289. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
1351. USDel Disarmament No. 534. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Subject: US–USSR bilateral, 11 am, August 22, at 44 Grosvenor Square.
Highlights:
1. With the consent of Western three delegations, USDel met with SovDel for purpose of discussing new Western proposals on nuclear testing. Zorin asked series of detailed serious questions on Western proposals on testing in a businesslike manner; questions apparently developed by SovDel for purpose acquiring more information on new positions. The meeting consisted of three hours discussion plus hour and a half working luncheon.
Details:
2. Zorin opened by asking what was precise difference between former Western position on nuclear testing and position presented in subcommittee on 21 August.2Stassen replied that new position showed West now disposed favorably to consideration two year suspension [Page 711] of testing under certain conditions. New position showed West also willing agree cut in production fissionable material for weapons would not occur in first year of agreement. Stassen then suggested Zorin’s detailed questions might be best way to further clarification Western position.
3. Control system for testing. Referring to the first paragraph of Western proposals on testing as presented in subcommittee on 21 August, Zorin noted that all parties to agreement would refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for 12 months provided agreement reached on installation, maintenance necessary controls; Zorin inquired when controls of testing would be established. Stassen answered that suspension of testing would go into force on same day as treaty, without awaiting establishment of control. However, there would be agreement that control would be established and both sides would move promptly and reciprocally to install an inspection system to monitor the suspension of testing. US did not consider it advisable or practicable to specify exact time for installation control system other than to say that if control not installed by time first year ended, this fact would be ground for dissatisfaction. Both sides must be satisfied with operation of inspection system before moving to second suspension period. Stassen expressed view that technical experts should meet to prepare details of inspection system in order to obtain clear understanding of what should be done. Referring again to the first paragraph of the new Western proposals on testing, Zorin inquired whether reaching agreement on controls meant agreement in principle only or whether there would be detailed specifications in the treaty on such matters as numbers and locations of control posts and types of instruments to be utilized. Stassen asked what the SovDel view on this would be. Zorin replied that it would be difficult for him to say which would be preferable and that he had asked the question seeking to understand the text of the Western proposals. Stassen replied that technical advice would be needed on this question and that the more exact were the details the less room there would be for misunderstanding. Stassen thought that the point may now have been reached where scientific discussions on this subject would be useful. If the USSR had a definite plan for a control system the US would study the plan and give its reaction to it. While the US did not ask for undue haste in any of these matters, it would think it unfortunate if there were undue delay.
4. Second suspension period. Zorin inquired whether a new agreement would be required after the initial 12 months suspension period in order to move to the second suspension period. Stassen stated that his own preliminary view was that the treaty might provide for a two-year suspension of testing while giving the President discretionary authority on the basis of specified conditions necessary for [Page 712] entering the second 12 months suspension of testing. Stassen felt that the treaty could provide that at the end of the first year governments would say yes or no as to whether there should be a second year of suspension. Zorin noted that the Western proposals specified that parties concerned must be satisfied that various conditions have been met before agreeing to a second period of suspension. Zorin asked which countries were considered to be parties concerned. Stassen replied that each of the three nuclear powers would have to be satisfied as well as any state whose affirmative vote was required in the operation of a board of control. This would include France, but the US did not have a firm view of what other countries would be required; certainly fifty parties could not each be given the veto power.
5. Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons. Zorin observed that the Western proposals implied that a date would be established by which time the cut-off on production of fissionable material for weapons must be effected; if there was to be a date, what date was contemplated? In response, Stassen stressed the mutual interests of the US and USSR in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to many countries. Stassen said that a suspension of testing alone was not enough to prevent the spread and agreement on the cut-off would be required. The August 21 proposals had made it clear that if a controlled cut-off did not occur within two years of entry into force of the treaty, testing would be resumed. Stassen said, if the Soviet Union had some particular date in mind the US would be prepared to consider it.
6. Control of the cut-off. Noting that the Western proposals called for technical experts to meet for the purpose of designing an inspection system to verify the suspension of testing, Zorin inquired who would develop an inspection system for the cut-off and when would this be done? Stassen replied that it seemed logical to the USDel that a group of experts would design an inspection system for the cut-off and that these experts would begin their work promptly after ratification of the treaty. This type of inspection system was more difficult and complex, Stassen said, and for this reason the work on the control system could progress better after the treaty went into force.
7. Other measures of a disarmament agreement. Zorin remarked that the nuclear testing proposals had been introduced as one of a series of provisions which would form an agreement on disarmament; what other measures would the USDel think should be in this agreement? Stassen replied that there should be provisions that (a) in the first year the US and USSR would reduce their force levels to 2.5 million with further reductions to 2.1 and 1.7 million being contemplated; (b) there would be some for later under the condition stated in the subcommittee reduction in non-nuclear armaments in the first year with further reductions contemplated; (c) a beginning would be made [Page 713] by inspecting one of the alternative inspection zones in the August 2 proposal; (d) beginnings on reductions of military expenditures should be contemplated; (e) a group of experts should meet to devise means of controlling development of missiles; (f) efforts would continue to be made to reach a later comprehensive disarmament program. Zorin asked whether the question of renunciation of use of nuclear weapons would be included. Stassen said that in a modified form the renunciation of use of nuclear weapons might be included or else the question could be postponed as being a matter to be worked out later under a comprehensive agreement. Zorin then asked whether numbers of bases, reductions of troops in Germany and other countries would be included. Stassen said that these questions were not essential from the standpoint of the US and were not included. He recalled his earlier discussions on this subject. Where serious political problems were involved, Stassen noted, it would be difficult to reach agreement on a first step of disarmament.
8. Zorin concluded by thanking Stassen for his clarification of the 21 August proposals and said that he might have other questions later. It was possible also that the SovDel might ask some of these questions formally in the subcommittee. Zorin thought it would facilitate the work if the final positions of the West on various matters could be made known. Stassen said that he thought the SovDel now understood the substance of the major Western positions and that the views of the USSR on any of these matters, including views on the August 2 paper on inspection zones, would also facilitate the work of the subcommittee.
9. The meeting ended at 3:25 p.m.
10. Comment: Worthy of note there were no remarks about a European zone, no negative attacks, and a serious tone in the approach to the problems.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8–2257. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.↩
- Stassen’s statement on the suspension of nuclear tests to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, August 21 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.149), is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 845–848.↩