288. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
London, August 17,
1957—11 a.m.
1213. USDel Disarmament No. 516. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Subject: Bilateral with Soviet Delegation, Soviet Embassy, August 16, 4:00 pm.
[Page 708]- 1.
- At four hour bilateral meeting with Soviet direct discussion centered primarily on question of forces stationed in Europe, Germany and foreign bases (on Soviet initiative) and relationship fissionable material production cutoff to other nuclear provisions of first stage agreement (at US initiative). There was some discussion also of certain additional matters related to August 15 subcommittee meeting, question of other parties to any first step agreement, and future work procedures. Significantly Zorin made no reference to a European zone, and no adverse comment on the Arctic zone.
- 2.
- Zorin opened session by stating he had certain questions re Stassen’s statement at August 15 subcommittee mtg. Asked whether references to consequential reductions in foreign bases and forces overseas which would follow from 2.1 to 1.7 indicated these would be deferred beyond first stage, commenting that in May 31 talking paper US had rejected one third reduction Germany which Soviet interpreted as difficulty with numbers rather that timing in first stage. Stassen proceeded to draw out and probe Soviet position. He first explained difference was due to differing emphases, with empasis on consent other states in informal paper whereas in subcommittee discussion emphasis was on fact lower force levels in future would consequently lead to reductions in bases and forces abroad. Pointed out US has promptly and firmly rejected Soviet proposal for one-third reduction of forces in Germany and reductions in foreign bases. Said if Soviet has some other different or more limited proposals, USDel would give due consideration to any proposals from Soviets and provide answers. Emphasized 2.5 million force level was not deep cut for US but was significant. Zorin pressed for US statement acceptance of principle of reduction foreign bases as part of first step agreement and asked for counter proposals. Stassen declined any counter proposals. Stressed need for agreement on general reductions, consequence of which would be certain local reductions in later stages. Commented US policy on issues of force reductions and foreign bases has not changed since late May. Stassen pointed out Soviet proposals to use December 1956 as a base referred to a time of unusually high Soviet force levels in Hungary. Stassen added that US and USSR could discuss together or each could decide unilaterally on reductions of forces beyond borders and bases which would be consequence of lower force levels. Zorin stressed importance including such European reductions in first step agreement, reiterating theme principal tension is in Europe and it must be reduced by reduction forces in Germany. Urged US indicate percentage reduction figure as basis for negotiations. Stassen developed motivations behind present stationing overseas of US forces recalled Korean war and Berlin blockade, said US believes there is greater concentration in central Europe now of Soviet forces than of US forces, and indicated US recognizes dangers in central Europe and [Page 709] willing examine situation thoroughly. Zorin closed discussion of this general point with restatement importance reducing forces in Germany as matter of urgency.
- 3.
- Zorin inquired as to meaning of “small first step” in August 15 statement by Stassen in subcommittee. Stassen developed US position on essential elements in first stage agreement including cessation nuclear tests, reciprocal inspection (August 2nd), force level reductions, deposit of armaments, etc. Stressed importance of making beginning and said US re-examining proposals to see whether movement possible.
- 4.
- Lengthy discussion ensued on basic elements of nuclear provisions required in first step agreement. Zorin reiterated Soviet view on relationship of production cutoff to prohibition on use of nuclear weapons, destruction of stocks, etc., indicating latter could be written in as goal. Said timing on these steps may be different but essential to have link. Stassen elaborated reasons why Soviet position illogical and unrealistic by linking measure which was impossible to control (elimination of nuclear weapons) with other measure of cutoff of future production which could be controlled. Asked Zorin whether this was intentional Soviet block to first step agreement. Restated US position on timing nuclear provisions whereby cessation of tests would be first step. Second step would be formula on use nuclear weapons and third would be cutoff fissionable materials production for weapons. Stated Soviet Union needs to reconsider their position in light vital importance preventing spread nuclear weapons. Said Soviet position on this had not changed since March. A change was required to meet the US change on tests in May. Stassen said US recognized Soviets could not accept premature cutoff date. Asked what timing the Soviet would propose. Concluded this discussion on note that present negotiations highly important since France and other countries not discussing subject of nuclear tests idly and spread of nuclear weapons would be uncontrollable problem in future. Said that if either side believes agreement impossible should say so, otherwise serious negotiations should be pressed. US Government took a positive view toward agreement. Zorin replied that agreement was possible if West would show some movement on these issues.
- 5.
- In course of meeting Stassen urged Soviets to put forward new and constructive proposals on cutoff in nuclear production and to give positive response to August 2 Western proposals on inspection zones. Indicated US would probably be able to introduce certain new positions in subcommittee end of next week.
- 6.
- Stassen queried Soviets as to their views on association states other than Five Powers with first step agreement. Zorin side-stepped question by replying that if Five Powers, or even US and USSR alone, agreed on first step disarmament arrangement, other states would [Page 710] follow this lead not through compulsion but through leadership. Commented in this connection that if Western Four sought full agreement with other Western powers and then sought to pressure Soviets to go along with them, this would not lead to agreement.
- 7.
- At conclusion of meeting Zorin suggested that next informal meeting should consider concrete proposals, Stassen said, concrete proposals by either side, to which Zorin agreed.
- 8.
- Full memorandum reporting discussion will be pouched.2
Barbour