258. Memorandum for the File, by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)1
MEETING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
PRESENT
- Dulles, Murphy, Bowie, Farley, and Smith
- Cutler, Lay
- Wilson, Radford, and Loper
- Strauss, Starbird
The Military Point of View
- 1.
- It is important now to develop the technique of making a very large clean bomb by a test which will involve no greater an explosion than we have heretofore used in tests. Later the decision can be made how many … bombs to stockpile.
- 2.
- The military need for a … bomb relates to:
[Page 657]
- (a)
- hard targets in border areas between friendly and hostile territory;
- (b)
- the greatly increased projected cost of carrying vehicles;
- (c)
- the weight limits of … pounds will probably be diminished in these new very expensive carrying vehicles;
- (d)
- concern over retaining U.S. deterrent capability under a limited defense budget and with diminished military personnel in view of USSR technical understanding of the nuclear art.
The AEC Point of View
- 1.
- To develop a stockpile of … bombs would probably set back the current program to develop small clean bombs by one year.
- 2.
- To test the feasibility of a … bomb, it is necessary to use an explosion something in the range of … , no larger than we have already tested.
- 3.
- The making of just one such test to ascertain and establish the principle and technique would not postpone the … bomb program; it would be the subsequent stockpiling that would effect such postponement.
State Point of View
- 1.
- Why is it important to make such a test in 1958 when no decision has yet been made whether or not to stockpile … bombs?
- 2.
- Development for stockpiling of … bombs would postpone the … bomb program (which is a desirable program to go forward with despite the Chiefs’ willingness to risk its postponement).
- 3.
- Publicity as to a … bomb program would reverse the world’s understanding gained from the President’s statements with either very unfortunate repercussions to his prestige and people’s belief that he knows what he is saying. Such publicity could hardly be avoided. Questions might be put to the President which he would be compelled to answer.
There is no real difference between deterrence and effectiveness (see page two of the July 3 draft).2 The criterion is the judgment of the Russians as to what we have as an effective weapon which is the true deterrent.
At the conclusion in response to the Secretary of State’s question whether the urgency to test the very large clean bomb technique was so great as to do it at this time, Strauss pointed out that such a test could be made in the 1958 series using a number of … less than that before used and trying to keep away from using … terms. Such a test, Strauss said, would establish the principle and technique but the test vehicle might not stay within the … pound carrying vehicle [Page 658] limitation. The single test would not cut down or postpone the … bomb program. It would be necessary to use a configuration as big as … in order to establish the principle.
Quarles suggested that the important decision now to make was to include one test for next year, well within the prior limits of explosiveness, to establish the principle and technique of making a large clean bomb.
The Secretary of State requested the Chairman, AEC, to draft a paper which would set forth what might be done by the AEC in making such a test in 1958 that would not interfere with other important programs or compromise the position already taken by the President.3
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, Chronological. Top Secret.↩
- Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.↩
- Strauss’ paper on this subject has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but the recommendations therein were incorporated in a draft prepared by the Department of Defense, which served as a first draft for the Report to the President. See Document 263.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩