked that they be submitted urgently which I promised to do.

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4. I then inquired how his projected trip to Paris would fit in with plan to go to Belgrade. He said that Popovic had invited him for July 8 to have tripartite talks while Nasser was in Yugoslavia.4 He said that while he wanted to help Yugoslavs he was beginning to have doubts about going now, particularly because of the rumors of Belgrade-Athens-Cairo axis and had almost decided to put off his trip. He said he would welcome our advice whether he should go while Nasser is there.5

5. As UK Ambassador was leaving for airport just after my conversation with Averoff, I had only short conversation with him. He said he proposed to discuss Averoff suggestions upon arrival in London but was not too optimistic on probable London reaction to them.

6. As we appear close to attaining what Department desired from Greeks on procedure in NATO, I should appreciate instructions promptly what I can say to Averoff.6

Riddleberger
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–158. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.
  2. Telegram 3915 to Athens, June 28, instructed Riddleberger to encourage Averoff to bring the Greek proposals to a meeting under NATO auspices. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–2758)
  3. Telegram 3730 from Athens, June 30, reported that Averoff was proposing that advisers to the Governor of Cyprus “should be chosen by two nationalities instead of by two governments,” and that a plebiscite held after 7 years of self-rule by the Cypriots should exclude both enosis and partition. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–3058)
  4. Dulles visited Paris July 3–5 for talks with French leaders.
  5. Nasser visited Yugoslavia July 2–22.
  6. In telegram 52 to Athens, July 3, the Department of State instructed Riddleberger to inform Averoff that in its view a decision to visit Yugoslavia during the Nasser visit was a matter for the Greek Government to decide. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8168/7–358)
  7. See footnote 2, Document 244.