Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, July 18, 1957—7 p.m.

203. I had long talks this morning, first with Blankenhorn, later with Chancellor. Chancellor is quite exercised over what he regards as an unnecessary and unskillful approach suggested in NAC document 2 (United States Disarmament No. 409² of which we have no copy Bonn) now before NAC for consideration. His views fully stated in following aide-mémoire given me today.

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I.

The German Federal Government has no apprehensions in respect of the principle of an aerial inspection in Europe as part of a first phase of disarmament. Nevertheless, the Federal Government is of the opinion that such an inspection cannot achieve its objective, namely, to offer security against surprise attacks, unless a broad belt of Soviet territory is covered by it. If an inspection zone between the 5th degree western longitude and the 60th degree eastern longitude should not be obtainable, the space contained between the 5th degree eastern longitude and the 35th degree eastern longitude should be the absolute minimum. This ought to be the extreme offer which might be conceded by the West for a European Zone.

For some weeks now there has been talk of linking up measures of aerial inspection with a ground control. This combination has first been submitted as a request to the NATO Council by the standing group.³ This combination can also be found in the proposals of the Four Western delegations submitted to the NATO Council for consideration on 16 July and to which the member countries of NATO were to have defined their attitude by 22 July. This plan contemplates fixed control posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways and important airfields, as well as ground teams “having an adequate and agreed degree of mobility”. It is added that those mobile control teams “will be established by agreement anywhere in the territories of the states concerned, and without regard to limits of zones of aerial inspection”.

The Federal Government has the following apprehensions in respect of the institution, within the framework of a “first step”, of mobile ground controls of the kind proposed:

1) Such a system is extremely complicated. Preparations for its implementation will require a great deal of time, probably years.

2) It is most improbable that the Soviets will be prepared to recognize such a mobile ground inspection for the entire area of the aerial inspection zone. Will they not avail themselves of the possibility, suggested in the plan, to request a zone of mobile ground control which is substantially smaller than the aerial inspection zone and which would be confined approximately to the German Federal Republic, the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia? We very much fear that the Soviets will do so. This would involve the danger that the territories named and in particular also the German Federal Republic would be subjected to a statute which would come very close to neutralization. It would, on the other hand, be very welcome to the Soviets if in this way they obtained internationally recognized inspection and control rights also in the countries of the Eastern bloc, especially in Poland.

3) A mobile ground control could scarcely be dissociated from existing frontiers and lines of demarcation (iron curtain). In order to be able to move and to carry out the necessary investigations, the inspection teams will need the permission of the appropriate authorities of the territories concerned. It would probably be very difficult in connection with such a ground control to find legal forms of including the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, which would not amount to a recognition of the regime established there.

II.

Following the discussions that took place in Washington in May 1957, the German Federal Government has proceeded on the assumption that the conduct of negotiations on the United States side aimed at initially proposing in London a zone of inspection confined to Arctic territories, and that negotiations concerning a European zone of aerial inspection were to follow only in the second place, viz., if the Soviets should oppose the first proposal. The German Federal Government has not been informed of any change in this plan of negotiations.

The policy of the Federal Government has been based on the above assumptions since May of this year. All the public statements made have explicitly or implicitly proceeded from that assumption. We would get into a difficult position if negotiation tactics were now suddenly changed and if as early as the initial stage all the negotiation proposals were submitted simultaneously for the Soviets to choose from.

From the point of view of negotiation tactics it seems to us to be very disadvantageous to put the proposals on the table all at once and thus to renounce the possibility in the course of negotiations to make any concessions that are not yet known beforehand and are therefore depreciated to a certain extent. With this in view it would seem to us to be preferable to proceed step by step, to negotiate on every proposal thoroughly and not to make the proposals that are acceptable only in the last resort until all the other possibilities have been exhausted. This applies particularly to the question of the extension of the European aerial inspection zone to the West and to the East.

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It would in my opinion be mistake to view Chancellor’s objections lightly. He feels strongly about them and is fully supported by his advisors. He would press them even more vigorously if he did not hesitate to provoke what might develop into a public division between himself and United States Government. He may do so anyhow through his NATO representatives.

He wishes London Disarmament Conference could soon be recessed to give time for Western governments to reflect on developments to date and especially future tactics. Thinks good excuse for this would be desirability delegates consulting closely with home governments before preparing UN report. I reminded him of his request to Secretary at Bonn NATO meeting that talks continue during German electoral campaign.⁴ He rejoined that there was distinction between his request they not be “broken off” and an uninterrupted continuance.

Bruce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7–1857. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO and London.
2. Telegram 417 (USDEL Disarmament 409) from London, July 16, enumerated the approved Western four-power proposals on inspection zones and missiles being sent to NATO. (Ibid., 330.13/7–1657)
3. The Standing Group, the executive agency of NATO consisting of representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, submitted a memorandum to the Secretary General of NATO, July 10, which is quoted in full in Polto 105 from Paris, July 11. (Ibid., 330.13/7–1157)
4. Regarding the NAC Ministerial Meeting in Bonn, May 2–4, see vol. IV, p. 167.