Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

302. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 5, 1957¹

Washington, October 5, 1957

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Mr. Elbrick
• Mr. Edward L. Freers
• Foreign Minister Gromyko
• Ambassador Zaroubin
• Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky²

Secretary Dulles: With regard to disarmament, we are puzzled again about the attitude of the Soviet Union. No progress was made in the Subcommittee on Disarmament. The Soviet attitude at the end, in rejecting the Western proposals, cancelled out the hopes we held earlier in the negotiations. We know you feel that there cannot be progress without what you call “confidence”. This cannot be built just out of words. It would be created by a system of inspection. This is of primary importance. The establishment of an accurate system would be a beginning and would be interpreted by the American people as indicating less chance for war and less need for armaments. This is true even though danger could still be lurking, despite such inspection. What else would breed confidence, we do not know. You proposed a system of ground inspection. We proposed aerial photography. Now we have agreed to a combination of both. We do not think ground inspection is adequate, since ground posts can be by-passed. Aerial photography is also needed. That is why we proposed a marriage of the two. We press this because it would give a real ingredient for confidence—a reduction of armaments would quickly result. On the nuclear side, great danger is the fourth power danger. An irresponsible dictator would get a bomb and would throw it wherever he wanted— on New York or Moscow. It is frightening to think of a world where anybody could have a bomb. The cruder they are the more fissionable fallout results. That is why we proposed a cut-off of the use of fissionable material for new weapons. This is not popular with our allies. It would stop the UK with a small amount. It would prevent the accumulation of any at all by other countries such as France. We were able to induce other countries, Great Britain, France and Germany, to accept this although they were very reluctant. Only such a program would prevent one country after another from using a fissionable material for weapons. This is the only way we know to keep things under control—that is cutting off now—after a certain date never to use fissionable material to make weapons. We are worried about irresponsible countries. There is not much danger that the US and the USSR—and the UK with its smaller amount—would use their stockpiles of weapons irresponsibly. They have too much at stake. A dictator could use the bombs to blackmail the rest of the world. We don’t know the basis of your objections to our proposal. Maybe you think we have a larger stockpile. Perhaps so, but yours is large enough to do much damage. And it will be a year or two before the cut-off would be effective. We cannot see why our proposal is so unacceptable to prevent the spread of these weapons to the rest of the world.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Of course, it was not a new idea that Mr. Dulles expressed in talking about the importance of the cessation of production of weapons from new fissionable material. There has been previous discussion on this question. Agreement on the basis of that proposal is impossible. We believe it would not improve the situation but lead to a deterioration of it. The production of weapons from newly produced fissionable material would be stopped, but the stockpiles of weapons would remain untouched, and the weapons themselves would not be prohibited. This would be tantamount to the legalization of nuclear weapons. This would be unacceptable. In our view, there is a possibility of an understanding on disarmament. Experience shows, however, that the problem as a whole is difficult. We should move to a partial agreement. We believe that the point mentioned by Mr. Dulles is no subject for agreement at the present time.

I will refer to other points on which we think agreement can be reached. First, there is the question of the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen tests. We are convinced that this is one of the questions on which agreement can be reached even now. There are no objective obstacles to it providing there is a desire on the part of the US and the Soviet Union to reach an understanding. We think that it would be possible to detect any violation of this understanding by observation. We have proposed installation of control instruments on the territory of the Soviet Union, the US, Great Britain, France and the Pacific Ocean. An agreement on this point would facilitate agreement on more complicated questions—not to mention other positive results. There does exist a real threat to the health of people and not only to their health alone. Test explosions are made to develop weapons of greater explosive force. Cessation of tests would stop this development. The Soviet Union has no more to gain by it than the US. Both the US and the Soviet Union and the common cause of peace stand to gain if the tests are stopped. We are sure that the Soviet Union is not more interested in stopping the tests than is the US. We mention this point because we believe that a suspension of tests would lead to a better atmosphere between our countries and a better world atmosphere. An agreement here might prove a turning point. It might result in an improvement in the situation and a better atmosphere in which other aspects of disarmament would be settled.

I would like to mention the possibility of agreement on the renunciation of the use of atomic weapons, without for the time-being liquidating stockpiles. This could be for 5 years, say, and we could revert to the matter later on.

The Soviet Union has made other proposals. We have called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, from the NATO countries, and from the Warsaw Pact countries. Has the Government of the US taken everything into consideration in this regard? Would the Government of the United States think it over once again? An agreement would be to the advantage of your country, of our country, and of world peace.

We also made proposals regarding conventional armaments. The figures coincided with certain figures suggested by the US. I won’t talk about our proposals regarding the liquidation of military bases. You know them well enough.

I want to talk now about proposals for checking posts and for aerial photography. With regard to the question of inspection of posts—our proposal—we do not put this forward separately from our other proposals for partial disarmament. We do look upon it as our proposal when it is combined with our other proposals. However, when it is detached from our other proposals, we do not look upon it as our proposal. We give consideration to this proposal in relation to other measures of disarmament and with initial measures in the field of nuclear weapons—that is, in connection with the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. When our proposal on inspection posts is thus connected with our other proposals, we consider it our own and a useful one. (In answer to a question from Secretary Dulles, Mr. Gromyko confirmed that he was at this point talking only about ground inspection—although at some future time ground posts could be installed at airports, he was still talking here about ground inspection.)

As far as aerial photography is concerned, the position of the Soviet Government was expressed immediately after the proposal advanced by President Eisenhower in an informal talk with Mr. Khrushchev. We reiterate that we believe it does not solve the question of the prevention of surprise attack—or ground inspection. In the beginning President Eisenhower did not link them at all. Last autumn we did agree to certain aerial photography.³ We advanced two proposals for zones, one in Europe and one in the Far East. This was done by Zorin in talks with Stassen in London. Unfortunately the West and the US did not show sufficient interest in those proposals. Two other ideas in the field of aerial photography were advanced—one in the Arctic region, not deserving serious consideration; the other for the whole territory of the US, the USSR and Canada, but it did not refer to other territories where military bases are located. (Secretary Dulles pointed out that this last point had been subsequently dealt with by him.⁴ Mr. Gromyko agreed but said he was describing the proposals as they were dealt with at the time.)

Why does one want to photograph the Arctic? All he would get would be pictures of ice, snow and polar bears.

Secretary Dulles: There have been Soviet explosions of nuclear devices in the area. On our part, there is an important base at Thule.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What does this have to do with surprise attack?

Secretary Dulles: Everybody knows that surprise attacks are likely to come from the Arctic area. Air lines are beginning to cross the area with increasing frequency. We did in fact begin by proposing areas which would embrace the centers of military capability—the territory of the US, the Soviet Union and other parts of Europe. You would not agree, so we proposed the Arctic as a beginning. This was an area with no political struggles and few population problems.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: As to aerial photography, the time is not yet ripe for an agreement. There is a lack of confidence between our two countries. We cannot consider it in earnest. Can anyone imagine British and American planes flying over the Soviet Union and Soviet planes flying over the US at the present time?

Secretary Dulles: As far as the US is concerned—yes.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Taking an objective view of the state of affairs, it is hardly possible to do so. At a later stage, when the state of international confidence improves to a necessary degree, the possibility may exist. But, at that time there would be no need for this nor other similar measures.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/10–557. Secret. Drafted by Freers.
2. Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky, Adviser to the Soviet Delegation at the U.N. General Assembly; interpreter.
3. See, for example, the paragraphs of the declaration of the Soviet Government, November 17, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, p. 727.
4. See the Western working paper submitted to the disarmament subcommittee on August 2, and Dulles’ statement to the subcommittee on August 2, both printed Ibid., vol. II, pp. 837–845.