280. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer1
My Dear Mr. Chancellor: I dictate this on the plane as I return from London. I went there having very much in mind our talks at Washington and the confidence you reposed in our purpose to conduct the disarmament talks in such a manner as would not prejudice the Federal Republic and tend either to perpetuate the partition of Germany or to demilitarize and neutralize the German nation which I am confident is destined to play a great role in the defense, and the peaceful spread, of freedom in the world.
I found in London a situation of some confusion, not altogether surprising in view of the complexity of the problem and the many nations involved.
It might perhaps have been better, as you indicated, if no partial European zone were to be suggested in the first stage. However, the Subcommittee and NATO had gone so far along this path that it was not practical to have retraced our steps and indeed it would not have been in the interest of the cause which the free nations espouse in common if at this point we had seemed to become totally negative to the idea of a European zone smaller than the whole of Europe.
However, we did, I think, take adequate steps to protect against the dangers inherent in such a limited concept.
First of all, the limited concept will not be considered at all unless the Soviets first reject the all-European concept. Also they must have accepted either the US–Canada–USSR zone or the Northern (Arctic) zone.
A further pre-condition is that they must agree that any limited European zone must include a significant part of Soviet territory as well as the countries of Eastern Europe.
We furthermore stipulated, as you and I agreed, that ground inspection must cover all of any given inspection area so that there will be no danger of a strip of ground inspection running through the center of Europe and tending to consolidate the partition of Germany and also tending to demilitarize the inspected strip. I made this even clearer in my official presentation of the Four Power paper when I said: [Page 693]
“It is assumed that the areas which I have described would have both air and ground inspection and that the areas open to aerial inspection shall all of them be open also to ground inspection. …2 The normal and usual condition would be coincidence between land and air inspection areas. The reference to ground inspection areas not being less than the areas of aerial inspection is designed to indicate the uniformity of ground inspection throughout substantial areas and not a concentration in one particular zone which might carry with it political implications.”3
It is of course provided that the mobility of the ground inspection would require in all cases the concurrence of the country directly concerned.
Also I obtained the express agreement of the other three Western Powers at London that if the conditions precedent to consideration of a limited European zone are met by the Soviet Union, the situation would at that point be further considered by NATO before any automatic presentation of the 5–35–40 zone.
I am highly skeptical that the Soviets will at any early date meet the conditions prerequisite to the study of a limited European zone.
There are, I know, some Western Powers which would like to put forward quickly the limited European zone, but I believe that that situation is now under control of the North Atlantic Council.
I hope that the Western Powers can complete the presentation of their whole disarmament position within the next two weeks or thereabouts and that then there may be a recess. However, I cannot forecast this schedule with assurance.
I know that it must be awkward to have these problems which so deeply affect Germany pending at a time of German general elections. I believe, however, that no further matters peculiarly affecting Germany are apt to come up between now and mid-September.
With much appreciation of your prompt cooperation, I am
Faithfully yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8–457. Personal and Confidential. A covering letter from Dulles to Ambassador Bruce, August 4, requested Bruce to read and deliver the letter to Adenauer, unless he had serious reservations about its contents. (Ibid.)↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- The full text of Dulles’ statement to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.143), is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 839–845.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩